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Abstract
Agents having to take a collective decision are often motivated by individual goals. In
such scenarios, two key aspects need to be addressed. The first is defining how to select
a winning alternative from the expressions of the agents. The second is making sure that
agents will not manipulate the outcome. Agents should also be able to state their goals in
a way that is expressive, yet not too burdensome. This dissertation studies the aggrega-
tion and the strategic component of multi-agent collective decisions where the agents use
a compactly represented language. The languages we study are all related to logic: from
propositional logic, to generalized CP-nets and linear temporal logic (LTL).
Our main contribution is the introduction of the framework of goal-based voting, where
agents submit individual goals expressed as formulas of propositional logic. Classical ag-
gregation functions from voting, judgment aggregation, and belief merging are adapted to
this setting and studied axiomatically and computationally. Desirable axiomatic properties
known in the literature of social choice theory are generalized to this new type of proposi-
tional input, as well as the standard complexity problems aimed at determining the result.
Another important contribution is the study of the aggregation of generalized CP-nets
coming from multiple agents, i.e., CP-nets where the precondition of the preference state-
ment is a propositional formula. We use different aggregators to obtain a collective ordering
of the possible outcomes. Thanks to this thesis, two lines of research are thus bridged: the
one on the aggregation of complete CP-nets, and the one on the generalization of CP-nets to
incomplete preconditions. We also contribute to the study of strategic behavior in both col-
lective decision-making and game-theoretic settings. The framework of goal-based voting
is studied again under the assumption that agents can now decide to submit an untruth-
ful goal if by doing so they can get a better outcome. The focus is on three majoritarian
voting rules which are found to be manipulable. Therefore, we study restrictions on both
the language of the goals and on the strategies allowed to the agents to discover islands of
strategy-proofness.
We also present a game-theoretic extension of a recent model of opinion diffusion over
networks of influence. In the influence games defined here, agents hold goals expressed as
formulas of LTL and they can choose whether to use their influence power to make sure
that their goal is satisfied. Classical solution concepts such as weak dominance and winning
strategy are studied for influence games, in relation to the structure of the network and the
goals of the agents. Finally, we introduce a novel class of concurrent game structures (CGS)
in which agents can have shared control over a set of propositional variables. Such struc-
tures are used for the interpretation of formulas of alternating-time temporal logic, thanks
to which we can express the existence of a winning strategy for an agent in a repeated game
(as, for instance, the influence games mentioned above). The main result shows by means
of a clever construction that a CGS with shared control can be represented as a CGS with
exclusive control.
In conclusion, this thesis provides a valuable contribution to the field of collective deci-
sion-making by introducing a novel framework of voting based on individual propositional
goals, it studies for the first time the aggregation of generalized CP-nets, it extends a frame-
work of opinion diffusion by modelling rational agents who use their influence power as
they see fit, and it provides a reduction of shared to exclusive control in CGS for the inter-
pretation of logics of strategic reasoning. By using different logical languages, agents can
thus express their goals and preferences over the decision to be taken, and desirable proper-
ties of the decision process can be ensured.

vRésumé
Des agents devant prendre une décision collective sont souvent motivés par des buts
individuels. Dans ces situations, deux aspects clés doivent être abordés : sélectionner une
alternative gagnante à partir des voix des agents et s’assurer que les agents ne manipulent
pas le résultat. Cette thèse étudie l’agrégation et la dimension stratégique des décisions col-
lectives lorsque les agents utilisent un langage représenté de manière compacte. Nous étu-
dions des langages de type logique : de la logique propositionnelle aux CP-nets généralisés,
en passant par la logique temporelle linéaire (LTL).
Notre principale contribution est l’introduction d’un cadre de vote sur les buts, dans
lequel les agents soumettent des buts individuels exprimés comme des formules de la logique
propositionnelle. Les fonctions d’agrégation classiques issues du vote, de l’agrégation de
jugements et de la fusion de croyances sont adaptées et étudiées de manière axiomatique
et computationnelle. Les propriétés axiomatiques connues dans la littérature sur la théorie
du choix social sont généralisées à ce nouveau type d’entrée, ainsi que les problèmes de
complexité visant à déterminer le résultat du vote.
Une autre contribution importante est l’étude de l’agrégation des CP-nets généralisés,
c’est-à-dire des CP-nets où la précondition de l’énoncé de préférence est une formule propo-
sitionnelle. Nous utilisons différents agrégateurs pour obtenir un classement collectif des
résultats possibles. Grâce à cette thèse, deux axes de recherche sont ainsi reliés : l’agrégation
des CP-nets classiques et la généralisation des CP-nets à des préconditions incomplètes.
Nous contribuons également à l’étude du comportement stratégique dans des contextes
de prise de décision collective et de théorie des jeux. Le cadre du vote basé sur les buts est de
nouveau étudié sous l’hypothèse que les agents peuvent décider de mentir sur leur but s’ils
obtiennent ainsi un meilleur résultat. L’accent est mis sur trois règles de vote majoritaires
qui se révèlent manipulables. Par conséquent, nous étudions des restrictions à la fois sur le
langage des buts et sur les stratégies des agents en vue d’obtenir des résultats de votes non
manipulables.
Nous présentons par ailleurs une extension stratégique d’un modèle récent de diffusion
d’opinion sur des réseaux d’influence. Dans les jeux d’influence définis ici, les agents ont
comme but des formules en LTL et ils peuvent choisir d’utiliser leur pouvoir d’influence
pour s’assurer que leur but est atteint. Des solutions classiques telles que la stratégie gag-
nante sont étudiées pour les jeux d’influence, en relation avec la structure du réseau et les
buts des agents.
Enfin, nous introduisons une nouvelle classe de concurrent game structures (CGS) dans
laquelle les agents peuvent avoir un contrôle partagé sur un ensemble de variables propo-
sitionnelles. De telles structures sont utilisées pour interpréter des formules de logique
temporelle en temps alternés (ATL), grâce auxquelles on peut exprimer l’existence d’une
stratégie gagnante pour un agent dans un jeu itéré (comme les jeux d’influence mention-
nés ci-dessus). Le résultat principal montre qu’un CGS avec contrôle partagé peut être
représenté comme un CGS avec contrôle exclusif.
En conclusion, cette thèse contribue au domaine de la prise de décision collective en
introduisant un nouveau cadre de vote basé sur des buts propositionnels. Elle présente
une étude de l’agrégation des CP-nets généralisés et une extension d’un cadre de diffusion
d’opinion avec des agents rationnels qui utilisent leur pouvoir d’influence. Une réduction
du contrôle partagé à un contrôle exclusif dans les CGS pour l’interprétation des logiques du
raisonnement stratégique est également proposée. Par le biais de langages logiques divers,
les agents peuvent ainsi exprimer buts et préférences sur la décision à prendre, et les pro-
priétés souhaitées pour le processus de décision peuvent en être garanties.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
On a sunny morning, Lucy is having a coffee with her colleagues Bob and Ann at the Depart-
ment of Computer Science. “Did you check your e-mails?” asks Bob. “Our bid for hosting
the next edition of the Important Conference in Artificial Intelligence has been accepted!”
They are all thrilled about the perspective of holding such a prestigious event in their city.
“That is great news!” says Lucy. “Do you think we should host it in the historical buildings
in the center, or here in the new campus?”
“I live in between the center and here”, replies Ann. “I’m indifferent about that. But I
would like to avoid a poster session”.
“If we have a poster session it’s better to use the premises in the center” comments Bob,
finishing his espresso. “We did it years ago and it worked quite smoothly!”
Lucy disagrees with Ann on the posters: she always learns a lot during these sessions
by asking questions one-on-one to the researchers. She will try later to change Ann’s mind.
After all, Ann recognizes that Lucy has more experience in organizing conferences and she
usually ends up listening to her on the topic.
“We could also split our tasks” suggests Bob, returning their cups to the counter. “For
instance, I could build the website, Lucy could think about location, and Ann could book the
gala dinner. But we all decide about the scientific issues together, of course”.
While the three are waiting for the elevator to go back to their offices, Ann offers a sheet
of paper to Lucy. “I was writing the syllabus for our course yesterday. In general, I prefer
to listen to students’ presentations rather than correcting weekly assignments, but if we are
having a final oral exam it is better the other way around”.
“Yes, I agree. And I also prefer the assignments to the presentations if we use the second
textbook in the list” says Lucy, looking at the syllabus. “It already has some exercises we
could use, and solutions are not available online”.
The door of the elevator closes behind the researchers.
In the corridor, now empty, the artificial lights slowly start to dim, until they switch off
completely.
A great variety of situations occurring every day resemble the ones in the short
story above: a group of agents (i.e., Lucy, Bob, and Ann — but also the sensors
regulating the lights in the corridor) hold complex goals and preferences, sometimes
conflicting with one another, and they want to find a collective decision.
In this thesis, we will bring together ideas and techniques coming from multiple
areas of computer science — ranging from multi-agent systems, logic, game theory
and computational social choice — to formalize and propose solutions for a set of
related problems in collective decision-making with rational agents.
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Background and Context
This section wants to give a bird eye’s view on the main areas of computer science to
which this thesis is related. A comprehensive introduction to each one of these areas
(as well as their intersections) would require multiple volumes, and is beyond the
scope of this section. For this reason we point to some key references in the literature,
often in the form of textbooks. Moreover, throughout the thesis we will give more
exhaustive and detailed presentations of the related work when introducing each
one of the problems we study.
The story in our incipit could be modeled in computer science as a multi-agent
system, an area broadly defined as the study of the interactions of multiple agents
(e.g., the three researchers) who can act autonomously towards the satisfaction of
some goal or objective (see Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008, Wooldridge, 2009 and
Weiss, 2013 for an introduction). In our case, in particular, the goals of the agents are
individual. An important aspect of multi-agent systems is thus how to model intel-
ligent agents, and many different approaches have been proposed in the literature
(Wooldridge, 2013). We can mention, for instance, one of the first popular models
originating from the philosophical analysis of intentions by Bratman (1987), where
agents are modeled as holding beliefs, desires, and intentions — i.e., the BDI ar-
chitectures (Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Rao and Georgeff, 1991, 1995; Dastani and
van der Torre, 2002). In our story, however, the focus is not on how the agents derive
their goals from beliefs and desires (see, e.g., Lorini, 2017), but rather on how they
can obtain a collective decision based on (a suitable representation of) their goals
and preferences.
In this respect, the field of qualitative decision theory comes into play in multi-agent
systems for modeling agents in decision-making situations. While in classical deci-
sion theory an agent is modeled as having a probability distribution over possible
outcomes (depending on the actions they take) which gives them a numerical utility
that they then try to maximize, in qualitative decision theory agents use qualitative
methods to express which outcomes they prefer and which ones they consider more
probable (Wellman and Doyle, 1991; Boutilier, 1994; Brafman and Tennenholtz, 1996;
Dubois et al., 2001). Qualitative descriptions of preferences over outcomes are usu-
ally easier to handle and to express for the agents than quantitative ones.
An important tool that has been used in multi-agent systems to formally repre-
sent agents and their interactions has been that of logic (see Van Dalen, 2004 for an
introduction to propositional and predicate logic, and Blackburn et al., 2006 for an
introduction to modal logic). We mentioned above some logics for BDI agents, but
numerous other logical formalisms have been defined for multi-agent systems (see,
e.g., Goranko and Jamroga, 2004 and Herzig, 2015 for some comparisons between
logics for multi-agent systems and different semantics). The use of logic allows to
rigorously represent a system, or some of its components (e.g., the agents’ goals and
preferences) in a formal language, and to reason about it.1 In particular, a compact
representation of goals and preferences given by a logical language is also impor-
tant for research in artificial intelligence (Russell and Norvig, 2016), whose aim is
1Logic has proven useful for modeling and reasoning in a variety of other fields in computer science,
an example being that of planning, where an agent in a certain initial state has to find a series of basic
actions allowing them to attain a goal state (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971; Kautz and Selman, 1992; Bylander,
1994; Kautz and Selman, 1996; Kautz et al., 1996). We can describe the collective choice that our agents
will take as an “abstract plan”, but we won’t focus on the actions needed for its actual realization (e.g.,
the phone call that the researchers need to make in order to book the gala dinner in the restaurant of
their choice).
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to create artificial agents displaying “intelligent” behavior, including for the areas of
individual and collective decision-making.
In the scenario described in our initial example the goals of the agents are con-
flicting, and since they all want to achieve their goal regardless of the satisfaction of
those of the others, their mutual interactions become adversarial. The field of game
theory (see the books by Gibbons, 1992 and Leyton-Brown and Shoham, 2008 for ref-
erence) provides a mathematical model to study agents acting strategically towards
the maximization of their (expected) individual utilities. If we are given the descrip-
tion of a game, in the form of the actions available to the agents and the payoffs they
get for any possible combination of actions, and if we assume that the agents are
rational, meaning that they want to maximize their payoff, the prediction of which
strategies the agents will play is given by studying different solution concepts: for
instance, Lucy has a winning strategy if no matter what the other agents do, she
always knows when to speak (and when to stay silent) to change Ann’s opinion.
Finally, computational social choice (see the recently published handbook by
Brandt et al., 2016) collects multiple formal models to study the aggregation of opin-
ions and preferences of a group of agents, as the ones expressed by Lucy, Ann, and
Bob on the organization of the conference or the syllabus for the course.2 This field
of computer science studies various computational problems for voting rules, such
as calculating the winner or manipulating the outcome (Hemaspaandra et al., 2005;
Conitzer et al., 2007; Conitzer and Walsh, 2016), and it originates from the branch
of economics known as social choice theory. Within social choice theory, seminal
results in voting include those by Arrow (1951), Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite
(1975), who showed that certain sets of desirable properties cannot be satisfied all
together by any voting rule, as well as that of May (1952), who proved that the ma-
jority rule can be characterized by a set of axioms. In computational social choice, the
field of judgment aggregation is concerned in particular with aggregating the yes/no
opinions of multiple agents over binary issues (see the book by Grossi and Pigozzi,
2014 and the recent chapter by Endriss, 2016). Logic is used in judgment aggregation
as a tool to model the questions that the agents have to approve or reject, as well as
potential integrity constraints expressing some external law or physical constraint.
We have thus seen which areas of computer science can give us models and tools
to study the situations as the one in the story at the beginning of this thesis. In
Section 1.2 we will state our research questions and in Section 1.3 we will see how
we tackle them by providing a chapter-by-chapter overview of this thesis.
1.2 Research Questions
We want to provide some answers to two research questions in collective decision-
making, which are at the core of the interactions between the agents in our initial
story. We can formulate them as follows:
1. How can we design aggregation procedures to help a group of agents having
compactly expressed goals and preferences make a collective choice?
2. How can we model agents with conflicting goals who try to get a better out-
come for themselves by acting strategically?
2The recent paper by Conitzer (2019) gives an account on how ideas from game theory, computa-
tional social choice and artificial intelligence can be used for the problem discussed above of designing
agents with identities and beliefs.
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For the first question we need to define some functions that can take as input
goals and preferences as the ones stated by the researchers in our story to obtain
a collective decision. In particular, we need to choose suitable languages for the
agents to express their goals and preferences, which may be more complex than just
accepting or rejecting an issue. We also want to know which properties are satisfied
by the functions we define, and how difficult it is to compute their outcomes.
For the second question we need to consider two kinds of strategic behavior. On
the one hand, an agent may realize that by submitting an untruthful goal she would
get a better result for herself (possibly at the expenses of some other agent). On the
other hand, the agents may exploit the fact that they are part of a common network,
as they may know one another or be influenced by each other for the opinions they
hold, to obtain their goals. We need to identify under which conditions such situa-
tions of strategic behavior may occur and which steps could be taken to limit them.3
1.3 Thesis Overview
The thesis is structured into two parts to address the two research questions we
delineated in Section 1.2. The first part concerns the aggregation of compactly rep-
resented goals and preferences, while the second part studies the strategic behavior
of agents in different multi-agent scenarios.
Chapter 2 introduces two known formal languages to express goals and prefer-
ences: propositional logic and conditional preference networks (CP-nets). We give
the basic definitions of propositional logic (Section 2.1) and of CP-nets (Section 2.3),
and we present a related literature review on goals in propositional logic and ex-
tensions of CP-nets (Sections 2.2 and 2.4, respectively). Finally, we compare the two
languages in Section 2.5.
In Chapter 3 we define the decision-making framework of goal-based voting, where
agents express goals as propositional formulas over binary issues. We introduce
different voting rules inspired from the fields of voting, judgment aggregation and
belief merging in Section 3.1.2. In particular we define three novel adaptations of
issue-wise majority and prove that the three rules are different in Proposition 3.1. In
Section 3.2 we define a variety of axioms, i.e., desirable properties that we would
like a rule to satisfy, and we prove numerous results on how the axioms relate to one
another and whether our proposed rules satisfy them. In line with similar results in
the literature, we prove in Theorem 3.1 that some combinations of axioms are mu-
tually inconsistent (i.e., resoluteness, anonymity and duality). Our main result is
Theorem 3.3 where we provide a characterization of TrueMaj, one of our majorities.
In Section 3.3 we study the computational complexity of the problem of comput-
ing the outcome of our rules. Goal-based voting rules turn out to be in general much
harder to compute than their voting counterparts, especially the three generaliza-
tions of the majority rule which are all hard for the Probabilistic Polynomial Time
class (Theorems 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10). We find however some polynomial results by re-
stricting the language of goals to conjunctions (Theorem 3.11) and to disjunctions
(Theorem 3.12). In Section 3.4 we compare the framework of goal-based voting with
the close frameworks of belief merging and judgment aggregation (with or without
3Some arguments on why manipulation of voting rules is to be considered a negative phenomenon
were given by Conitzer and Walsh (2016). For instance, it would be unfair towards agents who have
less information or cognitive capacities to think about a possible manipulation, and in general it could
be considered a waste of computational resources.
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abstentions). In particular, we compare the frameworks with respect to the axioms,
or postulates in belief merging, that the rules satisfy.
In Chapter 4 we study the problem of aggregating individual preferences ex-
pressed as generalized CP-nets, a language with which agents can state their prefer-
ence over the values for some variable given the same (partially specified) state of
the world. We adapt four semantics known in the literature on the aggregation of
classical CP-nets (Definition 4.3) and we study the computational complexity of dif-
ferent dominance problems for these semantics. In particular, we study the Pareto
semantics (Section 4.2.1) which can be seen as a unanimous aggregation procedure,
the majority semantics (Section 4.2.2) which corresponds to an absolute majority ag-
gregator, the max semantics (Section 4.2.3) which is a majority with respect to the
agents who did not abstain, and the rank semantics (Section 4.2.4) which is remi-
niscent of the Borda rule in voting. We find that for the most part the complexity
problems do not become harder when switching from a single agent to multiple
agents, with the sole exception of checking that an outcome is non-dominated, going
from polynomial to PSPACE-complete for Pareto and maj semantics (Theorems 4.1
and 4.5, respectively) and to PSPACE membership for max semantics (Theorem 4.9),
as well as existence of a non-dominated outcome for Pareto semantics, going from
NP-complete to PSPACE-complete (Theorem 4.2).
Chapter 5 introduces the second part of this thesis, focused on agents behaving
strategically. We first recall Boolean games and some classical definitions of solution
concepts in game theory. In Section 5.1 we give the basic definitions of known logics
for modelling time and strategic reasoning, i.e., ATL and LTL, which we intepret over
the Concurrent Game Structures (CGS) of Definition 5.1. In Section 5.2 we present
the related work at the intersection of logic, game theory and networks of agents.
In Chapter 6 we study the setting of goal-based voting introduced in Chapter 3
under the assumption that now agents can manipulate the outcome by submitting
untruthful goals. In Section 6.1 we add some definitions to model the manipulation
problem, distinguishing in particular three types of agents (optimists, pessimists,
and expected utility maximizers) and three types of manipulation strategies (unre-
stricted, erosion, and dilatation).
In Section 6.2 we establish some general manipulation results for the three issue-
wise majority rules defined in Section 3.1.2: Theorem 6.1 proves that the three ma-
joritarian rules are manipulable under all the types of manipulation we study. This
negative result leads us to try to refine the bounds of manipulability by focussing
on subclasses of goals: conjunctions (Section 6.2.1), disjunctions (Section 6.2.2) and
exclusive disjunctions (Section 6.2.3). Theorem 6.7 gives us some conditions under
which our majority rules become indeed strategy-proof for conjunctive and disjunc-
tive goals. Finally, Section 6.3 studies the computational complexity of the manip-
ulation problem for the resolute majoritarian voting rules, which is found to be as
hard as computing their outcome.
In Chapter 7 we introduce influence games, a class of iterated games where agents
can control the spread of their opinions over a network. In Section 7.1 we present the
opinion diffusion dynamics and the strategic actions available to the agents (i.e., the
possibility to use or not their influence power). While agents can use any rule they
like to aggregate the opinons of their influencers, we focus on the unanimous aggre-
gation procedure of Definition 7.7. Agents hold goals expressed in a variant of LTL
and we focus in particular on consensus and influence types of goals. In Section 7.3
we present results of both game-theoretic and computational nature for influence
games. Propositions 7.1 and 7.2, as well as Example 7.5 give us an insight on which
types of solutions can be attained depending on the influence network and on the
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goals of the agents, while Section 7.3.2 tells us that finding Nash equilibria for influ-
ence games is in general computationally hard.
Chapter 8 introduces a new subclass of CGS where agents have shared control
over subsets of propositional variables, generalizing existing work on CGS with ex-
clusive control. In Section 8.1 we give the definitions of both types of CGS, and
in Section 8.2 we give some examples of iterated games that can be modeled by
these structures, such as iterated Boolean games with exclusive control, the influ-
ence games of Chapter 7 and aggregation games. Our main result is Theorem 8.1
in Section 8.3, showing how it is possible to reduce the model-checking problem of
ATL∗ formulas on CGS with shared control to model-checking (a translation of) ATL∗
formulas on CGS with exclusive control.
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. In Section 9.1 we summarize what we achieved in
the dissertation with respect to our research questions, and in Section 9.2 we provide
some perspectives for future work.
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The work presented in this thesis is based on the following publications:
• Chapter 3 is based on:
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of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 23rd
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Novaro, A., Grandi, U., Longin, D., and Lorini, E. (2018). From Individual
Goals to Collective Decisions (Extended Abstract). In Proceedings of the
17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS-2018).
• Chapter 4 is based on:
Haret, A., Novaro, A., and Grandi, U. (2018). Preference Aggregation with
Incomplete CP-nets. In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on
Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-2018).
• Chapter 6 is based on:
Novaro, A., Grandi, U., Longin, D., and Lorini, E. (2019). Strategic Majoritar-
ian Voting with Propositional Goals (Extended Abstract). In Proceedings
of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems (AAMAS-2019).
• Chapter 7 is based on:
Grandi, U., Lorini, E., Novaro, A., and Perrussel, L. (2017). Strategic Disclo-
sure of Opinions on a Social Network. In Proceedings of the 16th Interna-
tional Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-
2017).
• Chapter 8 is based on:
Belardinelli, F., Grandi, U., Herzig, A., Longin, D., Lorini, E., Novaro, A.,
and Perrussel, L. (2017). Relaxing Exclusive Control in Boolean Games.
In Proceedings of the 16th conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and
Knowledge (TARK-2017).

Part I
Aggregation
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Chapter 2
Compact Languages for Goals and
Preferences
The first part of this dissertation focuses on how propositional logic can be used to
compactly represent goals and preferences. In many real-world applications, in fact,
the space of alternatives from which a collective choice needs to be taken is combi-
natorial and it would be too burdensome for the agents to provide a full ranking of
all possible outcomes (Chevaleyre et al., 2008).
An example is that of a group of agents having to decide which values to at-
tribute to the features composing a complex object: think, for instance, to the three
researchers in the story at the incipit of this thesis who have to decide over the dif-
ferent “features” composing the conference (i.e., location, posters, gala dinner, and
so on), or a group of friends having to plan a common trip to a city with multiple
points of interest. Observe that already for just three binary features, if agents were
to rank all possible combinations of choices they would need to order eight poten-
tial outcomes. The challenge is then to find a language to represent the preferences
and goals of the agents over all the possible alternatives which is at the same time
compact and expressive (see also the survey by Lang and Xia, 2016).
In this chapter we present the basic definitions for propositional goals and CP-
nets, which will be useful for Chapter 3, where we will introduce a framework for
voting with propositional goals, and for Chapter 4, where we will aggregate prefer-
ences expressed as CP-nets (with a component in propositional logic).
2.1 Propositional Goals
In propositional logic we have a countable set of propositional variables PV = {p, q, . . . }
and formulas are built according to the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
where p ∈ PV. Namely, we have the negation of ϕ (¬ϕ), the conjunction of ϕ1 and
ϕ2 (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) and the disjunction of ϕ1 and ϕ2 (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2). We write the implication
ϕ1 → ϕ2 as a shorthand for ϕ2 ∨ ¬ϕ1; we write the biconditional ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 in place of
(ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2 → ϕ1); we write the exclusive disjunction ϕ1 ⊕ ϕ2 for ¬(ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2).
Moreover, we write > for p ∨ ¬p and ⊥ for p ∧ ¬p.
A literal Lp is a propositional variable p or its negation ¬p: we call it positive
in case Lp = p and negative if Lp = ¬p. An interpretation is a function v : I →
{0, 1} associating a binary value to each propositional variable, such that value 1 is
interpreted as ‘true’ and value 0 as ‘false’. An interpretation v makes formula ϕ true,
written v |= ϕ, according to the following conditions:
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v |= p iff v(p) = 1
v |= ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that v |= ϕ
v |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff v |= ϕ1 and v |= ϕ2
v |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff v |= ϕ1 or v |= ϕ2
The set of interpretations that make a certain formula ϕ true, i.e, the set of its
models, is represented by the set Mod(ϕ) = {v | v |= ϕ}. Two formulas ϕ and ψ are
equivalent, denoted by ϕ ≡ ψ, if and only if Mod(ϕ) = Mod(ψ).
A propositional goal is then a propositional formula expressed over variables de-
noting the issues at stake. For instance, if we have variable p for the statement “We
will visit the park”, variable s for “We will visit the museum” and variable r for “We
will visit the old lighthouse”, we can write formula ϕ = (p ∧ r) → s to express the
complex goal “If we visit the lighthouse and the park, then we are also going to visit
the museum”. The models of ϕ are then Mod(ϕ) = {(111), (011), (101), (001), (100),
(010), (000)}.
We can also define restrictions on the language of goals. In particular, we define
the languages L? as follows:
ϕ := p | ¬p | ϕ1 ? ϕ2
where ? ∈ {∧,∨,⊕}. We call L∧ the language of conjunctions (or cubes), where each
formula is a conjunction of literals; L∨ the language of disjunctions (or clauses), where
each formula is a disjunction of literals; and L⊕ the language of exclusive disjunctions,
where each formula is an exclusive disjunction of literals. Note that negation only
applies to propositional variables and not to complex formulas. Thus, we have that
formula ¬p ∧ q belongs to L∧, while formula ¬(p ∧ q) does not.
2.2 Related Work on Propositional Goals
Propositional goals have been proposed as a compact representation of dichotomous
preferences over combinatorial alternatives described by binary variables (e.g., think
of multiple referenda where voters are asked to either accept or reject a number of
issues). Lang (2004) has studied numerous representation languages for goals. The
simplest representation of preferences Rbasic is such that each agent expresses a goal
in propositional logic and has utility either 1 or 0 (i.e., dichotomous) depending on
whether her goal is satisfied or not.
In the same paper, Lang also proposes a representation for weighted goals, where
propositional formulas in a goal base have a numerical value attached representing
their weight.1 Uckelman et al. (2009) also studied weighted goals, where the utility
of an alternative is calculated as the sum of the weights of the formulas it satisfies.
They defined different languages (with various restrictions on the syntax of the goal
or on the range of the weights) to characterize classes of utility functions, to compare
languages with respect to succinctness, and to study the computational complexity
of finding the most preferred alternative given a certain utility function.
Finally, Lang also discussed prioritized goals, where propositional formulas in
the goal base are associated with a weak order (a priority relation). Brewka (2004)
proposed a Logical Preference Description (LPD) language to describe qualitatively
the preferences of the agents over possible outcomes given their individual ranked
knowledge base (which they use to represent prioritized goals in propositional logic).
1Observe that Rbasic can be seen as a special case of weighted goals where the goal base contains a
single goal, whose weight can be assumed to be 1.
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The literature on Boolean games (Harrenstein et al., 2001; Bonzon et al., 2006) also
studies situations where agents are endowed with propositional goals. More pre-
cisely, each agent i has a propositional goal γi over a set of variables Φ but they are
also each assigned a subset of variables Φi ⊆ Φ whose assignment they can exclu-
sively control. We will see Boolean games again in more detail in the second part of
this thesis (Chapter 5).
Two other important frameworks are strongly related to the idea of aggregating
the propositional goals of a group of agents. The first one is judgment aggregation
(List, 2012; Lang and Slavkovik, 2014; Endriss, 2016), in particular in its binary aggre-
gation model (Dokow and Holzman, 2010a; Grandi and Endriss, 2011), which can be
seen as a form of voting where agents express propositional goals having a single
model (i.e., their goals are complete conjunctions over all the issues at stake). The
generalization of judgment aggregation to abstentions (by Gärdenfors, 2006; Diet-
rich and List, 2008; Dokow and Holzman, 2010b, and more recently by Terzopoulou
et al., 2018) corresponds to agents having partial conjunctions of literals as goals (i.e.,
goals in the language L∧ described in Section 2.1). Recent work in judgment aggre-
gation has advanced some ideas to give agents more flexibility in expressing their
opinions. For instance, Miller (2008) and Benamara et al. (2010) work in the frame-
work of judgment aggregation where issues can be divided into premises and con-
clusions, and instead of asking all agents to respect some external integrity constraint
(e.g., modeling a law) they let them follow individual rules to express their judg-
ments. Endriss (2018) distinguishes between rationality and feasibility constraints,
where the former has to be respected by the agents (and it is the same for all of them)
while the latter has to be satisfied by the outcome of the aggregation process.
The second related framework is belief merging (Konieczny and Pérez, 2002), that
aims at aggregating the beliefs coming from multiple agents in order to get the be-
liefs of the group. Each agent holds a set of beliefs in the form of a belief base K of
propositional formulas. Belief bases are aggregated via functions called merging op-
erators, satisfying a set of properties called IC postulates, and the aggregation takes
into account the presence of integrity constraints. Dastani and van der Torre (2002)
also proposed an attempt at using logic-based belief merging for goals, assessed by
axiomatic properties from belief revision.
In Chapter 3 we will define a framework for the aggregation of propositional
goals based on voting, building on the Rbasic representation by Lang (2004) men-
tioned above. We will also specify in more details the relationship of our proposed
framework with both judgment aggregation and belief merging in Section 3.4.
2.3 CP-nets
The framework of CP-nets has been introduced to model situations where the pref-
erence over the value for some variable depends on the choice made on another
variable, everything else being equal (Boutilier et al., 2004). The classical example to
explain CP-nets takes place at a restaurant. Lucy wants to order a main course and
a beverage and let us assume that, for simplicity, the options for the main course
in this restaurant are just fish or steak, and for beverages only white or red wine.
Overall, Lucy prefers fish over steak. However, the preference over type of wine for
Lucy depends on what she is eating: if she orders fish she would like to drink white
wine rather than red, and vice-versa if she orders steak.
In order to model situations like the one above we need variables to express the
features or components on which a choice has to be made. In our example, we have a
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variable B for the beverages and a variable M for the main course. The domain D(X)
of a variable X contains all the possible values that the variable can assume. The do-
main of beverages, for instance, would be D(B) = {w, r} for white or red wine, and
the one for main courses would be D(M) = {s, f } for steak or fish. Agents express
their preferences through (conditional preference) statements2 of the form xy . . . : z1 . z2.
The left part xy . . . , which we call precondition, describes some state of the world or
outcome, and the right part z1 . z2 expresses the preference over the values of some
variable in the given outcome. Lucy, for instance, expresses three statements:
(ϕ0) f . s
(ϕ1) f : w . r
(ϕ2) s : r . w
whose meaning is precisely “Fish is always preferred to steak” (ϕ0),3 “If fish is
served, white wine is preferred to red” (ϕ1), and “If steak is served, red wine is
preferred to white” (ϕ2).
We have just seen in which sense for CP-nets the preference over the value for
some variable depends on which value we chose for another variable. Another im-
portant aspect to consider is that we can compare two different outcomes by us-
ing some conditional preference statement only ceteris paribus, i.e., everything else
being equal. For instance, suppose our restaurant decides to improve their menu
by adding a (short) list of desserts, which we model by a new variable D. The
desserts offered are chocolate cake or banana bread, and hence the domain of D
is D(D) = {c, b}. According to ϕ1, Lucy prefers a world fwc (where the menu is fish,
white wine, and chocolate cake) to a world frc (where the menu is fish, red wine,
and chocolate cake). However, we cannot say that Lucy prefers fwc to frb (where
the menu is fish, red wine, and banana bread), as the two outcomes differ on the
value of variable D. Hence, only a small number of comparisons are made between
outcomes when using conditional preference statements.
This gives us an explanation of the first part of the name ‘CP-nets’: CP is an
acronym which stands at the same time for conditional preferences, as the statements
expressed by the agents, and ceteris paribus, as the comparisons made between out-
comes. The second part of the name is short for networks, as it is possible to construct
a graph illustrating how variables depend on one another as we explain below.
The nodes in the dependency graph (or preference graph), are the variables of our
problem. For instance, in the first version of the menu of the restaurant we would
have one node for variable M and one for variable B. Then, each node X is annotated
with a conditional preference table CPT(X) containing a preference statement over val-
ues of X for each possible combination of values for the variables upon which X
depends. Figure 2.1 represents the CP-net of Lucy’s preferences in our example.
2.4 Related Work on CP-nets
The literature on CP-nets includes many extensions and variations of the basic frame-
work we presented above. We have, for instance, tradeoff-enhanched CP-nets (or TCP-
nets), which extend CP-nets by allowing the agent to say that in a particular state of
the world it is more important to get a better value for variable X rather than getting
2Alternatively called conditional preference rules (Goldsmith et al., 2008).
3In Chapter 4 this statement will rather be written as > : f . s for generalized CP-nets. We follow
here the presentation given by Boutilier et al. (2004) in the case of complete CP-nets.
2.5. Comparing Propositional Goals and CP-nets 15
M f . s
B
f : w . r
s : r . w
FIGURE 2.1: Lucy’s CP-net.
a better value for variable Y (Brafman and Domshlak, 2002; Brafman et al., 2006). In
conditional preference theories (CP-theories), an agent is allowed to state than in a given
state of the world (which does not need to be completely specified), some value x1
for variable X is preferred to value x2, regardless of which values are assigned to
the variables in some set W (Wilson, 2004). If agents are given a set of objects S1,
and they can express that they prefer to also get the bundle of goods S2 rather than
the bundle of goods S3, we are in the framework of conditional importance networks
(CI-nets) by Bouveret et al. (2009).
Agents may also be allowed to express incomplete preference statements. For
instance, Lucy may want to express only ϕ1 in our previous example. Depending
on the specific application, we may want to handle this lack of information about
preferences over full outcomes by sticking to the ceteris paribus semantics or by de-
parting from it, as done for instance in the totalitarian semantics studied by Ciaccia
(2007) for incomplete databases. In Chapter 4 we will work in the framework of an-
other type of incomplete CP-nets, i.e., generalized CP-nets (gCP-nets), where agents
are allowed to express conditional preference statements by using arbitrary propo-
sitional formulas in the precondition. Moreover, we will be working in the context
of multiple agents (mCP-nets), whose incomplete CP-nets have to be aggregated.
2.5 Comparing Propositional Goals and CP-nets
Propositional formulas allow us to compactly represent goals, and with CP-nets we
can compactly represent ceteris paribus preferences over outcomes. Additionally, in
gCP-nets agents can express any propositional formula as the precondition of their
preference statements. We could then wonder whether it is possible to construct a
propositional formula expressing the same preference ordering over outcomes in-
duced by an arbitrary CP-net, and vice-versa to construct a CP-net expressing the
same preference ordering induced by a propositional goal.
If we assume that the preferences induced by propositional formulas are dichoto-
mous, the answer is no: in fact, an agent holding a propositional goal divides the
outcomes into just two classes, with the models of her goal in one and the counter-
models in the other.4 The following example illustrates this point:
Example 2.1. Consider two binary variables A and B whose respective domains are
D(A) = {a, a} and D(B) = {b, b}. A propositional goal of the form a ∨ b induces an
ordering where ab is preferred to ab: however, this relation cannot be reproduced by
a CP-net as both variables A and B are changing their values in the two outcomes,
4In Section 6.1 we will briefly discuss how the preferences of agents having propositional goals
could be alternatively defined based on the Hamming distance. The focus of the thesis will however
be on a dicothomous interpretation of preferences induced by goals.
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thus contradicting the ceteris paribus assumption. On the other hand, a CP-net com-
posed by statements as a . a, a : b . b and a : b . b induces the non-dichotomous pref-
erence relation over outcomes where ab is strictly preferred to ab, which in turn is
strictly preferred to ab.
There are however examples in the literature of more general languages able to
express both propositional goals and CP-nets. In particular, Bienvenu et al. (2010)
proposed the “prototypical” preference logic PL whose formulas are of the formΨ =
α B β ‖ F where α and β are propositional formulas and F is a set of propositional
formulas. Intuitively, the meaning ofΨ is that an outcome satisfying α is preferred to
an outcome satisfying β provided that they agree on the interpretation of formulas
in F. Both CP-nets and propositional goals (as a special case of prioritized goals) are
then shown to be fragments of PL.
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Goal-based Voting
Social choice and voting have provided useful techniques for the design of ratio-
nal agents that need to act in situations of collective choice (Brandt et al., 2016). In
particular, judgment aggregation has been applied in various settings: from multi-
agent argumentation (Awad et al., 2017) to the collective annotation of linguistic
corpora (Qing et al., 2014). However, when considering collective decision-making
in practice, the rigidity of judgment aggregation in asking individuals to provide
complete judgments over issues can become an obstacle. Consider the following
example, inspired by the traveling group problem (Klamler and Pferschy, 2007):
Example 3.1. An automated travel planner is organizing a city trip for a group of
friends: Ann, Barbara, and Camille. They have to decide whether to visit the Light-
house, the Museum, and the Park. Ann wants to see all the points of interest, Barbara
prefers to have a walk in the Park, and Camille would like to visit a single place but
she does not care about which one. A judgment-based planner would require all
agents, including Camille, to specify a full valuation over all issues.
For instance, we could obtain the following situation:
Lighthouse Museum Park
Ann X X X
Barbara × × X
Camille × X ×
By taking a simple majority vote, the collective plan would be to visit both the Mu-
seum and the Park. This does not satisfy Camille: by being asked for a complete
judgment, she was unable to express her truthful goal to “visit a single place, no
matter which one” thus getting an outcome that she does not like.
In order to take care of situations such as the one presented in Example 3.1, we
present a framework for the aggregation of individual goals expressed in proposi-
tional logic. We define some voting rules that could be used to return a collective de-
cision, and we analyze what are the properties that they satisfy, giving an axiomatic
characterization for one of them. We study how hard it is from a computational per-
spective to determine the outcome of the introduced rules. Finally, we compare our
framework with belief merging and judgment aggregation.
3.1 Framework
In the first part of this section we present the basic definitions of the framework of
goal-based voting, where agents express their goals as propositional formulas. In the
second part we define and compare a selection of voting rules, inspired by voting,
belief merging and judgment aggregation.
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3.1.1 Basic Definitions
A group of agents in the finite set N = {1, . . . , n} has to take a collective decision
over some issues in the finite set I = {1, . . . , m}. We assume that issues have binary
values: when they take value 1 it means they are accepted, and when they take
value 0 it means they are rejected. Each agent i ∈ N has an individual goal γi, which
is expressed as a consistent propositional formula. Formally, each γi is written in the
propositional language L whose propositional variables are all the issues j ∈ I (see
Section 2.1 for the basic definitions of propositional logic).
For simplicity, we sometimes write an interpretation v as vector (v(1), . . . , v(m)).
From a voting perspective, each interpretation corresponds to an alternative (a can-
didate), and the models of γi are those alternatives (candidates) that agent i sup-
ports. We also assume that issues are independent from one another, meaning that
all possible interpretations over I are feasible (or, equivalently, that there are no in-
tegrity constraints).
For agent i ∈ N and issue j ∈ I , we indicate by mxij = |{v ∈ Mod(γi) | v(j) = x}|
for x ∈ {0, 1} how many times issue j has value x in the models of agent i’s goal.
Then, we denote by vector mi(j) = (m0ij, m
1
ij) the two totals of zeroes and ones for
issue j in the models of γi. A goal-profile (or simply, a profile) Γ = (γ1, . . . ,γn) is a
vector collecting all the goals of the agents in N .
We now formalize Example 3.1 to illustrate all the above definitions:
Example 3.2. Agents Ann, Barbara, and Camille, are modeled by set N = {1, 2, 3}.
The three choices they have to make over the lighthouse, the museum, and the park,
are modeled by the set I = {1, 2, 3}. Ann’s goal is γ1 = 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3, while Barbara’s
goal is γ2 = ¬1 ∧ ¬2 ∧ 3 and Camille’s goal is γ3 = (1 ∧ ¬2 ∧ ¬3) ∨ (¬1 ∧ 2 ∧
¬3) ∨ (¬1 ∧ ¬2 ∧ 3). The models of the agents’ goals correspond to Mod(γ1) =
{(111)}, Mod(γ2) = {(001)} and Mod(γ3) = {(100), (010), (001)}. Ann only has
one model for her goal (i.e., |γ1| = 1) and for issue 3, for instance, we thus have
m13 = (m013, m
1
13) = (0, 1). Camille has three models for her goal γ3, and for issue 2
we have m32 = (m032, m
1
32) = (2, 1). Profile Γ = (γ1,γ2,γ3) captures this situation.
The agents take a decision over the issues at stake by means of voting rules,
whose input is a profile of n formulas (each one submitted by one agent in N ) and
whose output is a set of interpretations over the m issues in I , for all n and m. The
formal definition is as follows:
Definition 3.1. A goal-based voting rule is a collection of functions for all n, m ∈ N
defined as:
F : (LI )n → P({0, 1}m) \ {∅}
Vector F(Γ)j = (F(Γ)0j , F(Γ)
1
j ) where F(Γ)
x
j = |{v ∈ F(Γ) | vj = x}| for x ∈ {0, 1}
indicates the total number of zeroes and ones in the outcome of F for j in Γ. For
simplicity, we write F(Γ)j = x for x ∈ {0, 1} in case F(Γ)1−xj = 0.
3.1.2 Goal-based Voting Rules
We start by presenting a rule inspired by simple approval voting (Brams and Fish-
burn, 1978, 2007; Laslier and Sanver, 2010). For all profiles the Approval rule chooses,
among all the models of the agents’ goals, those interpretations that satisfy a maxi-
mal number of agents’ goals. Formally:
Approval(Γ) = arg max
v∈Mod(∨i∈N γi) |{i ∈ N | v ∈ Mod(γi)}|.
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The Approval rule has also been previously introduced in the work by Lang (2004)
under the name of plurality rule, and in belief merging by Konieczny and Pérez (2002)
as a ∆∑,dµ rule.1 Variations of Approval have been used for multi-winner elections
(Aziz et al., 2015), where the satisfaction of an agent is modeled by different vectors
depending on how many of her candidates (in this case, models of her goal) are
chosen by the rule. Despite its intuitive appeal, approval-based voting is not adapted
to combinatorial domains in which a large number of alternatives may be approved
by a few agents only, as illustrated by the following example:
Example 3.3. Consider a profile Γ = (γ1,γ2,γ3) for three agents and three issues
such that γ1 = 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3, γ2 = 1 ∧ 2 ∧ ¬3 and γ3 = ¬1 ∧ ¬2 ∧ ¬3. As each goal has
exactly one model, and there is no interpretation which satisfies more than one goal
at the same time, we have that the outcome is Approval(Γ) = {(111), (110), (000)}
which leaves the agents with the same options they began with.
The next class of rules that we define is inspired by the quota rules from judg-
ment aggregation (Dietrich and List, 2007a), where each issue needs a certain quota
of votes to be approved in the outcome. First, let µϕ : Mod(ϕ) → R be a function
associating to each model v of ϕ some weight µϕ(v). Observe that µϕ may associate
different weights to distinct models of the same formula ϕ.
Let threshold rules be defined as:
TrShµ(Γ)j = 1 iff
(
∑
i∈N
(wi · ∑
v∈Mod(γi)
v(j) · µγi(v))
) ≥ qj
such that 1 ≤ qj ≤ n for all j ∈ I is the quota of issue j, for each v ∈ Mod(γi) we
have µγi(v) 6= 0 and wi ∈ (0, 1] is the individual weight of agent i.
Intuitively, each issue j in threshold rules is considered independently from the
others, and there is a certain quota qj that has to be reached for the issue to be ac-
cepted. Additionally, each agent may be given a different weight wi (think for in-
stance of a committee where the vote of the president counts more than the vote of a
member) and each model v of an individual goal may have a different weight µγi(v).
To simplify notation we omit the vector ~q = (q1, . . . , qm), specifying the particular
choice of thresholds for the issues, from the name of TrShµ when clear from context.
The general definition of threshold rules can be used to provide a first adaptation
for goal-based voting of the classical issue-wise majority rule (May, 1952). Consider
a TrShµ rule having µγi(v) =
1
|Mod(γi)| and wi = 1 for all v ∈ Mod(γi) and for all i ∈N : we call EQuota such procedures, as they are inspired by equal and even cumulative
voting (Campbell, 1954; Bhagat and Brickley, 1984). Namely, the goal of each agent is
given a total weight of 1 (echoing the “one person, one vote” principle), which they
equally distribute over all the models of their goal. In this way, agents whose goals
have more models are not favored by the rule with respect to goals with less models.
The equal and even majority rule EMaj is formally defined2 as follows:
EMaj(Γ)j = 1 iff
(
∑
i∈N
m1ij
|Mod(γi)|
)
>
n
2
1In this case d is the drastic distance, such that for two interpretations v and v′, d(v, v′) = 0 if v = v′
and d(v, v′) = 1 otherwise.
2The EMaj rule has been initially defined by using d n+12 e as quota (Novaro et al., 2018), to stay close
to the intuition of majority where a quota corresponds to a certain number of ‘heads’ for or against an
issue. We can, however, let the quota be a real number as fractions of votes come from different agents.
20 Chapter 3. Goal-based Voting
for all j ∈ I . Observe that the EMaj adaptation of the (strict) majority rule is thus
biased towards rejection of an issue: when there is a tie in the sum of acceptances
and rejections the issue is rejected. To overcome this issue, we present a second
adaptation of majority where comparisons are directly made between acceptances
and rejections for each issue j ∈ I .
The TrueMaj goal-based voting rule is formally defined as:
TrueMaj(Γ) = Πj∈IM(Γ)j
where for each j ∈ I :
M(Γ)j =
{
{x} if ∑i∈N
mxij
|Mod(γi)| > ∑i∈N
m1−xij
|Mod(γi)|
{0, 1} otherwise
Intuitively, TrueMaj calculates for each issue a sum of the ones and a sum of the
zeroes in all the models of the individual goals, weighting each model as in EQuota
rules. If the weighted sum of ones (respectively, zeroes) is higher than the weighted
sum of zeroes (respectively, ones), the result for that issue is one (respectively, zero).
In case the sums are equal, the rule outputs all interpretations with either a 0 or a 1
for that issue.3
We now introduce our third and final adaptation of majority to goal-based vot-
ing. Let Maj(v1, . . . , vn)j = 1 if ∑i∈N vi(j) > n2 , and Maj(v1, . . . , vn)j = 0 otherwise.
Note that the function Maj has a vector of interpretations as input, and it outputs an
interpretation. We can now formally define the two-step majority rule:
2sMaj(Γ) = {Maj(EMaj(γ1), . . . , EMaj(γn))}.
The 2sMaj rule applies majority twice: first on the models of the agents’ individual
goals, and then again on the result obtained in the first step. This rule belongs to a
wider class of voting functions that apply first a rule on each individual goal, and
then a second (possibly different) rule on the results obtained in the first step.
We may think that the three adaptations of majority to goal-based voting that we
introduced here (i.e., EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj) are equivalent in the sense that they
simply represent via three definitions the same underlying function. The following
proposition proves that this is not the case:
Proposition 3.1. The rules EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj are different.
Proof. Since EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj are collection of functions for any n and m,
it suffices to provide three goal-profiles Γ, Γ’, and Γ′′, one for each pair of rules, on
which their outcomes differ. The three profiles are shown in Table 3.1.
Consider profile Γ and the rules EMaj and TrueMaj. For issues 2 and 3 we have
that ∑i∈N
m1i2
|Mod(γi)| = 2 and ∑i∈N
m1i3
|Mod(γi)| = 3, respectively, are the sums of the votes
coming from the agents in favour of the issues. Since ∑i∈N
m1i2
|Mod(γi)| = 2 > 1.5 and
∑i∈N
m1i3
|Mod(γi)| = 3 > 1.5 we have that EMaj(Γ)2 = 1 and EMaj(Γ)3 = 1, meaning
that both issues are accepted in the outcome of EMaj. Similarly, as ∑i∈N
m1i2
|Mod(γi)| =
2 > 1 = ∑i∈N
m0i2
|Mod(γi)| and ∑i∈N
m1i3
|Mod(γi)| = 3 > 0 = ∑i∈N
m0i3
|Mod(γi)| , we have that
TrueMaj(Γ)2 = 1 and TrueMaj(Γ)3 = 1, meaning again that both issues are accepted
3Observe that EMaj can be also defined as TrueMaj with a {0} instead of {0, 1} in the second line.
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Γ Mod(γi) Γ′ Mod(γi) Γ′′ Mod(γi)
Agent 1 1∧ ¬2∧ 3 (101) 1∧ 2∧ 3 (111) ¬(1∨ 2∨ 3) (000)
(111) (111)
Agent 2 ¬1∧ 2∧ 3 (011) 2∧ (1→ 3) (011) 2∧ (1∨ 3) (110)
(010) (011)
(111) (111) (111)
Agent 3 2∧ 3 (011) 2∧ (1→ 3) (011) 2∧ (1∨ 3) (110)
(010) (011)
EMaj (011) — (010)
TrueMaj (011) (111) —
(111)
2sMaj — (011) (111)
TABLE 3.1: Profiles Γ, Γ′, Γ′′ on which EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj differ.
in the outcome of TrueMaj. For issue 1, however, we have that ∑i∈N
m1i2
|Mod(γi)| =
1 + 0 + 12 = 1.5, and thus EMaj(Γ)1 = 0, meaning that the issue is rejected, while
TrueMaj(Γ)1 = (1, 1), meaning that there will be one interpretation where issue 1
has value 1 and one where it has value 0.
Consider Γ′ and the rules TrueMaj and 2sMaj. For issues 2 and 3, it is easy
to see that both rules will accept them in the outcome. For issue 1, observe that
∑i∈N
m1i1
|Mod(γi)| = 1 +
2
3 > 1 +
1
3 = ∑i∈N
m0i1
|Mod(γi)| and thus TrueMaj(Γ
′)1 = 1. For
2sMaj, the first step of aggregation results in ((111), (011), (011)) which, when fo-
cusing on issue 1, gives outcome 2sMaj(Γ′)1 = 0.
The outcomes for profile Γ′′ and rules EMaj and 2sMaj can be easily obtained
through a similar reasoning to the one given for profiles Γ and Γ′.
We briefly discuss here how non-binary issues could be handled in goal-based
voting. Suppose that Ann, Barbara and Camille of Example 3.2 also have to choose
a restaurant, and on a popular recommendation website restaurants are categorized
by price as cheap, medium, and expensive. One way to include this non-binary
issue would be to add three variables (one for each price range) and a constraint
for the outcome of the rule. In fact, while we might allow the agents to express
goals such as “I want either a cheap or a medium priced restaurant”, the final choice
must indicate a specific price category. Concretely, we would need to add three
new binary variables: 4 (cheap restaurant), 5 (medium restaurant) and 6 (expensive
restaurant), and a constraint IC= (4 ∧ ¬5 ∧ ¬6) ∨ (¬4 ∧ 5 ∧ ¬6) ∨ (¬4 ∧ ¬5 ∧ 6)
such that for all Γ we have F(Γ) ⊆ Mod(IC). As independent rules are susceptible
of returning a result which does not satisfy the constraint, the definitions of EMaj,
TrueMaj and 2sMaj would need to be modified to provide an alternative result in
such cases.4
In this section we have introduced aggregation rules for propositional goals in-
spired by existing rules in voting, judgment aggregation and belief merging. We
4Similar problems have been discussed for binary aggregation. In particular, the problem of lifting
integrity constraints (Grandi and Endriss, 2013) consists in looking for classes of aggregation rules (de-
fined by the axioms they satisfy) ensuring that for all integrity constraints of a certain syntactical class,
if the constraint is satisfied by all the agents it will also be satisfied by the outcome of the rule; and
the most representative voter rules (Endriss and Grandi, 2014) guarantee to always return an outcome
consistent with the constraint since they select the ballot of a voter in the profile.
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have also seen how the three definitions of majority that we provided designate in-
deed three different functions. In the next section we will compare the proposed
rules based on the properties they satisfy.
3.2 Axiomatics
A great variety of functions can be used to take a collective decision, as we have
seen in Section 3.1.2. Depending on the specific voting situation at hand, one rule
may be preferred to another: but how can agents compare different rules if they are
solely given their definitions? In this section we will follow the tradition in social
choice theory of providing a series of desirable properties (called axioms) adapted to
the setting of goal-based voting, and checking whether the rules satisfy them or not.
In line with Arrow’s theorem (Arrow, 1951) we will see that certain desiderata are
incompatible with one another and no rule can satisfy every axiom.
3.2.1 Resoluteness
Imagine a group of agents who needs to take a collective decision, and they sub-
mit their individual goals to a voting rule. It would be disappointing if the voting
rule returned a large set of possible alternatives as the result: in some sense they
would still need to make a choice over this result, as they will concretely execute a
single plan. The first two axioms that we introduce deal precisely with this idea of
resoluteness of a rule, in a stronger or weaker way.
Definition 3.2. A rule F is resolute (R) if and only if for all profiles Γ it is the case that
|F(Γ)| = 1.
By definition EMaj and 2sMaj are resolute since their outcome is constructed by
uniquely deciding for 0 or 1 one issue at a time. On the other hand, neither Approval
nor TrueMaj are resolute, as shown by the following example:
Example 3.4. Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and I = {1, 2}. Let Γ be such that γ1 = 1 ∧ 2,
γ2 = 2, γ3 = ¬1∧ 2. We have that Approval(Γ) = TrueMaj(Γ) = {(11), (01)}.
Such a requirement may seem too strict in situations as the one of Example 3.4:
after all, the agents have the same opinion on the second issue but they are equally
split about the first one. In this case we may argue that an abstention over the first
issue can be acceptable in the outcome. We thus introduce a novel definition of weak
resoluteness as follows:
Definition 3.3. A rule F is weakly resolute (WR) if and only if for all profiles Γ and all
j ∈ I we have F(Γ)j ∈ {(a, 0), (b, b), (0, c)} for a, b, c ∈N+.
Intuitively, a weakly resolute rule always gives either a definite answer on an
issue or it abstains: thus, while the rule is not resolute its outcomes still have some
structure. An equivalent formulation of the (WR) axiom is that for all profiles Γ there
exists a (possibly partial) conjunction ϕ such that F(Γ) = Mod(ϕ). We can easily see
that all resolute rules are weakly resolute:
Proposition 3.2. If a rule F is resolute, then it is also weakly resolute.
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Proof. By definition of resoluteness, we have that F(Γ) = {(x1 . . . xm)} where xj ∈
{0, 1} for all j ∈ I . Therefore, for each j ∈ I we have that F(Γ)j ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)},
and therefore F is weakly resolute.5
A consequence of Proposition 3.2 is that EMaj and 2sMaj are thus weakly reso-
lute. Intuitively, TrueMaj is also weakly resolute as for each issue it either provides a
0 or a 1 in the outcome, or it provides both a 0 and a 1.6
3.2.2 Anonymity, Duality and Neutrality
In many situations of collective decision making, for instance in political elections,
we want that each vote (and voter) is treated in an equal and fair way. Namely, we
want anonymity in the sense that it does not matter which agent submitted which
vote to compute the result. In goal-based voting, we express this axiom as:
Definition 3.4. A rule F is anonymous (A) if and only if for any profile Γ and permu-
tation σ : N → N , we have that F(γ1, . . . ,γn) = F(γσ(1), . . . ,γσ(n)).
By permuting in any possible way the agents’ goals, the result of an anonymous
rule does not change. Observe that EMaj, TrueMaj, 2sMaj and Approval are anony-
mous, while an instance of TrSh rules where at least two agents i, ` ∈ N have differ-
ent weights wi 6= w` would not be anonymous.
The following axiom of duality is inspired by the neutrality property of May
(1952) and by the domain-neutrality axiom in binary aggregation (Grandi and En-
driss, 2011). Essentially, we want a rule to not be biased towards the acceptance or
rejection of the issues. Let ϕ[j 7→ k] for j, k ∈ I be the replacement of each occurrence
of k by j in ϕ. For instance, if ϕ = p ∧ (q ∨ r) we have that ϕ[p 7→ q] = p ∧ (p ∨ r).
We define duality as:
Definition 3.5. A rule is dual (D) if and only if for all profiles Γ, F(γ1, . . . ,γn) =
{(1− v(1), . . . , 1− v(m)) | v ∈ F(Γ)} where γ = γ[¬1 7→ 1, . . . ,¬m 7→ m].
Both Approval and TrueMaj are easily seen to be dual. On the other hand, EMaj
and 2sMaj do not satisfy this axiom due to their being resolute, as shown by the
following example:
Example 3.5. Consider a profile Γ for two agents and two issues such that γ1 = 1∧ 2
and γ2 = ¬1 ∧ 2. We have that EMaj(Γ) = 2sMaj(Γ) = {(01)}. Take now the goals
γ1 = ¬1 ∧ ¬2 and γ2 = 1 ∧ ¬2 (we simplify the double negation) and observe that
for this new profile Γ′ we have EMaj(Γ′) = 2sMaj(Γ′) = {(00)}, while according to
duality we should have {(10)}.
Unfortunately, the properties of resoluteness, anonymity and duality cannot be
simultaneously satisfied, as shown by the following theorem:7
5We can provide an alternative proof of this proposition based on the equivalent formulation of
(WR) stated above. For all profiles Γ we have by definition that F(Γ) = {(x1 . . . xm)} where xj ∈ {0, 1}
for j ∈ I . Then, it suffices to consider the following conjunction ϕ:
ϕ =
∧
j∈I
xj=1
j ∧ ∧
j∈I
xj=0
¬j.
6We will see in this section a proof of this fact, i.e., that TrueMaj is weakly resolute, as a consequence
of the rule satisfying the axiom of independence.
7A related result in social choice theory states that there exists no resolute, anonymous, and neutral
voting procedure for 2 alternatives and an even number of voters (see Moulin, 1983).
24 Chapter 3. Goal-based Voting
Theorem 3.1. There is no resolute rule F satisfying both anonymity and duality.
Proof. Consider a rule F and suppose towards a contradiction that F is resolute,
anonymous and dual. Take profile Γ for N = {1, 2} and I = {1, 2} where γ1 =
1 ∧ ¬2 and γ2 = ¬1 ∧ 2. By anonymity of F, for profile Γ′ = (γ2,γ1) we have
F(Γ) = F(Γ′). Since F is resolute, F(Γ) = {(x, y)}, for x, y ∈ {0, 1}, and thus
F(Γ′) = {(x, y)}. However, note that γ1 = γ2 and γ2 = γ1. Hence, Γ′ = Γ and
by duality we must have F(Γ′) = {(1− x, 1− y)}, bringing us a contradiction.
We have seen how to ensure that agents are treated equally (anonymity) and that
the decision for each issue is not biased towards acceptance or rejection (duality). We
may also want to ensure that issues are treated in an equal way with respect to one
another. To this purpose, we introduce the axiom of neutrality, which is inspired by
its voting counterpart — stating that if two alternatives are swapped in every ballot,
they should be swapped in the outcome of the social choice function (see Zwicker,
2016). An analogous property has been introduced by Endriss and Grandi (2017)
for graph aggregation under the name of permutation-neutrality. We can now define
neutrality as follows:
Definition 3.6. A rule F is neutral (N) if for all profiles Γ and permutations σ : I → I ,
we get F(γσ1 , . . . ,γ
σ
n) = {(v(σ(1)) . . . v(σ(m))) | v ∈ F(Γ)} where we have that
γσi = γi[1 7→ σ(1), . . . , m 7→ σ(m)].
The following example shows that EQuota rules, and thus more generally TrSh
rules, are not neutral when the quotas for two issues differ:
Example 3.6. Let Γ be a profile for agents in N = {1, 2, 3} and issues in I = {1, 2}
such that γ1 = γ2 = 1∧ 2 and γ3 = ¬1∧ 2. Consider now the EQuota rule such that
q1 = 2 and q2 = 3: we have that EQuota(Γ) = {(11)}. Let σ be a permutation such
that σ(1) = 2 and σ(2) = 1. We then have that γσ1 = γ
σ
2 = 2 ∧ 1 and γσ3 = ¬2 ∧ 1,
and for Γσ = (γσ1 ,γ
σ
2 ,γ
σ
3 ) we have that EQuota(Γ
σ) = {(10)} which is different from
the permutation of (11) that should be the result according to neutrality.
As far as the other rules are concerned, Approval is neutral as it considers the
models of agents’ goals in their entirety and it simply permutes their values, and
both TrueMaj and 2sMaj are neutral since they have the same quota for all issues.
A different formulation of neutrality is the one commonly used in binary and
judgment aggregation (Grandi and Endriss, 2011; Endriss, 2016), also similarly in-
troduced for graph aggregation (Endriss and Grandi, 2017) which intuitively states
that if two issues are treated in the same way in a profile, their respective outcomes
on that profile should be the same. This definition however is not so easily adapt-
able to goal-based voting: consider a profile with a goal γ = 1 ∨ 2, whose models
are Mod(γ) = {(11), (10), (01)}. Should an axiom consider issues a and b as treated
equivalently in γ (and thus in Γ) or should it also impose that in each model they
have the same truth-value at the same time? Depending on the answer, we may (or
not) require the outcomes for a and b to be the same. We leave a deeper analysis of
this axiom for future research.
3.2.3 Unanimity and Groundedness
The property of unanimity imposes to the outcome of a rule on a profile to agree
with the agents if they agree with each other. In goal-based voting we can separate
this property into two different axioms. The first focuses on the case where the
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unanimous choice of the agents for a specific issue is respected in the outcome, and
it is a straightforward generalization of the unanimity axiom in binary aggregation
(Grandi and Endriss, 2011). It is also closely related to the unanimous consensus class
in voting (Elkind et al., 2010), stating that a candidate should win if it is ranked first
by all voters in an election. We formally define unanimity as:
Definition 3.7. A rule F is unanimous (U) if for all profiles Γ and for all j ∈ I , if
mxij = 0 for all i ∈ N then F(Γ)j = 1− x for x ∈ {0, 1}.
It is fairly easy to see that if all agents accept or reject unanimously an issue the
outcomes of EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj will agree with the profile. The Approval rule
also satisfies it, since it will choose one of the models of the agents’ goals (which by
definition are all unanimous on that issue). For TrSh rules, the axiom is not satisfied
for certain (degenerate) choices of quotas and weights for the agents’ goals, as shown
by the following example:
Example 3.7. Consider Γ for three agents and two issues such that γ1 = γ2 = γ3 =
1 ∧ 2, where q1 = q2 = 3 are the quotas, and µ1∧2(11) = 0.3 are the weights for
the agents’ goals. If wi = 1 for all i ∈ N are the weights of the agents, we have
TrSh(Γ) = {(00)}. Similar examples can be found for agents’ weights lower than 1.
The second type of unanimity captures the idea that if the agents all agree on
some models of their goals, these models should be the outcome. More formally, we
define model-unanimity8 as follows:
Definition 3.8. A rule F is model-unanimous (MU) if on all profiles Γ we have v ∈ F(Γ)
if and only if v ∈ Mod(γi) for all i ∈ N .
The (MU) axiom can be alternatively formulated as stating that if for all Γ we
have Mod(
∧
i∈N γi) 6= ∅ then we must have that F(Γ) = Mod(
∧
i∈N γi). Observe
that in Definition 3.8, the right-to-left direction ensures that if agents are unanimous
about a model it will be accepted in the outcome (but the outcome may include
other models which are not unanimously supported), while the left-to-right direc-
tion ensures that all the models in the outcome are unanimously accepted by the
agents (but the rule may be excluding from the outcome some models that all agents
accept). Model-unanimity is also known as the (IC2) postulate in belief merging
(Everaere et al., 2015) and since Approval can be expressed as an IC merging opera-
tor (see Section 3.1.2) it therefore satisfies model-unanimity. The following example
shows that EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj do not satisfy this type of unanimity:
Example 3.8. Let Γ be a profile for three agents and three issues where the agents’
goals are such that Mod(γ1) = {(000), (101), (110)}, Mod(γ2) = {(000), (111), (100)}
and Mod(γ3) = {(000), (101), (110)}. Even though Mod(γ1 ∧ γ2 ∧ γ3) = {(000)},
we have that EMaj(Γ) = TrueMaj(Γ) = 2sMaj(Γ) = {(100)}.
Unanimity does not imply model-unanimity since EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj sat-
isfy the first but not the second. Interestingly, the opposite is also not the case:
Proposition 3.3. There exists a rule F that is model-unanimous and not unanimous.
8The rule Conjv defined in previous work (Novaro et al., 2018) captured precisely the intuition
behind this axiom, in that its output was defined as the models of the conjunction of the agents’ goals
if they were mutually consistent, and a default option otherwise.
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Proof. Let F be defined as such that F(Γ) = Mod(
∧
i∈N γi) if Mod(
∧
i∈N γi) 6= ∅, and
{0}m otherwise. By definition F is model-unanimous. Consider the profile Γ for two
agents and three issues where γ1 = 1∧ ¬2 and γ2 = 1∧ 2. Since Mod(γ1 ∧ γ2) = ∅,
we have that F(Γ) = {(000)}. However, m0i1 = 0 for all i ∈ N and yet F(Γ)1 = 0.
Observe that (MU) implies in particular that F(γ, . . . ,γ) = Mod(γ), which corre-
sponds to the strongly unanimous consensus class in voting (Elkind et al., 2010).
The axioms of unanimity that we just saw require that the outcome agrees with
the agents if they all agree (on issues or models). The next axiom that we introduce
states that the outcome of a rule should be supported by at least one of the agents in
the profile. We formally define groundedness as follows:
Definition 3.9. A rule F is grounded (G) if F(Γ) ⊆ Mod(∨i∈N γi).
By definition, Approval is grounded, since it outputs a model approved by at least
one agent in the profile. On the other hand, the same is not true for the majority rules
EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj, as shown by the following result:
Proposition 3.4. EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj are not grounded.
Proof. Consider a profile Γ for three agents and issues where Mod(γ1) = {(111)},
Mod(γ2) = {(010)} and Mod(γ3) = {(001)}. The rules EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj all
return {(011)}, and since (011) 6∈ Mod(∨i∈N γi) groundedness is not satisfied.
Proposition 3.4 implies that the three majority rules do not guarantee that the col-
lective choice will satisfy the goal of at least one agent. In some cases, however, this
can be seen as the rules finding a compromise issue-by-issue between the conflicting
views of the agents.
Since Mod(
∧
i∈N γi) ⊆ Mod(
∨
i∈N γi) we may think that model-unanimity im-
plies groundedness. The following result however shows that the two axioms are
not related:
Proposition 3.5. There exists rules F and F′ such that F is grounded and not model-
unanimous, while F′ is model-unanimous and not grounded.
Proof. Consider F such that for all profiles Γ, if Mod(
∨
i∈N γi) = Mod(
∧
i∈N γi) then
F(Γ) = Mod(
∨
i∈N γi) and F(Γ) = Mod(
∨
i∈N γi) \Mod(
∧
i∈N γi) otherwise. For F′
it suffices to consider the same rule defined in the proof of Proposition 3.3.
An analogous notion of groundedness has been previously defined for the ag-
gregation of ontologies as well (Porello and Endriss, 2014).
3.2.4 Monotonicity, Egalitarianism and Independence
In judgment aggregation, the axiom of monotonicity informally states that the accep-
tance decision of an issue should not be reversed if more agents endorse it (List,
2012; Grandi and Endriss, 2011). Similarly, we say that a goal-based voting rule is
monotonic if adding support for an issue j when the current result for j is equally
irresolute or favoring acceptance, results in an outcome strictly favoring acceptance
for j. The formal definition that we provide applies only to comparable profiles Γ and
Γ′ for which |Mod(γi)| = |Mod(γ′i)| for all i ∈ N :
Definition 3.10. A rule F satisfies monotonicity (M) if for all comparable profiles Γ =
(γ1, . . . ,γi, . . . ,γn) and Γ? = (γ1, . . . ,γ?i , . . . , γn), for all j ∈ I and i ∈ N , if m1?ij >
m1ij, then F(Γ)
1
j ≥ F(Γ)0j implies F(Γ?)1j > F(Γ?)0j .
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The rules EMaj and 2sMaj are monotonic, since they have a threshold of accep-
tance for each issue and once the issue is accepted, adding support only confirms
the current result. The same reasoning applies to TrueMaj, with the additional ob-
servation that a tie in the outcome only comes from a tie in the profile, and if more
support is added (deleted) the issue is decided towards acceptance (rejection). The
Approval rule however does not satisfy this axiom, as the following example shows:
Example 3.9. Let Γ be defined for three agents and issues with Mod(γ2) = Mod(γ3) =
{(101), (001)} and Mod(γ1) = {(101), (111), (010), (000)}. We have Approval(Γ) =
{(101)}. Take now a goal γ?1 with Mod(γ?1) = {(110), (111), (001), (100)}. Since
m111 = 2 and m
1?
11 = 3 and Approval(Γ)
1
1 = 1 > 0 = Approval(Γ)
0
1, we should have
Approval(Γ?)11 > Approval(Γ
?)01. However, as Approval(Γ
?) = {(001)} the axiom is
not satisfied.
As for (MU), a model-wise monotonicity could be defined as follows: for every
profile Γ, if v ∈ F(Γ) and there is i ∈ N such that v 6∈ Mod(γi) and v ∈ Mod(γ′i) then
v ∈ F(γ1, . . . ,γ′i , . . . ,γn); and if v 6∈ F(Γ) and there is i ∈ N such that v ∈ Mod(γi)
and v 6∈ Mod(γ′i) then v 6∈ F(γ1, . . . ,γ′i , . . . ,γn).9
The next axiom that we introduce formalizes the “one person, one vote” prin-
ciple, while at the same time ensuring that a rule is giving an equal weight to the
models of each agent’s goal. Namely, if we take a profile Γ in which agents have a
varying number of models for their goals, and we transform it into a bigger profile
Γ′ where a set of agents (proportional to how many models a goal had in Γ) has a
goal satisfied by exactly one of the models in Γ, the results in Γ and Γ′ should be the
same. Formally:
Definition 3.11. A rule F is egalitarian (E) if for all Γ, on the profile Γ′ such that:
(a) |N ′| = |N | · lcm(|Mod(γ1)|, . . . , |Mod(γn)|), and
(b) for v ∈ Mod(γi) and i ∈ N , |N
′|
|N |·|Mod(γi)| agents have γ
′ =
∧
j∈I
v(j)=1
j ∧∧ `∈I
v(j)=0
¬`
it holds that F(Γ) = F(Γ′).
In an egalitarian rule it is thus possible to turn every profile into an equivalent
profile (with respect to the outcome) where each agent submits a goal in the form
of a complete conjunction. From their definitions, we see that all EQuota rules and
TrueMaj satisfy the axiom. It is not satisfied by some TrSh rules (where the weight of
the models is unequal), by 2sMaj and by Approval, as per the following example:
Example 3.10. Consider a profile Γ for three agents and issues such that Mod(γ1) =
{(111)}, Mod(γ2) = {(110), (000), (001)} and Mod(γ3) = {(110), (011), (010)}. We
have that Approval(Γ) = {(110)} and 2sMaj(Γ) = {(010)}. Consider now a new
profile Γ′ constructed according to Definition 3.11: it is a profile for three issues
and nine agents such that Mod(γ1) = Mod(γ2) = Mod(γ3) = {(111)}, Mod(γ4) =
{(110)}, Mod(γ5) = {(000)}, Mod(γ6) = {(001)}, Mod(γ7) = {(110)}, Mod(γ8) =
{(011)} and Mod(γ9) = {(010)}. We have that Approval(Γ′) = 2sMaj(Γ′) = {(111)}.
Consider now a TrSh rule such that qj = n2 for all j ∈ I and the weight function µ
is defined as follows: µγ2(110) = µγ3(110) =
2
3 , µγ2(000) = µγ2(001) = µγ3(011) =
9Moreover, Novaro et al. (2018) also defined the axiom of positive responsiveness as a stronger ver-
sion of monotonicity. Namely, a rule F is positively responsive (PR) if for all comparable profiles
Γ = (γ1, . . . ,γi, . . . ,γn) and Γ? = (γ1, . . . ,γ?i , . . . , γn), for all j ∈ I and i ∈ N , if mx?ij > mxij for
x ∈ {0, 1}, then F(Γ)xj ≥ F(Γ)1−xj implies F(Γ?)xj > F(Γ?)1−xj .
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µγ3(010) =
1
6 , and µγ(v) = 1 for any other γ and v. We have that TrSh(Γ) = {(110)}
while TrSh(Γ′) = {(111)}.
The final axiom that we present is related to a controversial yet well-known
property used in both characterization and impossibility results in aggregation the-
ory (List, 2012; Brandt et al., 2016). It states that the decision of acceptance or rejec-
tion for each issue j should be taken by looking uniquely at the acceptances or rejec-
tions that j received in the profile. First, let Dm = {(a, b) | a, b ∈ N and a + b ≤ 2m}
and C = {{0}, {1}, {0, 1}}. We formalize the principle of independence in goal-based
voting as follows:
Definition 3.12. A rule F is independent (I) if there are functions f j : Dnm → C for j ∈ I
and n, m ∈N+ such that for all profiles Γ we have F(Γ) = Πj∈I f j(m1(j), . . . , mn(j)).
From the definitions we see that TrSh, EQuota and TrueMaj rules are independent,
since they construct the outcome issue-by-issue. The Approval rule is not indepen-
dent, as shown by the following example:
Example 3.11. Consider a profile Γ for three agents and three issues such that γ1 =
1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3, γ2 = 1 ∧ 2 ∧ ¬3 and γ3 = 1 ∧ ¬2 ∧ 3. The outcome is Approval(Γ) =
{(111), (110), (101)}. From the outcome on issues 2 and 3 we see that it does not cor-
respond to the cartesian product of functions with codomain C = {{0}, {1}, {0, 1}}.
We conclude this section with another general result relating our axioms, namely
those of independence and weak resoluteness:
Theorem 3.2. Each independent goal-based voting rule is weakly resolute.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary profile Γ and the outcome of an independent rule F(Γ).
As F is independent, we have F(Γ) = Πj∈I f (m1(j), . . . , mn(j)), where each mx(j) ∈
{{0}, {1}, {0, 1}}. We want to show that F is weakly resolute. We construct a con-
junction ψ as follows: for all j ∈ I , if f (m1(j), . . . , mn(j)) = {0} add conjunct ¬j to ψ;
if f (m1(j), . . . , mn(j)) = {1} add conjunct j to ψ; if f (m1(j), . . . , mn(j)) = {0, 1} skip.
Observe that for all v ∈ Mod(ψ) and for all j ∈ I appearing as conjuncts in ψ, we
have v(j) = 1 for a positive literal j, and v(j) = 0 for a negative literal ¬j. Moreover,
for all k ∈ I which did not appear in ψ we have any possible combination of truth
values. Therefore, Mod(ψ) = F(Γ).
The converse of Theorem 3.2 does not hold: consider an F that returns {(11 . . . 1)}
if in at least one v ∈ Mod(γ1) issue 1 is true, and returns {(00 . . . 0)} otherwise.
3.2.5 Characterizing Goal-Based Majority
A seminal result in the characterization of aggregation rules is due to May (1952),
who gave an axiomatization of the majority rule in the context of voting over two
alternatives. Part of the appeal of the majority rule is its omnipresence in everyday
decisions as well as its simple definition. We build on May’s result and similar re-
sults in judgment aggregation (Endriss, 2016) to provide a characterization of our
TrueMaj rule in the following theorem:10
Theorem 3.3. A rule F satisfies (E), (I), (N), (A), (M), (U) and (D) if and only if it is
TrueMaj.
10A previous version of this result used the stronger axiom of positive responsiveness in place of
monotonicity (Novaro et al., 2018).
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Proof. The right-to-left direction follows from the discussion provided in Section 3.2.
For the left-to-right direction, consider a rule F which satisfies this list of axioms.
Let Γ be an arbitrary profile over n voters and m issues. Since F satisfies (E), we
can construct a profile Γ′ for m issues and n′ = |N | · lcm(|Mod(γ1)|, . . . , |Mod(γn)|)
agents where each agent inN ′ submits a goal having a single model (a model of one
of the goals in Γ). Importantly, we know that v ∈ F(Γ) if and only if v ∈ F(Γ′).
Therefore, without loss of generality we can restrict our attention only to profiles
where each agent submits a goal corresponding to a complete conjunction (having
thus a unique model). We denote by G∧ such a set of profiles: in particular we have
that Γ′ ∈ G∧. We now have to show that F(Γ′) = TrueMaj(Γ′).
Since F satisfies (I), we know that there are functions f1, . . . , fm such that F(Γ′) =
Πj∈I f j(m1(j), . . . , mn(j)). Moreover, as Γ′ ∈ G∧ we have that mi(j) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)}
for all i ∈ N ′ and j ∈ I . Namely, since each goal has a unique model in Γ′, either an
issue has value 1 or 0 in it. Hence, each f j on profiles in G∧ can equivalently be seen
as a function from {0, 1}n to {{0}, {1}, {0, 1}} = C. By the fact that F satisfies also
the (N) axiom, we have that f1 = · · · = fm must be the case: i.e., the same function
f is applied to all issues. The axiom (A) tell us that any permutation of the goals of
the agents in Γ′ gives the same result F(Γ′).
Combining the (A), (I) and (N) axioms, we can see that only the number of ones
(or zeroes) counts in determining the outcome of f , and not their position in the
input. Hence, we can consider f as a function f : {0, . . . , n} → C from number of
agents (say, all those that assign 1 to the issue) to {{0}, {1}, {0, 1}}.
Given that F satisfies (U), we know that on a profile Γ+ such that for all i we have
m0ij = 0 we have F(Γ
+)0j = 0, i.e., v(j) = 1 for all v ∈ F(Γ+). Consequently, we have
that f (n) = {1} and similarly that f (0) = {0}.
Let now s be a sequence of G∧-profiles Γ− = Γ0, Γ1, . . . , Γn = Γ+ where exactly
one agent i changes her goal γi from profile Γk, in which m1ij = 0, to profile Γ
k+1, in
which m1ij = 1. Namely, each agent i replaces ¬j with j in their goal γi. By the (I)
axiom and the definition of cartesian product, for any Γ and j we have that F(Γ)j is
either equal to (a, 0), (b, b) or (0, c) for a, b, c ∈ N. In fact, the interpretations in the
outcome F(Γ) can either have only zeroes for j (a, 0), as many zeroes as ones for j
(b, b), or only ones for j (0, c). Since F satisfies (M), we have that the outcome on the
Γk profiles in s can only possibly change:
• from (a, 0) to (b, b) or (0, c);
• from (b, b) to (0, c).
Considering that f (0) = {0} and f (n) = {1}, this means that there is some number
q such that f (0) = {0}, . . . , f (q − 1) = {0}, f (q) = {0, 1} or f (q) = {1}, and
f (q + 1) = {1}, . . . , f (n) = {1}. We now show that for n even we have q = n2 and
f (q) = {0, 1}, while for n odd we have q = n+12 and f (q) = {1}.
For n even, consider the profile Γ` were exactly half of the agents accept j and
half reject it. If F(Γ`)j = (a, 0) or (0, c), meaning that f ( n2 ) = {0} or f ( n2 ) = {1}
respectively, the outcome would have to be reversed for F(Γ`)j since F satisfies (D).
However, both in Γ` and Γ` the decision for j is determined by f ( n2 ), which therefore
has to be equal to {0, 1}.
For n odd, suppose for reductio that q < n+12 and consider a profile Γ where there
are exactly q agents accepting j. From the discussion above, we have by definition
of q that the outcome must be F(Γ)j = (0, c), i.e., issue j is accepted. Consider
the profile Γ: by definition, all the agents that accept j in Γ reject it in Γ: that is,
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|{i | mi(j) = (0, 1) for γi ∈ Γ}| = |{i | mi(j) = (1, 0) for γi ∈ Γ}| = q < n+12 .
Thus, |{i | mi(j) = (0, 1) for γi ∈ Γ}| ≥ n+12 > q. From definition of q we should
have F(Γ)j = (0, c′) which however contradicts axiom (D). Suppose for reductio that
q > n+12 and consider a profile Γ where
n+1
2 ≤ |{i | mi(j) = (0, 1) for γi ∈ Γ}| < q.
Again from definition of q we have that F(Γ)j = (a, 0) (i.e., issue j is rejected), and
the same is true for the profile Γ contradicting (D). Therefore, we have q = n+12 .
Concluding, F is a rule defined as the cartesian product of the decisions for each
j ∈ I taken by the same function f : {0, . . . , n} → C, with f (k) = {0, 1} for n even
and k = n2 , f (k) = {0} for ∑i∈N ′ mxij > ∑i∈N ′ m1−xij for x ∈ {0, 1}, corresponding to
the definition of TrueMaj. As Γ was an arbitrary profile and TrueMaj satisfies axiom
(E) this concludes the proof.
The rules EMaj and 2sMaj are based on analogous intuitions as TrueMaj. How-
ever, observe that EMaj has a bias towards rejection of the issues and thus it does
not satisfy the (D) axiom. Without the (D) axiom we obtain (uniform) EQuota rules,
of which EMaj is an instance. On the other hand, the rule 2sMaj does not satisfy the
egalitarian axiom (E), as we have seen with Example 3.10. Hence, the proof of The-
orem 3.3 could not be directly modified to obtain a characterization result for 2sMaj.
The axioms used in the proof of Theorem 3.3 will be compared with their judgment
aggregation counterparts in Section 3.4.2.
As we have seen, a general tension exists between the decisiveness or resolute-
ness of the rule — i.e., its ability to take a unique decision in all (or most) situations,
essential in the development of decision-aid tools — and fairness requirements with
respect to issues and individuals. The TrueMaj rule seems to strike a fair balance
between these requirements.
3.3 Computational Complexity
In this section we study the computational complexity of a central problem in voting:
that of determining the outcome of a rule on a given profile, i.e., the winner determi-
nation problem. We will see that while propositional logic helps the agents express
compactly their goals, it carries over an increase in complexity with respect to the
standard setting of voting. We will assume familiarity with the field of computa-
tional complexity: for an introduction to the topic and more details, see the manual
by Arora and Barak (2009).
3.3.1 Definitions
In the literature on judgment aggregation we can find two definitions for the win-
ner determination problem, in case the rule is resolute or not (Endriss et al., 2012;
Baumeister et al., 2015; de Haan and Slavkovik, 2017). For both types of rules, the
underlying idea is to construct an outcome (that in case of resolute rules will be
unique) by finding the value of one issue at a time.
We adapt the definition of the winner determination problem for a resolute rule
F in goal-based voting as follows:
WINDET(F)
Input: profile Γ, issue j ∈ I
Question: Is it the case that F(Γ)j = 1?
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As F is resolute, the outcome F(Γ) on any profile will be a singleton. Hence,
given a profile Γ in order to construct the outcome of F on Γ it suffices to ask the
WINDET(F) question m times, once for every issue j ∈ I .
Next, we present the definition of the winner determination problem for a non-
resolute rule F (that can potentially be weakly resolute):
WINDET?(F)
Input: profile Γ, subset S ⊆ I , partial interpretation ρ : S→ {0, 1}
Question: Is there a v ∈ F(Γ) with v(j) = ρ(j) for j ∈ S?
By asking the WINDET?(F) question for a profile Γ starting from a subset S of I
containing a single issue, and progressively adding all the issues in I we can con-
struct a complete outcome in F(Γ). Note that we only need to ask the WINDET?(F)
question m times, as a negative answer implies that we must assign the opposite
truth value in the partial interpretation ρ for the issue that we just added. This defi-
nition of the WINDET?(F) problem is formulated by an existential quantifier, but an
universal definition had been proposed as well (Lang and Slavkovik, 2014).11
Finally, we introduce a variation of WINDET(F) and WINDET?(F) for weakly
resolute rules:
WINDETWR(F)
Input: profile Γ, issue j ∈ I , value x ∈ {0, 1}
Question: Is there a v ∈ F(Γ) with v(j) = x?
We will use this formulation of the winner determination problem for the rule
TrueMaj. While we could also use WINDET?(F), the fact that TrueMaj is independent
and thus weakly resolute allows us to simplify the problem by only focusing on one
issue at the time (instead of a subset of issues as for WINDET?(F)). Therefore, to
build its entire outcome it suffices to ask the WINDETWR(F) problem for each issue
j ∈ I twice: one for x = 1 and one for x = 0.
3.3.2 Approval Rule
We start by determining the complexity of the WINDET?(F) problem for the Ap-
proval rule. In the standard voting setting determining the winning candidate(s) for
approval is computationally easy, as it amounts to summing for each candidate the
number of approval votes they received and then looking for the highest total. When
moving to goal-based voting, the problem becomes harder.
First, we need some preliminary definitions and results. Let Θp2 = P
NP[log] be the
class of decision problems solvable in polynomial time by a Turing machine that can
make O(log n) queries to an NP oracle, for n the size of the input.
Consider now the following decision problem:
MAX-MODEL
Input: satisfiable propositional formula ϕ, variable p of ϕ
Question: Is there a model v ∈ Mod(ϕ) that sets a maximal number of variables of
ϕ to true and such that v(p) = 1?
To illustrate the MAX-MODEL problem, consider an instance for three proposi-
tional variables {p, q, s} where ϕ = p ∧ ¬q. We have that Mod(ϕ) = {(101), (100)}
are its models. Suppose we ask the MAX-MODEL question for q and ϕ: the answer
11As explained by Lang and Slavkovik (2014), for judgment aggregation rules the existential and
universal definitions of the WINDET problem are dual to each other, in the sense that if the universal
problem for a rule F is in a class C, its existential version is in the class CO-C.
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will be negative, since in the model (101) with a maximal number of variables set to
true, the variable q is false. On the other hand, the answer for p and ϕ is positive.
The complexity of the MAX-MODEL problem has been previously established:
Theorem 3.4 (Chen and Toda, 1995). MAX-MODEL is Θp2 -complete.
We are now ready to prove the following result for winner determination of Ap-
proval in goal-based voting:
Theorem 3.5. WINDET?(Approval) is Θp2 -complete.
Proof. For membership, we reduce an arbitrary instance of WINDET?(Approval) to
the ELECT-SATplurality,Rbasic problem, which has been shown to be Θ
p
2 -complete in
Proposition 4.(3) by Lang (2004). Intuitively, given a profile B and a formula ψ,
the ELECT-SATplurality,Rbasic problem asks whether there is a model selected as the
winner by plurality which satisfies ψ. It thus suffices to construct an instance for
B = 〈γ1, . . . ,γn〉 and formula ψ = ∧ j∈S
ρ(j)=1
j ∧∧ j′∈S
ρ(j′)=0
¬j′.
For hardness we reduce from an instance of MAX-MODEL where ϕ[p1, . . . , pm] is
a satisfiable formula and pi for i ∈ {1, . . . , m} is one of its variables. Construct now
an instance of WINDET?(Approval) where Γ = (γ1, . . . ,γm,γm+1,γm+2, . . . ,γ2m+1) is
a profile such that γ1 = · · · = γm+1 = ϕ and γm+2 = p1, . . . , γ2m+1 = pm.
We have that Approval(Γ) ⊆ Mod(ϕ), since a strict majority of m+12m+1 agents al-
ready supports all the models of ϕ. Moreover, in this profile Γ precisely the mod-
els maximizing the number of variables set to true in ϕ win. In fact, consider a
model v ∈ Mod(ϕ): as explained, v gets the support of all the first m + 1 agents
whose goal is ϕ, and then for all the agents in {m + 2, . . . , 2m + 1} it gets the sup-
port of those agents whose goal-variable is true in v. Specifically, the support of v is
(m + 1) + |{pi | v(pi) = 1}|.
Hence, only those v ∈ Mod(ϕ) with a maximal number of 1s are in the out-
come of Approval(Γ). It now suffices to set S = {pi} for pi the propositional vari-
able in the instance of MAX-MODEL and ρ(pi) = 1. Therefore, a formula ϕ has a
model with a maximal number of variables set to true where pi is true if and only if
WINDET?(Approval) returns yes on the constructed profile Γ.
As stated in Section 3.1.2, the Approval rule is an instance of an IC merging op-
erator from belief merging. The proof sketch of an equivalent result to that of The-
orem 3.5 had been previously shown by Konieczny et al. (2002) in the context of
belief merging. Our formulation however allows for a clearer comparison with the
frameworks of voting and judgment aggregation.
3.3.3 Threshold Rule
We now study the winner determination problem for a TrShµ rules where the weight
for each model of an agent’s goal, and for each agent, is 1. Intuitively, this means that
an agent submitting a goal having three models will have a global weight of 3, while
an agent submitting a goal satisfied by a single model will have a weight of 1. This
rule is of interest in case we want to reward an agent submitting a goal which can be
satisfied in more cases (i.e., we interpret it as a sign of the agents being flexible versus
them being “picky”). The individual weight of each agent is 1, however, meaning
that no specific agent has more voting power by design.
Theorem 3.6. WINDET(TrShµ) is NP-complete, if µγi(v) = 1 and wi = 1 for all i ∈ N
and v ∈ 2m.
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Proof. For membership in NP, consider an instance of WINDET(TrShµ) composed by
a profile Γ = (γ1, . . . ,γn) and an issue j. Guess n sets of interpretations X1, . . . , Xn
such that for all i ∈ N we have Xi ⊆ 2m and |Xi| ≤ qj + 1, and for each v ∈ Xi
we have v(j) = 1. Namely, we are guessing potential (sub)sets of the models of the
agents goals having issue j set to true. The size of this guess is at most n · qj and recall
that qj ≤ n. It is then easy to check whether |X1|+ · · ·+ |Xn| > qj and whether for
all v ∈ Xi we have v ∈ Mod(γi), i.e., model-checking if v |= γi.
For hardness, we reduce from an instance ϕ of the SAT problem. Construct a
profile Γ = (ϕ ∨ ¬p) for a single agent and a fresh variable p. Set qp = 0 (recall
that in Threshold rules the operator used is ≥). Then, ϕ is satisfiable if and only if
∑v∈Mod(γ1) v(p) > qp.
The proof of Theorem 3.6 could be easily adapted to the case where the individ-
ual weights wi for i ∈ N have different values, as they have to be multiplied with
the corresponding cardinalities |Xi|. However, when the weights of the models of
the goals are defined in a more complex manner, as for instance in EQuota rules, it
may not be enough to know that the models are at least k to compute the result.
3.3.4 Majority Rules
An example of a jump in complexity brought by the weights assigned to the agents’
goals is given by our generalizations of the majority rules. In particular, let PP,
for Probabilistic Polynomial Time, be the class of decision problems solvable by a
non-deterministic Turing machine that accepts in strictly more than half of all non-
deterministic choices if and only if the answer to the problem is yes.
The typical complete problem for PP is MAJSAT, or simply MAJ in the original
paper by Gill (1977):
MAJSAT
Input: propositional formula ϕ
Question: Is it the case that |Mod(ϕ)| > |Mod(¬ϕ)|?
Namely, given a propositional formula ϕ we check whether ϕ has more models
than its negation ¬ϕ: i.e., if it is the case that a majority of all possible interpretations
is a model of ϕ.
Theorem 3.7 (Gill, 1977). MAJSAT is PP-complete.
We can now establish the complexity bounds of the problem WINDET(EMaj):
Theorem 3.8. WINDET(EMaj) is in PSPACE and PP-hard.
Proof. We start by showing membership in PSPACE. Take the algorithm which con-
siders one agent at a time and for each agent i it holds two counters ai and bi. Starting
from interpretation (00 . . . 0) and proceeding towards (11 . . . 1), the algorithm checks
whether the current interpretation satisfies γi ∧ j and if it satisfies γi. In the former
case, it increments counter ai and in the latter case it increments counter bi. Then, it
erases the current interpretation and writes the next one. At the end, the algorithm
outputs yes if and only if it it is the case that ∑i∈N
ai
bi
> n2 .
For hardness, we reduce from an instance ϕ of the MAJSAT problem. Consider a
profile Γ for three agents such that γ1 = (ϕ ∧ p) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬p) and γ2 = γ3 = > for p
a fresh variable. Since agent 1 is pivotal in Γ, we then have that EMaj(Γ)p = 1 if and
only if
m11p
Mod(ϕ) >
1
2 if and only if |Mod(ϕ)| > |Mod(¬ϕ)|.
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We next move to the rule 2sMaj and prove its complexity bounds for the WINDET
problem. We will also use the class PPP which contains problems solvable in poly-
nomial time with access to a PP oracle. First, consider the following problem:
MAJSAT-p
Input: propositional formula ϕ, variable p of ϕ
Question: Is it the case that |Mod(ϕ ∧ p)| > |Mod(ϕ ∧ ¬p)|?
For example, consider the instance of MAJSAT-p for formula ϕ = p ∨ q and vari-
able p. As Mod(ϕ ∧ p) = {(10), (11)} and Mod(ϕ ∧ ¬p) = {(01)} we have that the
answer will be positive. We now establish the complexity for this problem:
Lemma 3.1. MAJSAT-p is PP-complete.
Proof. We start by showing membership in PP. Consider the non-deterministic Tur-
ing machine that guesses an interpretation v for ϕ, with Var the set of its variables.
If v 6|= ϕ the machine accepts with probability 12 , if v |= ϕ ∧ p the machine accepts
with probability 1 and if v |= ϕ ∧ ¬p the machine accepts with probability 0. The
probability that the machine accepts is thus given by |Mod(ϕ ∧ p)|
2|Var| +
1
2 · |Mod(¬ϕ)|2|Var| , while
the probability that it rejects is |Mod(ϕ ∧ ¬p)|
2|Var| +
1
2 · |Mod(¬ϕ)|2|Var| . Therefore, |Mod(ϕ ∧ p)| >
|Mod(ϕ ∧ ¬p)| if and only if the probability that the TM accepts is higher than 12 .
For hardness, we reduce from an instance ϕ of the problem MAJSAT. Define
ψ = (ϕ ∧ p) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬p) for p a fresh variable. Now, ψ ∧ p makes only the first
disjunct true, while ψ ∧ ¬p makes the second disjunct true. Therefore, |Mod(ϕ)| >
|Mod(¬ϕ)| if and only if |Mod(ψ ∧ p)| > |Mod(ψ ∧ ¬p)|.
We can now prove the complexity of WINDET for 2sMaj:
Theorem 3.9. WINDET(2sMaj) is in PPP and PP-hard.
Proof. In order to prove membership in PPP, consider the Turing machine asking the
n queries MAJSAT-j for formulas γ1, . . . ,γn to the PP oracle. Observe that the queries
allow us to know the result of the first aggregation step of 2sMaj for j. The machine
accepts if and only if strictly more than half of the queries have positive answer.
To prove hardness for the class PP, we reduce from an instance ϕ of the MAJSAT
problem. Consider a profile Γ for three agents such that γ1 = (ϕ ∧ p) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬p),
γ2 = p and γ3 = ¬p for p a fresh variable. Observe that since agent 1 is pivotal on
p, if there are more models for ϕ than for ¬ϕ there will be more models for p than
for ¬p in Γ. We also have that 2sMaj(Γ)p = 1 if and only if EMaj(Γ)p = 1, namely on
this profile Γ the two rules will give the same outcome for p. The proof is then the
same as for Theorem 3.8.
Finally, we study the complexity of WINDETWR for the TrueMaj rule. First, note
that in the paper by Gill (1977) it is shown that the class PP is closed under com-
plement. This means that for any problem X ∈ PP, the complement problem X is
also in PP. In particular, we thus have that there is a polynomial reduction from
any instance x of a problem X ∈ PP or of its complement X ∈ PP into an instance
of MAJSAT, as MAJSAT is PP-complete. Hence, we have that x ∈ X if and only if
its translation is in MAJSAT, which means that x ∈ X if and only if its translation
is in MAJSAT, which means that MAJSAT is PP-complete. This reasoning leads to
proving the following result:
Theorem 3.10. WINDETWR(TrueMaj) for x = 1 is in PSPACE and PP-hard.12
12A similar proof can be found for x = 0.
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Proof. For membership, consider the same algorithm as the one of the proof of The-
orem 3.8, with acceptance condition that ∑i∈N
ai
bi
≥ n2 .
For hardness, we provide a reduction from an instance ϕ of the MAJSAT problem.
Construct an instance of WINDETWR(TrueMaj) by taking a profile Γ for three agents,
such that γ1 = (ϕ ∧ ¬p) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ p) and γ2 = γ3 = > for p a fresh variable, and
x = 1. Observe that when the models of ϕ are more than the models of its negation
there will be more models for ¬p than for p in Γ. We then have that |Mod(ϕ)| ≥
|Mod(¬ϕ)| if and only if WINDETWR(TrueMaj) for Γ = (γ1), j = p and x = 1 gives a
positive answer.
As we have seen, the three variations of majority for goal-based voting all bring
about a jump in complexity from the issue-wise majority rule of judgment aggrega-
tion, i.e., from P to PP. This is a direct consequence of using propositional logic as
a way to compactly express the agents’ goals. In fact, if the agents submitted the
models of their goals as the input of a goal-based voting rule, the winner determina-
tion problem for the majorities EMaj, 2sMaj and TrueMaj would become easy, since
it would suffice to perform a (weighted) sum of the positive votes for an issue.
We can, however, obtain positive results for the winner determination problem
of majority rules for certain restrictions on the language of the goals. The first concerns
the language of conjunctions L∧:
Theorem 3.11. If γi ∈ L∧ for all i ∈ N, then WINDET(EMaj), WINDET(2sMaj) and
WINDETWR(TrueMaj) are in P.
Proof. Since γi ∈ L∧ for all i ∈ N, every goal is a (possibly incomplete) conjunction
of literals Lk for k ∈ I . Hence, for each issue k that does not appear in a goal γ
exactly half of the models of γ have k true and the other half have k false; while if k
appears as a positive literal all models of γ have k true, and if it appears as a negative
literal all models of γ have k false.
For WINDET(EMaj) and WINDETWR(TrueMaj), consider a counter supp starting
at 0. For each goal γi where i ∈ N , add 1 to supp if Lj = j appears in γi, add 0 to supp
if Lj = ¬j appears in γi, and add 0.5 to supp if there is no literal Lj in γi. The answer
of WINDET(EMaj) is positive if and only if supp> n2 , and for WINDET
WR(TrueMaj)
with x = 1 the answer is positive if and only if supp> n2 .
For WINDET(2sMaj) the only difference is that also whenever there is no literal
Lj in γi we add 0 to supp. Then the answer for WINDET(2sMaj) is positive if and
only if supp> n2 .
A similar positive result can be proven for the language of disjunctionsL∨, which
includes (among other classes) Horn clauses:
Theorem 3.12. If γi ∈ L∨ for all i ∈ N, then WINDET(EMaj), WINDET(2sMaj) and
WINDETWR(TrueMaj) are in P.
Proof. We follow a similar reasoning to the one of the proof of Theorem 3.11. For
WINDET(EMaj) and WINDETWR(TrueMaj), consider a counter supp starting at 0. For
each goal γi where i ∈ N , let k be the number of literals appearing in γi. First, we
parse the agent’s goal and in case we find (p ∨ ¬p) for some p ∈ I we add 0.5 to
supp. Otherwise, add 2
k−1
2k−1 to supp if Lj = j appears in γi, add 1− 2
k−1
2k−1 to supp if
Lj = ¬j appears in γi, and add 0.5 to supp if there is no literal Lj in γi. The answer of
WINDET(EMaj) is positive if and only if supp> n2 , and for WINDET
WR(TrueMaj) with
x = 1 the answer is positive if and only if supp> n2 .
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For WINDET(2sMaj), the counter supp works differently: it adds 1 to supp if Lj =
j appears in γi and it adds 0 to supp if Lj = ¬j appears in γi or if there is no literal Lj
in γi.13 The answer for WINDET(2sMaj) is positive if and only if supp> n2 .
Theorems 3.11 and 3.12 thus open a direction of future research on restrictions
over the language of goals to find tractable instances of the winner determination
problem for the majority rules. Note also that the restrictions are not too limiting, as
we can recover both binary aggregation (with abstentions) and Horn clauses.
3.4 Aggregating Beliefs, Judgments or Goals
In this section we compare in more details our framework of goal-based voting with
both belief merging (Konieczny and Pérez, 2002) and judgment aggregation (List,
2012). The connection with the former comes from the fact that belief merging was
proposed to combine the beliefs of multiple agents: though belief merging opera-
tors and axioms differ from those of goal-based voting, both settings are concerned
with the problem of aggregating propositional formulas into a result (a set of inter-
pretations) for the group. The connection with the latter comes from the fact that
judgment aggregation is a setting where agents submit binary vectors over a set of
issues to take a collective decision: goal-based voting adapts known rules in judg-
ment aggregation to the more expressive propositional goals.
3.4.1 Goal-based Voting and Belief Merging
We here analyze the axioms and rules of goal-based voting with respect to the IC
postulates of belief merging, following the formulation by Everaere et al. (2017). The
first obvious observation is that since the Approval rule is an IC merging operator, as
mentioned in Section 3.1.2, it satisfies all the IC postulates.
In belief merging, a group of n agents wants to aggregate their individual be-
liefs to obtain the beliefs of the group. Each agent i has a set Ki = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} of
consistent propositional formulas as her beliefs. Profile E = (K1, . . . , Kn) is a vector
including all the individual belief bases. An integrity constraint µ is a propositional
formula posing a restriction on the possible outcomes. A merging operator ∆µ(E)
is a function from profiles of belief bases and integrity constraints to a set of for-
mulas. In goal-based voting terms, we have that belief bases correspond to goals:
i.e., γi = ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕk for {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} = Ki. A profile E thus corresponds to a
goal-profile Γ and a merging operator ∆µ(E) corresponds to F(Γ), with the sole ex-
ception that the output of ∆µ(E) is a set of formulas while for F(Γ) we have a set of
interpretations.
The first two IC postulates are the following:
(IC0) ∆µ(E) |= µ
(IC1) If µ is consistent, then ∆µ(E) is consistent
The postulate (IC0) requires the outcome of a rule to satisfy the constraint, while
(IC1) demands the outcome to be consistent if the constraint is consistent. As in goal-
based voting there are no integrity constraints (equivalently, the integrity constraint
is µ = >) and since F(Γ) 6= ∅ on all Γ, (IC0) and (IC1) are satisfied by design.
13Observe that the first step of aggregation of 2sMaj does not distinguish between a goal expressed
in L∧ and the corresponding goal in L∨ where each occurrence of ∧ is replaced by a ∨.
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The next postulate determines a crucial difference between belief merging oper-
ators and goal-based voting rules (except, of course, for the Approval rule):
(IC2) If
∧
E ∧ µ is consistent, then ∆µ(E) ≡
∧
E ∧ µ
Postulate (IC2) states that the outcome of a rule should coincide with the con-
junction of the individual goals if they are consistent. In Section 3.2.3 we introduced
this axiom under the name of model-unanimity and showed that EMaj, TrueMaj and
2sMaj did not satisfy it. We now generalize this result by proving that (IC2) is in-
compatible with both resoluteness and weak resoluteness:
Proposition 3.6. No goal-based voting rule F satisfying (IC2) can satisfy (R) or (WR).
Proof. Consider a profile Γ for two issues such that γ1 = · · · = γn = 1 ∨ 2. Since
Mod(
∧
i∈N γi) = {(11), (10), (01)} we have that |Mod(
∧
i∈N γi)| > 1, thus F is not
resolute, but also F(Γ) = Mod(1∨ 2) and thus F is not weakly resolute.
The next postulate (IC3) expresses the idea of irrelevance of syntax:
(IC3) If E1 ≡ E2 and µ1 ≡ µ2, then ∆µ1(E1) ≡ ∆µ2(E2)
All the goal-based voting rules defined in Section 3.1.2 satisfy (IC3), as proposi-
tional logic is used for a compact representation of goals but then the rules look at
the models of the goals to compute the outcome.
Postulate (IC4) has been introduced as a fairness axiom defined for two agents,
aiming at treating equally two belief bases. Intuitively, it states that if the result of
the merging is consistent with one belief base, it should also be consistent with the
other, so that there is no bias towards either. The formal definition is:
(IC4) If K1 |= µ and K2 |= µ, then ∆µ((K1, K2)) ∧ K1 is consistent if and only if
∆µ((K1, K2)) ∧ K2 is consistent
Goal-based voting rules EMaj, 2sMaj and 2sMaj do not satisfy (IC4), as shown by
the following example:
Example 3.12. Consider a profile Γ for two agents and three issues such that γ1 =
¬1∧ ¬2∧ ¬3 and γ2 = (1∧ ¬2∧ ¬3) ∨ (¬1∧ 2∧ ¬3) ∨ (¬1∧ ¬2∧ 3). We have that
EMaj(Γ) = TrueMaj(Γ) = 2sMaj(Γ) = {(000)}. The outcome is thus only consistent
with the goal of agent 1 and not with that of agent 2.
Postulates (IC5) and (IC6) can be seen as analogous to the axiom of reinforce-
ment in social choice theory (Young, 1974). Together they intuitively say that if we
combine two profile into a new one, the outcome of the merging on the new profile
should be the intersection of the outcomes on the two initial profiles. Formally:
(IC5) ∆µ(E1) ∧ ∆µ(E2) |= ∆µ(E1 unionsq E2)
(IC6) If ∆µ(E1) ∧ ∆µ(E2) is consistent, then ∆µ(E1 unionsq E2) |= ∆µ(E1) ∧ ∆µ(E2)
We prove that the three majoritarian rules EMaj, 2sMaj and TrueMaj satisfy the
reinforcement postulates (IC5) and (IC6). For clarity, we express them in goal-based
voting terms:14
14The same formulation of reinforcement has been introduced for binary aggregation as well
(Costantini et al., 2016).
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Theorem 3.13. For any Γ and Γ′, EMaj, 2sMaj and TrueMaj satisfy F(Γ) ∩ F(Γ′) =
S 6= ∅ if and only if F(Γ unionsq Γ′) = S.
Proof. Consider two arbitrary profiles Γ and Γ′. Let EMaj(Γ) = EMaj(Γ′) = {w}. For
all j ∈ I : if w(j) = 1, then there were more than n2 votes for j in both Γ and Γ′ (and
consequently in Γ unionsq Γ′); if w(j) = 0, then in Γ and Γ′ either there was a tie for j or
there were less than n2 votes for j. Any combination of ties or votes lower than
n
2 for
j in Γ and Γ′ still leads to EMaj(Γ unionsq Γ′)j = 0.
The reasoning for 2sMaj is the same as for EMaj applied to the second step only.
For TrueMaj, let TrueMaj(Γ) ∩ TrueMaj(Γ′) = S. For all j ∈ I : if there are w, w′ ∈ S
such that w(j) = 1 and w′(j) = 0, then Γ and Γ′ had a tie in the votes for j and thus
a tie will be in Γ unionsq Γ′ (hence in the outcome). If w(j) = 1 for all w ∈ S (analogously
for 0), there may have been a tie in either Γ′ or Γ for j, but not both, and so Γunionsq Γ′ will
have no tie for j.
Next, we have (IC7) and (IC8) which have been introduced as generalizations of
belief revision axioms:
(IC7) ∆µ1(E) ∧ µ2 |= ∆µ1∧µ2(E)
(IC8) If ∆µ1(E) ∧ µ2 is consistent, then ∆µ1∧µ2(E) |= ∆µ1(E)
Again, since in the framework of goal-based voting presented here we do not con-
sider integrity constraints, the two postulates are not applicable.
Finally, we have the (Maj) postulate defining majority merging operators: it
states that we can always make any belief base the outcome by adding a certain
number of its copies to a given profile. Formally:
(Maj) ∃n∆µ(E1 unionsq En2 ) |= ∆µ(E2)
Interestingly, the (Maj) postulate is not satisfied by neither EMaj nor TrueMaj, as
illustrated by the following example:
Example 3.13. Take a profile Γ for two issues such that γ1 = 1∧ 2 and γ2 = 1↔ ¬2:
by adding any number of copies of γ2 to Γ, in the presence of γ1 the outcome will
always be {(11)} for both EMaj and TrueMaj.
In conclusion, belief merging and goal-based voting are technically similar frame-
works to the point where some rules, like Approval, can be used in both. On the other
hand, as we have seen in this section, the focus in each framework is on rules which
satisfy some properties (being them called axioms or postulates) that are deemed
more important if the object of the aggregation is a goal or a belief and that can be
mutually exclusive.
3.4.2 Goal-based Voting and Judgment Aggregation
The framework of judgment aggregation has been introduced to model collective
decision-making when agents have binary opinions over a set of issues. This frame-
work can be expressed in two equivalent formulations: the formula-based model by
List (2012) and the binary aggregation model by Grandi and Endriss (2011). The
models are equivalent in the sense that it is possible to translate any problem ex-
pressed in one framework into a problem of the other framework (Endriss et al.,
2016). Moreover, the relationship of judgment aggregation rules and voting rules
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has been studied by Lang and Slavkovik (2013). In this section we will first con-
sider formula-based judgment aggregation, then the binary aggregation model (also
with its extension to abstentions), and finally we will re-examine the axioms used in
Theorem 3.3 in judgment aggregation terms.
We start by briefly describing formula-based judgment aggregation and compare
it with goal-based voting. A set of agentsN = {1, . . . , n} have to take a decision over
a set Φ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm,¬ϕ1, . . . ,¬ϕm} of propositional formulas called the agenda.
Each agent i supports some formulas of the agenda by adding them to her individual
consistent judgment set Ji which contains one of either ϕk or ¬ϕk for 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
A first intuitive idea would be to translate an instance of a goal-based voting
problem into formula-based judgment aggregation as follows:
Example 3.14. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents expressing the goals γ1, . . . ,γn
over the issues in I = {1, . . . , m}. Construct now a formula-based judgment aggre-
gation problem by considering the set of agents N JA = {1, . . . , n} and the agenda
Φ = {γ1, . . . ,γn,¬γ1, . . . ,¬γn}.15 Then, let Ji = {γi}⋃k 6=i{¬γk} for all i ∈ N .
There are a number of problems with the translation proposed in Example 3.14.
From a conceptual point of view, the agenda should be a set in advance list of issues
on which agents are asked to provide an opinion: it should not be the opinions
themselves. From a technical point of view, individual judgment sets need to be
consistent while the proposed translation may give inconsistent sets in case goals
are mutually compatible (e.g., if γ1 = 1 ∧ 2 and γ2 = 1 we would have J1 = {1 ∧
2,¬1}which is inconsistent). From a practical point of view, many rules in judgment
aggregation calculate their outcome based on how many agents support a formula in
the agenda: in the proposed translation, only agents having goal γi would include
formula γi in their individual judgment set, and in profiles with n different goals
it would result in a symmetric situation where only one agent supports each goal-
formula and the negations of all the other goal-formulas.
Observe that even a translation where Φ = I ⋃j∈I{¬j} would not work, as an
agent with goal γ = 1 → 2 would not be able to choose whether or not to include
formulas 1 and 2 in her judgment set. For ease of presentation, given the difficulties
just raised and since the two models are equivalent, we discuss how to translate
a judgment aggregation problem into goal-based voting for the binary aggregation
model only.
In binary aggregation, we have a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n} who have to ex-
press an opinion over a set I = {1, . . . , m} of binary issues. Each agent i ∈ N
submits as her ballot a vector Bi ∈ {0, 1}m with a binary decision for each issue in I .
The j-th position of vector Bi is denoted by bij. A profile is a vector B = (B1, . . . , Bn)
containing all the agents’ ballots. Finally, we have an integrity constraint IC, that is a
propositional formula written over variables in I to model an existing relationship
among the issues.16 Each agent i has to submit a ballot Bi satisfying IC.
In order to translate an instance of a binary aggregation problem into goal-based
voting we thus need to extend the latter framework with integrity constraints. Then,
a possible translation is illustrated by the following example:
Example 3.15. Let B = (B1, . . . , Bn) be a binary aggregation profile for issues I =
{1, . . . , m}, agents N = {1, . . . , n} and constraint IC. Consider now the goal-based
15To be consistent with the common definition of agendas in formula-based judgment aggregation,
we let ¬γi = ψ in case γi = ¬ψ (i.e., we avoid double negation).
16When translating an instance of a formula-based judgment aggregation problem into a binary
aggregation one, the constraint IC is used to model the logical structure of the agenda Φ.
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voting translation whose issues and agents are I and N , respectively, and the goal
of an agent i ∈ N is defined as γi = ∧bij=1
j∈I
j ∧ ∧bij=0
j∈I
¬j. Namely, we construct a
goal-profile Γ where each goal γi is such that Mod(γi) = {Bi}. By construction we
thus have that γi |= IC.
As far as rules are concerned, the issue-wise (strict) majority rule for binary ag-
gregation (Dietrich and List, 2007b; Endriss, 2016), is formally defined as:
Maj(B)j = 1 iff ∑
i∈N
bij ≥
⌈
n
2
⌉
.
It is then easy to prove that both EMaj and 2sMaj are generalizations of Maj, in the
sense that their outcomes coincide when agents have goals in the form of complete
conjunctions of literals (as per Example 3.15). More precisely, we have that for EMaj:
EMaj(Γ)j = 1 iff ∑
i∈N
( ∑
v∈Mod(γi)
v(j)
|Mod(γi)| ) ≥
⌈
n
2
⌉
iff ∑
i∈N
( ∑
v∈Mod(γi)
v(j)
1
) ≥
⌈
n
2
⌉
iff ∑
i∈N
vi(j) ≥
⌈
n
2
⌉
Maj(B)j = 1 iff ∑
i∈N
bij ≥
⌈
n
2
⌉
And for 2sMaj we have:
2sMaj(Γ) = Maj(EMaj(Mod(γ1)), . . . , EMaj(Mod(γn)))
= Maj(B1, . . . , Bn)
Since TrueMaj is weakly resolute, it does not directly correspond to Maj. Endriss
and Grandi (2014) proposed an irresolute issue-wise majority defined as Maj?(B) =
{Bw, Bs} where Bw is the outcome of weak majority and Bs is that of strict major-
ity. This is a different rule from TrueMaj, even when restricted to profiles of binary
aggregation, as shown by the following example:
Example 3.16. Take a profile Γ for two agents and issues such that Mod(γ1) = {(01)}
and Mod(γ2) = {(10)}. The result of Maj? is {(00), (11)}, while the result of TrueMaj
is {(11), (00), (10), (01)}.
In the framework of binary aggregation with abstentions by Dokow and Holz-
man (2010b) entries in a ballot can also have value ? in case the agents is abstaining
on those issues, i.e., Bi ∈ {0, 1, ?}m. We can keep the translation of ballots into goals
of Example 3.15: if a ballot Bi for some i ∈ N has value bij = ? for some j ∈ I , the
issue will not appear as a conjunct in the corresponding γi. Terzopoulou et al. (2018)
recently defined classes of scoring functions for formula-based judgment aggregation
with abstentions, where different weights are given to the formulas in an individual
judgment set Ji depending on its size: an interesting direction for future work would
be to translate such rules as goal-based voting rules.
We conclude this section by comparing the axioms used in Theorem 3.3, i.e.,
(I), (N), (A), (M) and (U), with those used for characterizing the majority rule in
resolute binary aggregation (Grandi and Endriss, 2011). From the point of view of
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goal-based voting, we will thus focus on the special case of goals which are complete
conjunctions of literals: for all i ∈ N we have |Mod(γi)| = 1. Hence, for simplicity
we can write mi(j) = 0 instead of mi(j) = (1, 0), and mi(j) = 1 instead of mi(j) =
(0, 1). As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we denote by G∧ the class of profiles Γ where
goals are complete conjunctions. Note however that in binary aggregation functions
are defined for fixed N and I , while in goal-based voting functions are defined for
any N and I .
Independence. A rule F is independent if and only if there are functions f j : {0, 1}m →
{{0}, {1}, {0, 1}} for j ∈ I and m ∈ N+ such that for all profiles Γ we have
F(Γ) = Πj∈I f j(m1(j), . . . , mn(j)). If this is the case, it means that in partic-
ular if in two profiles Γ and Γ′ we have that mi(j) = m′i(j) for all i ∈ N ,
f j(m1(j), . . . , mn(j)) = f j(m′1(j), . . . , m
′
n(j)) and thus F(Γ)j = F(Γ
′)j. Thus, the
restriction of (I) to profiles in G∧, i.e., profiles of binary aggregation,17 implies
the binary aggregation axiom of independence (I)BA:
(I)BA: For any issue j ∈ I and profiles B and B′, if bij = b′ij for all i ∈ N , then
F(B)j = F(B′)j.
The formulation of the axiom of independence in goal-based voting is close to
the original formulation by List and Pettit (2002) of the axiom of systematicity
for judgment aggregation. Besides being defined for resolute rules and for a
given set of agents and issues, the notion of systematicity differs from inde-
pendence as it also includes neutrality, since the function f used to decide the
outcome is the same for all issues.18
Neutrality. The goal-based voting notion of neutrality when restricted to profiles in
G∧ implies the binary aggregation notion of issue-neutrality (I-N)BA:
(I-N)BA: For any two issues j, j′ ∈ I and any profile B, if for all i ∈ N we have
that bij = b′ij then F
′(B)j = F(B)j′ .
In fact, if we consider a profile Γ in which two issues j, k ∈ I are such that
mi(j) = mi(k) for all i ∈ N , and we consider the permutation σ such that
σ(j) = k, σ(k) = j, and σ(`) = ` (for ` ∈ I \ {j, k}) we obtain a profile Γ′ which
is identical to Γ. Therefore, F(Γ)j = F(Γ′)k = F(Γ)k.
Anonymity. The axiom of anonymity in goal-based voting is a direct generalization
of anonymity in binary aggregation (A)BA:
(A)BA: For any profile B and any permutation σ : N → N , it is the case that
F(B1, . . . , Bn) = F(Bσ(1), . . . , Bσ(n)).
It suffices to substitute the propositional goals with their unique model to ob-
tain the axiom of binary aggregation.
17To be more precise, a profile in binary aggregation is (v1, . . . , vn for vi ∈ Mod(γi) for i ∈ N rather
than (γ1, . . . ,γn), as we have seen above in this section. We use the two formulations interchangeably
given that we focus on goals in G∧.
18Similarly to the discussion presented here, in the paper by List and Pettit (2004) it is stated that the
original notion of systematicity implies the preference aggregation notion of independence of non-welfare
characteristics (INW). The generalization of the definition of (INW) from preferences to judgments has
then been used as the standard definition of systematicity, and thus of independence (List, 2012).
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Unanimity. A rule F is unanimous if for all profiles Γ and for all j ∈ I , if mi(j) = x
for all i ∈ N , then F(Γ)j = x for x ∈ {0, 1}. Again, this is a direct generalization
of the axiom of unanimity in binary aggregation (U)BA:
(U)BA: For any profile B and any x ∈ {0, 1}, if bij = x for all i ∈ N then
F(B)j = x.
Monotonicity. A rule F is monotonic if for all profiles Γ = (γ1, . . . ,γi, . . . ,γn) and
Γ? = (γ1, . . . ,γ?i , . . . ,γn), for all j ∈ I and i ∈ N , if mi(j)? = 1 and mi(j) = 0
then F(Γ)1j ≥ F(Γ)0j implies F(Γ?)1j > F(Γ?)0j . First, observe that the condition
of comparable profiles is trivially satisfied in binary aggregation, as agents al-
ways have a goal with a single model. Goal-based monotonicity implies issue-
monotonicity in binary aggregation (M)BA:
(M)BA: For any issue j ∈ I and profiles B = (B1, . . . , Bi, . . . , Bn) and B′ =
(B−i, B′i) if bij = 0 and bij′ = 1, then F(B)j = 1 entails F(B
′)j = 1.
Goal-based monotonicity is however more general, as it also considers possible
ties in the outcome (which for the TrueMaj rule derive from a tie in the input).
Duality. The notion of duality in goal-based voting does not directly imply the ax-
iom of domain neutrality (D-N)BA in binary aggregation:
(D-N)BA: For any two issues j, j′ ∈ I and any profile B, if bij = 1− bij′ for all
i ∈ N then F(B)j = 1− F(B)j′ .
Duality and independence together imply domain-neutrality. Consider a pro-
file Γ where for two issues j, j′ ∈ I we have mi(j) = 1− mi(j′) for all i ∈ N .
In the profile Γ? where for all i ∈ N we have γ?i = γi, the resolute outcome
F(Γ)j is equal to 1− F(Γ)j. Observe however that mi(j)? = mi(j′) and thus by
independence we have that F(Γ)j′ = 1− F(Γ)j.
In binary aggregation, we have the following result:
Theorem 3.14 (Grandi and Endriss, 2011). If the number of individuals is odd, an
aggregation procedure F satisfies (A)BA, (I-N)BA, (D-N)BA, (I)BA, (M)BA if and only if
it is the majority rule.
Theorem 3.3 can thus be seen as a generalization of Theorem 3.14, with the im-
portant distinctions that (i) we consider rules defined for all N and I , (ii) we con-
sider odd and even number of agents, and (iii) TrueMaj is not resolute (unlike Maj).
3.5 Conclusions
From the observation that judgment aggregation falls short in modeling some real-
life examples of collective decision-making in multi-issue domains, such as finding
a shared travel plan for a group of friends (Example 3.1), we introduced voting rules
to aggregate a set of compactly represented goals in propositional logic into a col-
lectively satisfying alternative. Some of our rules were inspired by belief merging
operators or they were generalizations of known voting rules in social choice theory.
In order to formally analyze them, we explored many possible formulations of
axioms describing desirable properties and studied how they relate to one another.
We noticed a tension between resoluteness and fairness for a voting rule, as certain
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sets of axioms are not satisfiable together (see, e.g., Theorem 3.1). A rule that tries
to find a compromise between these two needs is the adaptation of the majority rule
that we call TrueMaj, for which we provided an axiomatization in Theorem 3.3.
We also studied the computational complexity of determining the outcome for
our rules, with an expected increase in complexity due to the fact that our agents
use compactly expressed preferences. In particular, we find that Approval is Θp2 -
complete (as per analogous results in the literature on belief merging), a special case
of TrSh rules is NP-complete, and our generalizations of majority are all hard for the
PP class. Such a result opens up a path for future research in studying restrictions
on the language of goals that may determine islands of tractability for the WINDET
problem, or develop tractable approximations for their computation. We obtained
first positive results in this direction with Theorems 3.11 and 3.12.
Finally, we compared our framework with both belief merging and judgment
aggregation, in order to give a precise assessment of how the settings relate to one
another. We find that some of the properties we study are incompatible with proper-
ties of other frameworks (in particular, belief merging) and that the rules in different
frameworks focus on different types of properties. For the reader interested in a
comparison between the frameworks of belief merging and judgment aggregation
we refer to the paper by Everaere et al. (2017).
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Chapter 4
Aggregation of Incomplete CP-nets
In Chapter 3 we have seen how goals of different agents who look for a collective
decision can be compactly represented by a propositional formula. Propositional
logic can be used also to compactly represent preferences of agents over possible
outcomes that are conditional on specific assumptions, as in the scenario presented
in the following example:
Example 4.1. Lucy wants to rent an apartment and to make her decision she deems
three factors to be important: location, price, and whether she will have flatmates
or not. In case the apartment is expensive or it is located in the suburbs, she would
prefer having flatmates (to share utilities or get some company) rather than living
alone. Hence, if an apartment is expensive and located in the city center she would
rather share it with flatmates. Lucy does not say what her preference is over having
flatmates if she sees the listing for a cheap and central apartment. Nor do we know
what she would prefer between an expensive shared apartment in the center and a
cheap shared apartment in the suburbs.
In Example 4.1, Lucy needs a compact way to express her preferences instead
of simply ordering all possible configurations of apartments. Moreover, she does
not specify her preference over some variable for all possible combinations of the
remaining variables, which would be required by the classical framework of CP-
nets introduced in Section 2.3. We thus need to work in the framework of generalized
CP-nets by Goldsmith et al. (2008), gCP-nets for short, where agents do not have the
burden of providing complete preference tables but they can state preconditions of
their statements as propositional formulas.
In this chapter we thus bridge two lines of research in CP-nets: the one on gCP-
nets and the one on the aggregation of CP-nets coming from multiple agents (mCP-
nets). We will consider the case where multiple agents express a gCP-net and they
want to find a collective ordering that reflects their individual preferences. We will
use four semantics to aggregate individual gCP-nets, inspired by the work on mCP-
nets by Rossi et al. (2004) and Lukasiewicz and Malizia (2016), but adapted to the
fact that CP-nets in our case are incomplete. Analogously to the winner determi-
nation problem in goal-based voting that we saw in Section 3.3.1, when studying
the computational complexity for mgCP-nets we will not aim at generating the full
order on outcomes (its number being in general exponential in the number of vari-
ables). Rather, we will focus on determining dominance over outcomes for different
semantics, starting from complexity results for individual gCP-nets.
Grandi et al. (2014) also studied the aggregation of CP-nets but in the presence of
constraints delimiting feasible outcomes, and defined a procedure based on sequen-
tial voting that can be applied on CP-net profiles having special characteristics (i.e.,
profiles where we can find an ordering of the variables such that the agents can vote
for the value of the current variable given what has already been decided for the
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previous variables). Another approach is to use heuristics and techniques from con-
straint satisfaction problems for computing local winners in the individual CP-nets
and then rule out those that are majority-dominated by some other alternative (Li
et al., 2014, 2015). Even probabilistic CP-nets (PCP-nets), where for each variable X
there is a probability distribution over the set of all possible preference orderings
for the domain of X, have been used to model the aggregation of multiple CP-nets
(Cornelio et al., 2013, 2015). Finally, the aggregation of classical CP-nets in a context
of social influence has been studied by Maran et al. (2013), with focus in particular
on the issue of bribery.
4.1 Framework
We start by providing the syntax and the semantics for gCP-nets (Section 4.1.1).
Then, we give some complexity results for individual CP-nets (Section 4.1.2) and
present mgCP-nets (Section 4.1.3).
4.1.1 Preliminaries
Let V = {X, Y, Z, . . . } be a finite set of variables. Each variable X ∈ V has a finite
domain D(X) = {x1, . . . , xk} of possible values. With a slight abuse of notation, we
write simply xi to indicate that the variable X has been assigned value xi ∈ D(X).
Agents express conditional preferences, meaning that the value for one variable may
depend on the values assigned to other variables. For X a variable and xi, xj ∈ D(X)
two of its possible values, xi . xj expresses a preference over X intuitively stating that
value xi is preferred to xj for X. A preference can only be expressed over values of a
single variable: i.e., we cannot write xi . yi for xi ∈ D(X) and yi ∈ D(Y) for X 6= Y.
A propositional formula ψ over W ⊆ V is defined over ⋃X∈W D(X) by using the
standard propositional connectives, though the domains are not necessarily binary.
Therefore, a formula such as ¬xi, for xi ∈ D(X), is equivalent to ∨xj∈D(X),xj 6=xi xj and
formulas such as xi ∧ xj for xi and xj different values of variable X are inconsistent,
as illustrated by the following example.
Example 4.2. Lucy is considering three neighborhoods in Toulouse: Capitole, Es-
quirol and Rangueil. We thus have a variable, let us call it B, whose domain D(B)
has three values, one for each neighborhood: b1, b2 and b3. If Lucy wants to exclude
Capitole, it means that she either considers Esquirol or Rangueil: i.e., formula ¬b1 is
equivalent to b2 ∨ b3. Moreover, she cannot state that she wants her apartment to be
in two neighborhoods at the same time, hence a formula like b2 ∧ b1 is inconsistent.
Let ψ be a propositional formula over variables inW and X /∈ W be a variable.
Let also pi = xi . xj be a preference over two possible values xi, xj ∈ D(X). A
conditional preference statement ϕ defined as ψ :pi expresses the fact that if ψ is true,
then the preferences over X behave as stated by pi. In particular, we call formula ψ
the precondition of ϕ. The condition X /∈ W is required to rule out statements such as
“If the apartment is in Rangueil, then an apartment in Capitole is to be preferred to
an apartment in Esquirol”. A gCP-net N = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} is a finite set of conditional
preference statements. We rewrite more compactly transitive statements of the form
ψ :(xi . xj) and ψ :(xj . xk) as ψ :(xi . xj . xk).
A gCP-net can be represented by a dependency graph, where each node is a
variable and an edge from X to Y indicates that some values of X occur in the pre-
condition of a preference over values for Y. A gCP-net N is acyclic if its dependency
graph is acyclic. The following example shows the concepts introduced above:
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A
B
C
c ∨ b3 : a . a
> : b2 . b1 . b3
c : b1 . b2
FIGURE 4.1: Dependency graphs and conditional preference state-
ments for the gCP-nets N1 and N2 of Example 4.3. The additional
dependency given by statement ϕ3 is shown with a dashed line.
Example 4.3. Lucy is looking for an apartment in Toulouse on a popular website
for local listings. She is interested by three features: the type of accommodation
she can rent (A), which can be either an entire apartment (a) or a room in a shared
apartment (a); the neighborhood where the house is located (B), that for her only
includes Capitole (b1), Esquirol (b2) or Rangueil (b3); the cost (C), which can be high
(c) or normal (c). The set of variables is V = {A, B, C} and the domains of the
variables are D(A) = {a, a}, D(B) = {b1, b2, b3} and D(C) = {c, c}. Lucy submits to
this service her gCP net N1 = {ϕ1, ϕ2}, where the statements are as follows:
(ϕ1) > : b2 . b1 . b3,
(ϕ2) c ∨ b3 : a . a.
Later on, Lucy updates her gCP-net by adding statement ϕ3:
(ϕ3) c : b1 . b2.
Statement ϕ1 says that Lucy unconditionally prefers to live in Esquirol over Capitole
over Rangueil. Statement ϕ2 says that if the apartment is expensive or in Rangueil, a
shared place is preferred. Statement ϕ3 says that if the apartment is costly, Capitole
is better than Esquirol.
The dependency graphs for Lucy’s gCP-nets N1 and N2 = N1∪{ϕ3} are depicted
in Figure 4.1.
An outcome is an assignment to each variable X ∈ V of a value in their domain
D(X). For instance, outcome x1y2z3 . . . is such that variable X is assigned value x1,
Y is assigned y2, Z is assigned z3, and so on. In our example, an outcome would
be a specific apartment of which we know location, price and presence of flatmates.
The set of all outcomes is denoted by O = ΠXi∈VD(Xi). If X ∈ V is a variable, we
write as o[X] the value of outcome o on X; ifW ⊆ V is a set of variables, we write
o[W ] for the values of outcome o on W . We also write o |= ψ to say that outcome
o satisfies propositional formula ψ (taking into account as explained before how we
handle variables with non-binary values).
Preferences over outcomes are represented by a binary relation > over O. If
o1 > o2 we say that o1 dominates o2 with respect to >, meaning that o1 is preferred to
o2 in >. If o1 > o2 and o2 6> o1, we say that o1 strictly dominates o2 with respect to >. In
case o1 6> o2 and o2 6> o1 we say that o1 and o2 are incomparable with respect to >, and
we write it as o1 ./ o2. The following notion of worsening flips allows us to define
the semantics of conditional preference statements over binary relations on O.
Definition 4.1. If xi, xj ∈ D(X), ϕ = ψ : xi . xj is a conditional preference statement
with respect to X, and o1 and o2 are two outcomes, then there is a worsening flip from
o1 to o2 sanctioned by ϕ if o1 |= ψ, o2 |= ψ, o1[Y] = o2[Y], for any Y ∈ V \ {X} and
o1[X] = xi, o2[X] = xj.
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ab3c
ab1c
ab2c
ab3c
ab1c
ab2c
ab3c
ab1c
ab2c
ab3c
ab1c
ab2c
ϕ1
ϕ1
ϕ1
ϕ1
ϕ1
ϕ1ϕ1
ϕ1
ϕ2ϕ2
ϕ2
ϕ2
ϕ3
ϕ3
FIGURE 4.2: The induced model from Example 4.4. An arrow from
o1 to o2 indicates a worsening flip sanctioned by N1 and is labeled by
the preference statement inducing it. Transitivity arrows are omitted.
Intuitively, we have a worsening flip from o1 to o2 sanctioned by ϕ = ψ :(xi . xj) if
outcomes o1 and o2 both satisfy precondition ψ, and they differ only in that variable
X has value xi in o1 and value xj in o2. Namely, if ψ is true, all else being equal (ceteris
paribus) it is better to have xi than xj. We say that there is an improving flip from o2 to
o1 sanctioned by ϕ if there is a worsening flip from o1 to o2 sanctioned by ϕ. If N is a
gCP-net, a worsening (improving) flip from o2 to o1 sanctioned by N is a worsening
(improving) flip from o2 to o1 sanctioned by some ϕ ∈ N.
Definition 4.2. If N is a gCP-net and o, o′ are two outcomes, then o dominates o′ with
respect to N, written o >N o′, if there exists a sequence of outcomes o1, . . . , ok such
that o1 = o, ok = o′ and, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}, there exists a worsening flip
from oi to oi+1 sanctioned by N.
We call >N the induced model of N and often write >i instead of >Ni when clear
from context. We say that a gCP-net is consistent if there is no chain of worsening
flips starting with some outcome o and ending back on o. Since >N is transitive, this
is equivalent to saying that there is no outcome o such that o >N o.
Example 4.4. For the scenario described in Example 4.3 there are 12 possible out-
comes. The outcome o = ab2c refers to a reasonably priced and private apartment
in Esquirol. For the variables A and B, o[{A, B}] = ab2 refers to the values of out-
come o on variables A and B. For the gCP-net N1 = {ϕ1, ϕ2} provided by Lucy, the
induced model >1, as well as the worsening flips induced by adding ϕ3, is depicted
in Figure 4.2. Adding statement ϕ3 to N1 results in an inconsistent gCP-net, as the
induced model >2 of N2 = N1 ∪ {ϕ3} contains the sequence of worsening flips ab2c,
ab1c, ab2c, which implies that ab2c >2 ab2c.
Observe that Definition 4.1 assumes that the ceteris paribus assumption holds
even for the models of ψ in statements as ψ :pi. For instance, in Example 4.3 we
induce the rankings ab3c > ab3c and ab3c > ab3c from statement ϕ2 = c ∨ b3 : a . a,
but not ab3c > ab2c, though both ab3c and ab2c satisfy precondition c ∨ b3. While it
induces less comparisons between outcomes, we believe this interpretation to be jus-
tified here as (i) it does not infer more than what is strictly warranted by the agent’s
statements, and (ii) it gives the agents more freedom to refine their orders without
thereby creating inconsistencies, as the following example illustrates:
Example 4.5. Consider V as in Example 4.3, but Lucy now submits the gCP-net
N = {a ∨ c : b3 . b2}. If the semantics was not interpreted only ceteris paribus, we
could derive that ab3c >N ab2c, meaning that Lucy prefers an expensive shared
apartment in Rangueil to a cheap shared apartment in Esquirol. Suppose Lucy later
adds some statements to N, leading to N′ = {a ∨ c : b3 . b2, b2 ∧ c : a . a, b3 ∧ c : a .
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DOMINANCE: o1 >N o2.
CONSISTENCY: N is consistent.
WNON-DOM’ED: o is weakly non-dominated in >N.
NON-DOM’ED: o is non-dominated in >N.
DOM’ING: o is dominating in >N.
STR-DOM’ING: o is strongly dominating in >N.
∃NON-DOM’ED: there is a non-dominated outcome in >N.
∃DOM’ING: there is a dominating outcome in >N.
∃STR-DOM’ING: there is a strongly dominating outcome in >N.
TABLE 4.1: Reasoning tasks for a gCP-net N and outcomes o, o1, o2.
a, a ∧ c : b2 . b3, a ∧ b2 : c . c}. From N′ we now derive ab2c >N′ ab3c, i.e., N′ is now
inconsistent, which would not have happened under the ceteris paribus assumption.
4.1.2 Individual gCP-nets
We are interested in studying some key computational problems about notions of
consistency, dominance, and optimality, rather than providing a full order over out-
comes. Let > be a binary relation on O and o an outcome: we say that o is weakly
non-dominated if, for any outcome o′, it holds that o′ > o implies o > o′. If there
is no outcome o′ such that o′ > o, including o′ = o, then we say that o is simply
non-dominated. If o > o′ for all outcomes o′, then o is a dominating outcome. If o is
dominating as well as non-dominated, then it is strongly dominating. Observe that if
o is weakly non-dominated, then it is possible that o is part of a cycle in >, as long
as the cycle is not dominated by an outcome outside it. Likewise, if o is dominating,
then it can be involved in a cycle in >. Table 4.1 lists the reasoning tasks of interest.
The computational complexity of these tasks for a single gCP-net has been es-
tablished in previous work (Goldsmith et al., 2008)1. In particular, DOMINANCE,
CONSISTENCY, WNON-DOM’ED, DOM’ING, STR-DOM’ING, ∃DOM’ING as well as
∃STR-DOM’ING have been shown to be PSPACE-complete in the general case, with
the result for DOMINANCE holding even when the gCP-net N is consistent. The
NON-DOM’ED problem is in P, while ∃NON-DOM’ED is NP-complete. If N is con-
sistent, then the DOM’ING and ∃DOM’ING problems are in coNP. Moreover, the
SELF-DOMINANCE problem, i.e., the problem of determining for a given gCP-net N
and outcome o whether o >N o, is also PSPACE-complete.
Let us consider an additional problem. In CP-nets, an acyclic dependency graph
guarantees consistency (Boutilier et al., 2004). However, in gCP-nets this is not true
anymore, as shown by the following example:
Example 4.6. Take a gCP-net N over V = {A, B, C, D}, such that D(A) = {a},
D(B) = {b}, D(C) = {c} and D(D) = {d1, d2, d3}. Consider the following state-
ments composing the gCP-net N = {a : d1 . d2, b : d2 . d3, c : d3 . d1}. The depen-
dency graph of N is acyclic, yet N induces the ordering abcd1 >N abcd2 >N abcd3 >N
abcd1, hence abcd1 >N abcd1.2
Example 4.6 shows that a gCP-net can be acyclic, and yet contain some preference
statements whose preconditions can be triggered by the same assignment, and for
which a cycle in the ordering over outcomes is derived. Therefore, acyclic gCP-nets
1Importantly, the results by Goldsmith et al. (2008) assume that the precondition ψ of a gCP-net
is represented in disjunctive normal form. As our results will depend on theirs, we follow the same
assumption — which does not limit the expressivity of the precondition.
2An analogous example was pointed out by Wilson (2004).
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may or may not be consistent: we thus define the computational problem of check-
ing consistency for acyclic gCP-nets. Namely, given an acyclic gCP-net N for which
we can assume, without loss of generality,3 that all preferences pi in the statements
are over the same variable, to determine whether
aCONSISTENCY: N is consistent.
Intuitively, we look for a N′ ⊆ N for which the conjunction of all preconditions is
satisfiable and the preference statements lead to a cycle over the outcomes.
Proposition 4.1. aCONSISTENCY is coNP-complete.
Proof. For membership, we show that the complement of aCONSISTENCY, i.e., de-
ciding whether an acyclic gCP-net N = {ψ1 :pi1, . . . ,ψn :pin} is inconsistent, is in NP.
We guess a subset N′ ⊆ N and an assignment for the ψi’s in N′ (a partial assignment
over V). Then, for all possible completion of the guessed assignment with values in
the pii’s we check if the statements ψi :pii lead to a cycle. For hardness we reduce
from UNSAT. Consider an instance of UNSAT, i.e., a propositional formula ϕ whose
unsatisfiability we want to check. Construct now a gCP-net N = {ϕ : a . a} for A a
fresh variable whose values D(A) = {a, a} do not occur in ϕ. If ϕ is unsatisfiable,
then ϕ : a . a is discarded when constructing >N , and thus N is consistent, since it
has no cycles. On the other hand, suppose ϕ is satisfiable. Then ϕ : a . a leads to a
cycle in >N .
4.1.3 mgCP-nets
An mgCP-net M is a multi-set M = 〈N1, . . . , Nm〉 of m gCP-nets over the set V of vari-
ables. We think of the semantics for mgCP-nets as a binary relation over outcomes,
reflecting the domination relationships induced by the individual gCP-nets in M.
For every mgCP-net M we thus define a binary relation >M on outcomes, called the
induced collective model of M, which is obtained by aggregating the induced models
of the gCP-nets in M, with notions such as dominance and consistency analogous to
the ones for single gCP-nets (though transitivity is not guaranteed anymore).
Given an mgCP-net M = 〈N1, . . . , Nm〉 and two outcomes o1, o2, we define the
following sets of agents supporting a certain dominance or incomparability relation
between outcomes:
so1>o2M = {Ni ∈ M | o1 >i o2},
so1./o2M = {Ni ∈ M | o1 6>i o2 and o2 6>i o1}.
Given a gCP-net N and two outcomes o1 and o2, we define the equivalence relation
o1 ≈dN o2 if o1 = o2, or o1 >N o2 and o2 >N o1. Namely, we partition the set of
outcomes into equivalence classes. If o is an outcome, its equivalence class (i.e., the
set of outcomes that includes o and, if they exist, all outcomes with which o forms
a cycle in >N) is called the dominance class of o with respect to N and is denoted by
[o]N, with the subscript omitted when clear from context. The dominance classes
form a strict partial order, which we denote by >dN. We say that [o1] dominates [o2]
with respect to >dN, written [o1] >
d
N [o2], if o1 >N o2 and o2 ≯N o1 for o1 and o2
representative elements of their equivalence class. A dominance class [o] is non-
dominated with respect to >dN if there is no dominance class which dominates it with
respect to >dN.
3We can ignore statements on other variables as they would not be part of this inconsistency cycle.
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>N
ab3
ab3
ab2
ab1 ab1 ab2
>dN
{ab3}3
{ab3}2
{ab2}1
{ab1}0 {ab1, ab2}0
FIGURE 4.3: Dominance classes and rlpN (in superscripts).
A ranking function r with respect to a gCP-net N (mgCP-net M, respectively) assigns
to every outcome o a non-negative number rN(o) (rM(o), respectively). We some-
times write ri(o) instead of rNi(o) for simplicity. The longest path rank function r
lp
N
assigns to an outcome o the length of the longest path from [o] to a non-dominated
dominance class in >dN.
4 Observe that this always exists because all the outcomes
forming a cycle belong to the same equivalence class.
Example 4.7. Consider V = {A, B} where D(A) = {a, a} and D(B) = {b1, b2, b3}.
Take a gCP-net N = {> : b1 . b2 . b3, b3 : a . a, a : b2 . b1}. Figure 4.3 shows the induced
model >N, the dominance classes, the strict partial order >dN on dominance classes,
and the longest path ranks assigned by rlp.
We now define the semantics of mgCP-nets, generalizing the semantics defined for
mCP-nets (Rossi et al., 2004; Lukasiewicz and Malizia, 2016).
Definition 4.3. If M = 〈N1, . . . , Nm〉 is an mgCP-net, the Pareto relation >PM, major-
ity relation >majM , maximality relation >
max
M and rank relation >
r
M with respect to M are
defined, for any o1 and o2, as follows:
o1 >PM o2 if o1 >i o2, for every Ni ∈ M;
o1 >
maj
M o2 if o1 >i o2, for
⌈m+1
2
⌉
Ni ∈ M;
o1 >maxM o2 if |so1>o2M | > max{|so2>o1M |, |so1./o2M |};
o1 >rM o2 if rM(o1) ≤ rM(o2).
A dominance relation is preserved in Pareto semantics if all agents were unani-
mous about it in their individual gCP-nets. For majority semantics, it is sufficient to
have a majority of agents with that dominance relation in their gCP-nets. For max
semantics, a dominance relation is preserved if there are more agents wanting it than
agents against or indifferent towards it. Finally, a dominance relation holds in rank
semantics if the rank of an outcome is better (lower) than the rank of the other.
If S is a semantics, we call >SM the S-induced (collective) model of M. Given an
mgCP-net M and a semantics S, if o1 >SM o2 we say that o1 S-dominates o2 with re-
spect to M. We say that M is S-consistent, or simply consistent, if there is no set of
outcomes o1,. . . ,ok such that o1 >M . . . >M ok >M o1. S-non-dominated, S-weakly
non-dominated, S-dominating and S-strongly dominating outcomes for an mgCP-
net M are defined analogously as for individual gCP-nets. In the following we will
use a specific type of rank relation rM, obtained by summing up the rlp score for all
agents in M. Thus, for an mgCP-net M = 〈N1, . . . , Nm〉, we will take the rank of o
with respect to M to be rM(o) = ∑Ni∈M r
lp
i (o).
4The rank semantics has been used before to aggregate acyclic CP-nets (Rossi et al., 2004;
Lukasiewicz and Malizia, 2016). However, their definition differs from ours since acyclic CP-nets fea-
ture no cycles between outcomes.
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FIGURE 4.4: Individual and collective semantics for the mgCP-net M
of Example 4.8. Edges in the induced models >1−3 indicate worsen-
ing flips given by the gCP-nets N1−3, respectively, whereas edges in
the induced collective models indicate domination relations obtained
through aggregation. Arrows inferred through transitivity in >PM and
>rM are omitted; since >
maj
M and >
max
M are not guaranteed to be transi-
tive, every domination relation in them is explicit. Longest path ranks
assigned by rlpi are shown as a superscript.
Example 4.8. Alice, Bob and Carol are looking for a shared apartment in Toulouse.
The online service of Example 4.3 can now handle preferences submitted by multi-
ple agents. The variables are V = {A, B} as in Example 4.3, though for simplicity we
now assume each variable is binary. Alice submits N1 = {> : a . a,> : b . b, a : b . b},
while Bob and Carol submit N2 = N3 = {> : a . a,> : b . b, b : a . a}, with the cor-
responding 3gCP-net being M = 〈N1, N2, N3〉. The induced models >1, >2 and >3
together with the induced collective models >PM, >
maj
M , >
max
M and >
r
M, are shown in
Figure 4.4. None of the induced individual models has a strongly dominating out-
come, though ab is weakly non-dominated, as well as dominating, in each, and thus
a prime candidate for being at the top of the list of suggested apartments. Since
ab self-dominates in each of the individual induced models, this domination rela-
tion carries over to the induced collective models. The rank of an outcome in >rM
is computed by summing up its ranks in the individual induced models. Thus,
rM(ab) = ∑
3
i=1 r
lp
i (ab) = 6.
Observe that for different outcomes o1 and o2, if o1 >PM o2, then o1 >
maj
M o2, and
if o1 >
maj
M o2, then o1 >
max
M o2. The fact that the semantics are not mutually exclusive
suggests that they can be used alongside each other, e.g., to deliver results when
the Pareto semantics is undecided. Secondly, the maj- and max-induced models >majM
and >maxM , respectively, are not guaranteed to be transitive. However, the Pareto-
induced model >PM is transitive, since if o1 >
P
M o2 and o2 >
P
M o3, then o1 >
P
i o3, for
every Ni ∈ M, and thus o1 >PM o3. Hence, if there is a set of outcomes such that
o1 >PM . . . >
P
M ok >
P
M o1, then we have that o1 >
P
M o1. It follows that the condition
for Pareto-consistency of mgCP-nets coincides with consistency for individual gCP-
nets, i.e., M is Pareto-consistent if and only if there is no outcome o for which o >PM o.
By definition we cannot have o >maxM o, though other forms of inconsistency are
possible. Finally, the longest-path induced by >rM is a total pre-order on outcomes,
since every outcome gets a rank in >rM and two outcomes can have the same rank.
Therefore, >rM is transitive by design.
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single gCP-nets mgCP-nets
Pareto maj max r
S−DOMINANCE PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-h
S−CONSISTENCY PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-h PSPACE-h —
S−WNON-DOM’ED PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-h PSPACE-h
S−NON-DOM’ED in P PSPACE-c PSPACE-c in PSPACE —
S−DOM’ING PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-h
S−STR-DOM’ING PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-c —
S−∃NON-DOM’ED NP-c PSPACE-c NP-h (*) NP-h —
S−∃DOM’ING PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-c —
S−∃STR-DOM’ING PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-c —
TABLE 4.2: Complexity results for single gCP-nets (by Goldsmith
et al., 2008) and mgCP-nets; ‘-c’ and ‘-h’ are short for -complete and
-hard, respectively, for a given class; ‘—’ means that the answer is
trivial; ‘S’ stands for the corresponding semantics; ‘(*)’ indicates the
presence of a non-tight upper bound.
4.2 Computational Complexity
We will study here the reasoning tasks of Table 4.1, now focusing on mgCP-nets and
on the semantics introduced in Section 4.1.3. An overview of our results, along-
side existing results for single gCP-nets, is given in Table 4.2. We also recall that
PSPACE = coPSPACE and that, by Savitch’s Theorem, NPSPACE = PSPACE (Arora
and Barak, 2009): both facts will be used in our proofs.
4.2.1 Pareto semantics
For Pareto semantics (abbreviated by P), all the tasks considered turn out to be
PSPACE-complete. Intuitively, we cannot leverage the polynomial algorithm for
checking whether an outcome o1 is non-dominated in individual gCP-nets: if o1 is
found to be dominated by o2 in some gCP-net Ni from M, this is of no help in de-
ciding whether o1 is dominated in >PM. The outcome o2 would have to dominate o1
in every >i for this to hold. Our first two results will thus determine a jump in com-
plexity with respect to the single-agent case from P and NP, respectively, to PSPACE;
while the rest of our results will stay in PSPACE.
Theorem 4.1. The P−NON-DOM’ED problem for mgCP-nets is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. We show that the complement, i.e., checking whether o is dominated in >PM,
is PSPACE-complete. For membership, guess an outcome o′ and check if o′ >PM o,
which amounts to at most m PSPACE tasks.
For hardness, we do a reduction from the SELF-DOMINANCE problem for single
gCP-nets. Thus, given a gCP-net N and an outcome o = xyz · · · , take the 2gCP-net
M = 〈N1, N2〉, where N1 = N and N2 = {(y ∧ z ∧ . . . ) : x . x}: i.e., N2 is such that the
only induced comparison in >2 is one in which o self-dominates. The claim, then, is
that o is self-dominating in >N iff o is dominated in >PM. To see this, assume first that
o >N o, hence o >1 o. Since o >2 o by design, it follows that o >PM o. Conversely, if o
is dominated in >PM, then, as o is not dominated by another outcome in >2, this can
only be because it is dominated by itself in >PM, and thus it self-dominates in >N.
Theorem 4.2. The P−∃NON-DOM’ED problem for mgCP-nets is PSPACE-complete.
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Proof. For membership, we guess an outcome o and ask the PSPACE−complete
problem P−NON-DOM’ED for M and o, where M is the given mgCP-net. This is
in NPSPACE, and as NPSPACE = PSPACE it is thus in PSPACE.
For hardness, we reduce from P−NON-DOM’ED. Consider an instance with
mgCP-net M = 〈N1, . . . , Nm〉 and outcome o = v1 . . . vk for V = {V1, . . . , Vk} and
vi ∈ D(Vi) for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We now construct a mgCP-net M′ = 〈N′1, . . . , N′m〉,
where N′i = Ni ∪ {> : v′i . v′i | v′i ∈ D(Vi), v′i 6= vi}. The intuitive idea is that any out-
come o′ 6= o is now self-dominating in >N′i , and hence self-dominating in >PM′ . Thus,
if there is a non-dominated outcome at all in >PM′ , then it must be o: and this only
happens if o is non-dominated in M. In other words, o is non-dominated in M if and
only if there is a non-dominated outcome in M′, concluding the proof.
Theorem 4.3. The problems P−STR-DOM’ING, P−∃STR-DOM’ING, P−DOMINANCE,
P−CONSISTENCY, P−WNON-DOM’ED, P−DOM’ING, P−∃DOM’ING are all PSPACE-
complete.
Proof. For hardness, it suffices to reduce from all the corresponding problems for a
single gCP-net.
For membership, consider an mgCP-net M = 〈N1, . . . , Nm〉. For P−DOMINANCE,
we have to check whether o1 >i o2, for every Ni ∈ M. This amounts to solving m
PSPACE tasks, which is also in PSPACE. For P−CONSISTENCY, recall that M being
Pareto-consistent is equivalent to o ≯PM o, for any outcome o, i.e., o ≯i o, for some
Ni ∈ M. We thus ask of every outcome whether o >i o, for all Ni ∈ M, which
amounts to a (potentially exponential) number of PSPACE tasks. A similar algorithm
works for P−WNON-DOM’ED, where we need to take every outcome o′ and check
whether o′ >i o and o ≯i o′, for every Ni ∈ M. Existence of such an outcome o′
implies that o is not weakly non-dominated in >M, while lack of existence implies
the contrary. For S−DOM’ING, we have that o is a dominating outcome iff o >PM
o′, for any outcome o′. This is equivalent to o being dominating in every induced
model >i, for Ni ∈ M. Determining this involves solving m PSPACE tasks. For
P−STR-DOM’ING we have to check that o is dominating in every >i, for Ni ∈ M and,
in addition, that o is strongly dominating in at least one >i. In fact, suppose o was
dominating in every >i, but strongly dominating in neither of them: then o >i o for
all Ni ∈ M, and thus o >PM o, which means that o is not strongly dominating in >PM.
Checking whether o is strongly-dominating in some >i is in PSPACE, thus our task
is in PSPACE. For P−∃DOM’ING and P−∃STR-DOM’ING, respectively, we can go
through every outcome and ask whether it is dominating and strongly dominating,
respectively, in >PM. This consists entirely of PSPACE tasks.
4.2.2 Majority Semantics
The majority semantics maj is inspired by the well-known majority rule in preference
aggregation. By definition 4.3, when the number of agents is even we get a strict
version of majority. The results can be however easily adapted to a weak majority.
Our first result includes all problems which remain PSPACE-complete when moving
from a single gCP-net to many. Then, we have a result whose complexity increases
from polynomial to PSPACE-complete from gCP-nets to mgCP-nets. Finally, we have
hardness results which again follow from the single-agent case.
Theorem 4.4. Problems maj−DOMINANCE, maj−∃DOM’ING, maj−STR-DOM’ING,
maj−DOM’ING, maj−WNON-DOM’ED, maj−∃STR-DOM’ING are PSPACE-complete.
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Proof. PSPACE-hardness is inherited from the corresponding single-agent problems,
by considering a mgCP-net with m = 1. We now establish membership.
For maj−DOMINANCE, consider an algorithm counting whether there are more
than dm+12 e agents in M such that for each i it holds that o1 >i o2. If this is the case
answer yes, and no otherwise. This algorithm need to keep track of the yes/no an-
swer of at most m PSPACE problems, and hence it is in PSPACE. For maj−DOM’ING,
consider an algorithm checking for each o′ ∈ O whether there is a set S of agents,
such that |S| ≥ dm+12 e, where each agent i ∈ S has o >i o′. Hence, if for some o′
such a set S is found, the algorithm answers yes, and no otherwise. We thus need
to repeat at most |ΠX∈VD(X)| times (for all possible outcomes), at most m (for all
agents) dominance PSPACE tasks. For maj−STR-DOM’ING, consider an algorithm
which solves the problems maj−DOM’ING and maj−NON-DOM’ED, that are both in
PSPACE, and answers yes if and only if for both problems it gets a positive answer.
For maj−WNON-DOM’ED, given an outcome o we do the following procedure for all
outcomes o′ in M. We check if (a) there is a majority of agents for which o′ >i o (at
most m PSPACE tasks) and (b) there is a majority of agents for which o >i o′ (again,
at most m PSPACE tasks). If we find an outcome o′ such (a) is true while (b) is false,
the algorithm gives a negative answer (o is weakly dominated), and positive other-
wise. For maj−∃DOM’ING and maj−∃STR-DOM’ING, consider an algorithm solving
the problems maj−DOM’ING and maj−STR-DOM’ING, respectively, for all outcomes
o ∈ O, and that says yes if at least for one instance the answer is positive. This
amounts to solving a (possibly exponential) number of PSPACE tasks.
Theorem 4.5. The maj−NON-DOM’ED problem for mgCP-nets is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. Let maj−NON-DOM’ED be the complement of maj−NON-DOM’ED, i.e., the
problem asking whether there is some outcome o′ such that o′ >majM o, for given o
and M. Consider the algorithm that for every outcome o′ checks whether for at least
dm+12 e (and at most m) agents i in M it is the case that o′ >i o, and it outputs yes
if so. This problem is in PSPACE and thus its complement maj−NON-DOM’ED is in
coPSPACE, which means that maj−NON-DOM’ED is in PSPACE.
Proof of hardness is identical to that of Theorem 4.1, since in maj semantics for
m = 2 majority corresponds to the total number of agents.
Theorem 4.6. Problem maj−CONSISTENCY is PSPACE-hard; maj−∃NON-DOM’ED is
NP-hard and in PSPACE.
Proof. The hardness reductions are from the single-agent problems where m = 1.
For maj−∃NON-DOM’ED, membership in PSPACE comes from the algorithm asking
the PSPACE−complete problem maj−NON-DOM’ED for all outcomes o, and giving
a positive answer if at least one is non-dominated.
4.2.3 Max Semantics
The semantics max refines maj by taking into account also incomparabilities and thus
expressing a relative majority. The max semantics does not admit cycles of length at
most 2. In fact, for >maxM to be inconsistent there would need to be two outcomes
o1 and o2 such that o1 >maxM o2 and o2 >
max
M o1, implying a contradiction between
|so1>o2M | > |so2>o1M | and |so2>o1M | > |so1>o2M |.
Theorem 4.7. Problems max−DOMINANCE, max−DOM’ING, max−STR-DOM’ING,
max−∃DOM’ING and max−∃STR-DOM’ING are PSPACE-complete.
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Proof. Hardness is obtained from the corresponding single-agent problems, by con-
sidering a mgCP-net with m = 1. We thus focus on PSPACE-membership.
For max−DOMINANCE, consider an algorithm that stores |so1>o2M | as supp, i.e., the
number of agents i in M for whom o1 >i o2. Observe that supp ≤ m. Then, the
algorithm stores |so2>o1M | as opp, i.e., the number of agents in M such that o2 >i o1.
Again, opp ≤ m. Then, it stores m − supp− opp as inc; i.e., the number of agents
in M for whom o1 and o2 are incomparable. Finally, if inc ≥ opp and supp ≥ inc,
or if inc ≤ opp and supp ≥ opp, the algorithm answers yes, and no otherwise.
For max−DOM’ING, consider an algorithm that for any o′ ∈ O it stores as supp the
number of agents i in M such that o′ >i o, then the number of agents k in M such
that o >k o′ as opp, and the number of agents considering o and o′ as incompara-
ble in inc = m − supp − opp. Analogously to max−DOMINANCE, the algorithm
checks if inc ≥ opp and supp ≥ inc, or if inc ≤ opp and supp ≥ opp, in which
cases it answers yes, and no otherwise. The algorithm solves a (potentially expo-
nential) number of PSPACE tasks, which is in PSPACE. For max−STR-DOM’ING, it
suffices to design an algorithm which runs the algorithms for max−DOM’ING and
max−NON-DOM’ED (both in PSPACE), and which answers yes if and only if both
tasks return yes. For max−∃DOM’ING and max−∃STR-DOM’ING, consider an algo-
rithm asking the problems max−DOM’ING and max−STR-DOM’ING for all outcomes
o ∈ O, and answering yes if for at least one of the outcomes the answer is yes. This
amounts to solving a (possibly exponential) number of PSPACE tasks.
Theorem 4.8. Problems max−CONSISTENCY and max−WNON-DOM’ED are PSPACE-
hard, while max−∃NON-DOM’ED is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from the corresponding single-agent problems where m = 1.
Theorem 4.9. The max−NON-DOM’ED problem for mgCP-nets is in PSPACE.
Proof. Consider an algorithm that checks for all o′ ∈ O whether o′ >maxM o, which is a
PSPACE problem according to Theorem 4.7, and it answers yes if every one of these
tasks gives a no answer.
Observe that we cannot reduce from SELF-DOMINANCE as done in the proof of
Theorem 4.1 for max−NON-DOM’ED since >maxM has no self-dominating outcomes
by definition.
4.2.4 Rank semantics
Since the r-induced model of an mgCP-net M is a total preorder, the notions of
strongly dominating outcome and non-dominated outcome are vacuous, as o >rM o
for all o. Furthermore, weakly non-dominated outcomes always exist, and they co-
incide with dominating outcomes. Thus, the r−CONSISTENCY, r−NON-DOM’ED,
r−STR-DOM’ING, r−∃NON-DOM’ED, r−∃DOM’ING, and r−∃STR-DOM’ING prob-
lems have trivial answers. We will focus on r−DOMINANCE and r−WNON-DOM’ED,
with the understanding that a solution to the latter problem is also a solution to the
r−DOM’ING problem. We first show, using results on single gCP-nets and some
intermediary results that finding the rank of an outcome and comparing two out-
comes with respect to their rank is PSPACE-hard even in the single gCP-case (Propo-
sition 4.10) and this carries over to the multi-agent case (Theorem 4.11).
Lemma 4.1. If o and o′ are two outcomes and their Hamming distance, i.e., the num-
ber of variables on which they differ, is dH(o, o′) = p, then there exists a gCP-net
N(o, o′) such that |N| = p and a sequence of length p of worsening flips from o to o′.
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Proof. Since worsening flips exist only between outcomes oi and oj differing on just
one variable, we can create a chain of outcomes o1, . . . , op of length p of worsen-
ing flips sanctioned by the following gCP-net. Let o = v1 . . . vka1 . . . ap and o′ =
v1 . . . vka′1 . . . a
′
p such that there are p variables A1, . . . , Ap where o[Ai] 6= o′[Ai] for
each i and on the Vi variables the two outcomes agree. Consider now the statements:
v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vk ∧ a2 ∧ · · · ∧ ap : a1 . a′1
v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vk ∧ a′1 ∧ a3 ∧ · · · ∧ ap : a2 . a′2
. . .
v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vk ∧ a′1 ∧ · · · ∧ a′p−1 : ap . a′p
The gCP-net N(o, o′) is simply the collection of all the statements above.
If o is an outcome over a set of variables V and X /∈ V is a variable such that
D(X) = {x, x}, we write ox∗ for the outcome o′ over V ∪ {X} such that o′[Y] = o[Y],
for any Y ∈ V , and o′[X] = x∗, for x∗ ∈ D(X). We can think of o′ as o concatenated
with x∗. We now show that given an outcome o of rank 0 in N, we can construct a
new gCP-net N′ where (a suitable copy of) o has rank k, for any k ≥ 0.
Lemma 4.2. If N1 is a gCP-net and o is an outcome over variables in V , and k ≥ 0,
then there exists a gCP-net N2 over variables V ∪ {X1, . . . , Xk}, where all the vari-
ables in {X1, . . . , Xk} are binary and none of them occurs in V , such that rlp1 (o) = 0
iff rlp2 (ox1 . . . xk) = k.
Proof. Consider the following gCP-net:
N2 = N1 ∪ {
∧
X∈V
o[X] ∧
k−1∧
i=1
xi : xk . xk,
∧
X∈V
o[X] ∧
k−2∧
i=1
xi ∧ xk : xk−1 . xk−1,
∧
X∈V
o[X] ∧
k−3∧
i=1
xi ∧
k−1∧
j=k
xj : xk−2 . xk−2, . . . ,
∧
X∈V
o[X] ∧
k∧
i=2
xi : x1 . x1}.
It holds that rlp1 (o) = 0 iff r
lp
2 (ox1 . . . xk) = k. See Example 4.9 for an illustration
of the construction.
Example 4.9. Take a gCP-net N1 over a single binary variable A, with N1 = {> : a . a}.
Suppose we want to construct N2 such that (a suitable copy of) outcome a has rank 2.
We add two new binary variables, X and Y, and define N2 over variables A, X and Y.
As for proof of Lemma 4.2, we first import all the conditional preference statements
from N1: by the ceteris paribus semantics, this creates four copies of the dominance
relation from >1, one for each assignment to variables X and Y. We then add state-
ments a ∧ x : y . y and a ∧ y : x . x, which create a chain improving flips from axy to
axy of length 2 (see Figure 4.5). It is easy to see now that rlp1 (a) = 0 iff r
lp
2 (axy) = 2.
Theorem 4.10. For a gCP-net N, two outcomes o1 and o2, and k ≥ 0, then it is
PSPACE-hard to check:
(a) whether rlpN (o1) = k;
(b) whether rlpN (o1) = r
lp
N (o2);
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FIGURE 4.5: The induced models >1 and >2 from Example 4.9; the
outcome whose rank goes from 0 to 2 is circled.
(c) whether rlpN (o1) < r
lp
N (o2).
Proof. For (a), observe that o1 is weakly non-dominated in >N if and only if it has
rlp1 (o1) = 0. Then, Lemma 4.2 gives us a reduction from WNON-DOM’ED for indi-
vidual gCP-nets under >N .
For (b) we do a reduction from DOMINANCE. Let N1 be a gCP-net, we define
N2 = N1 ∪ N(o2, o1), where N(o2, o1) is a gCP-net constructed as in Lemma 4.1,
which induces a dominance relation from o2 to o1. Note that if o1 >N o2, for some
gCP-net N, then o1 must be on a path from [o2] to a non-dominated class in >dN, and
thus rlpN (o1) ≤ rlpN (o2). It follows now that o1 >1 o2 iff rlp2 (o1) = rlp2 (o2).
For (c), we do a reduction from DOMINANCE. Let N1 be a gCP-net and o1, o2
outcomes over variables in V . We now construct a gCP-net N2 over variables in
V ∪ {X}, where X /∈ V is binary, such that o1 >1 o2 iff rlp2 (o1x) < rlp2 (o2x). Namely,
given a gCP-net N1, we can create a gCP-net N2, where a dominance relation in >1
is reflected by a difference between the ranks of two (copies of the) outcomes in >2.
First, note that dH(o1, o2) = p implies dH(o1x, o2x) = p. By Lemma 4.1 we construct
the gCP-net N(o2x, o1x) of size p which sanctions a chain of worsening flips from o2x
to o1x. We now take N2 = N1 ∪N(o2x, o1x). If o1 >1 o2, then rlp2 (o1x) < rlp2 (o2x).
Conversely, if o1 ≯1 o2, then rlp2 (o1x) ≥ rlp2 (o2x), since o1 inherits all of o2’s ancestors,
and thus its rank is at least as great.
The following example illustrates the point (c) in the previous proof:
Example 4.10. Take N1 = {b : a . a} and we are interested in outcome ab and ab
(circled in Figure 4.6). Namely, we want to construct N2 such that ab >1 ab iff
rlp2 (abx) < r
lp
2 (abx). Taking N2 as described in the proof of Theorem 4.10 we get,
via the ceteris paribus semantics, an extra copy of every dominance relation in >1,
one for x and one for x. The added preference statements take the dominance
block abx >2 abx and place it on top of abx: since this block is a copy of the block
abx >2 abx, we get that abx inherits all of abx’s ancestors. Thus, the rank of abx in
>2 can be smaller than the rank of abx if and only if the path of ancestors of abx goes
through abx, i.e., only if abx >2 abx. But this means that this edge must have been
in >1 originally (which is not the case here).
From Theorem 4.10 we get that for a single gCP-net weak non-dominance (point (a)
with k = 0) and domination (either (b) or (c)) for rank semantics are PSPACE-hard.
Theorem 4.11. The r−DOMINANCE and r−WNON-DOM’ED problems for mgCP-
nets are PSPACE-hard.
Proof. Inherited from the single gCP-net case.
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FIGURE 4.6: The induced models from Example 4.10.
4.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we studied mgCP-nets, i.e., profiles of generalized CP-nets (Gold-
smith et al., 2008) aggregated under semantics adapted from the literature of mCP-
nets (Rossi et al., 2004; Lukasiewicz and Malizia, 2016). Our motivation has been il-
lustrated by the Examples 4.1 and 4.8, where an online renting service allows agents
to only partially specify their preconditions for conditional preference statements.
We have hereby bridged the line of research on gCP-nets, which provides a frame-
work for expressing general types of preferences under the ceteris paribus semantics,
and that on the aggregation of CP-nets coming from different agents. In particular,
the Pareto semantics we study here is reminiscent of the unanimity axiom of Section
3.2.3 and the majority semantics of the Maj rule of Section 3.4.2.
As the main barriers to implementation are computational, our focus has been
that of studying a variety of complexity problems for mgCP-nets. In particular, we
analyzed the consequences of moving from one to multiple agents with respect to the
complexity of some known consistency and optimality problems. Our findings show
that these problems fall mostly in the PSPACE complexity class. On the positive side,
for most cases the complexity does not increase when moving to the multi-agent
case, one exception being the problems for non-dominated outcomes.
The results of this chapter lead to many interesting directions for future work.
Analogously to what we did at the end of Section 3.3.4 for the complexity results
of the winner determination problem for majority rules in goal-based voting, we
could explore restrictions (possibly syntactical) on gCP-nets to make reasoning tasks
tractable. Moreover, alternative ways to aggregate individual gCP-nets could be
explored, such as voting directly on formulas as in judgment aggregation (Endriss,
2016), or adapting rules from goal-based voting as the ones of Section 3.1.2.

Part II
Strategic Behavior
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Chapter 5
Logic, Goals, and Strategic Agents
In the second part of this thesis we study some game-theoretic and strategic prob-
lems in settings where agents have individual goals represented in a logical lan-
guage. In particular, we will start in Chapter 6 by studying the strategic component
of goal-based voting (introduced in Chapter 3): i.e., an agent i will not be assumed
to be truthful anymore and she will submit a goal γ′i different from her honest goal
γi if by doing so she can obtain a better result of the aggregation process.
A fundamental example in the literature on propositional goals in a strategic
setting is that of Boolean games (Harrenstein et al., 2001; Bonzon et al., 2006). In
such games, each player i wants to achieve a goal γi represented by a formula of
propositional logic and her preferences are dichotomous. Goals are expressed over
a set of propositional variables Φ which is partitioned in as many subsets as the
number of agents and each agent has exclusive control over the variables in her subset
Φi ⊆ Φ. The strategic actions at her disposal consist in affecting the truth values of
the variables she controls (i.e., those inΦi). The following simple example illustrates
a situation captured by a Boolean game:
Example 5.1. Consider three agents, Diana, Bacchus and Flora, who want to orga-
nize a potluck, i.e., a meal where everyone brings something to share. In order to
avoid the common scenario where everyone just brings a bag of chips and a beer,
they decide to make each one of them in charge of a specific category. Diana will
bring the meat (either steak or chicken), Bacchus will bring the wine (either white or
red), and Flora will bring the appetizer (either spring rolls or fried squash blossom).
Each one of them can only control the part of the meal that they are assigned to: e.g.,
Diana cannot decide if they will be drinking white or red wine. However, each one
of them has some goal regarding the meal as a whole. In particular, Diana would
like to have red wine if they have steak, Bacchus would be happy if at the meal there
will be chicken or spring rolls, and Flora would like to have white wine and chicken.
In Boolean games the strategic actions are thus different from those of goal-based
voting: in the former agents act by assigning a truth value only to the propositional
variables they control, while in the latter agents directly submit their (possibly un-
truthful) goal. Boolean games have later been generalized to their iterated version
(Gutierrez et al., 2013, 2015), in which agents play the game infinitely many times.
Therefore, the goals of the agents are expressed in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), that
we introduce in Section 5.1, which extends propositional logic by making it possible
to refer to future states of the world. In Chapter 7 we will see another example of
iterated game where agents have goals expressed in LTL, i.e., we will introduce the
class of influence games. Here, agents will be connected by a network of influence
and they will try to change the opinions of the other agents to achieve their goals by
using their influence power as an action.
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Given a class of games, classical problems in game theory consist in studying
whether the game admits certain types of solutions. Examples of solution concepts
are, for instance, whether an agent has a strategy allowing her to obtain her goal no
matter what the other agents do (winning strategy), whether an agent has a strategy
which is better than any other strategy (weakly dominant strategy), and finally whether
a strategy profile is such that no single agent would benefit from a unilateral devi-
ation (Nash equilibrium). An important tool that can be used to check the existence
of a winning strategy for an agent in an iterated game is Alternating-Time Temporal
Logic (ATL), that we introduce in Section 5.1, which extends LTL by allowing to talk
about the actions of a coalition of agents. As we will see, the semantics of ATL can
be defined over so-called Concurrent Game Structures (CGS): in Chapter 8 we will
introduce a special type of CGS where agents have shared control over propositional
variables, which is useful for instance to capture the dynamics of influence games.
5.1 Logics for Time and Strategic Reasoning: ATL and LTL
A multitude of logics have been defined to reason about different scenarios in multi-
agent systems, in particular game-theoretic ones (see, e.g., the book by Shoham and
Leyton-Brown, 2008). We present here two such logics, suited to reason about agents
having propositional goals in iterated games: the Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL)
by Pnueli (1977) and the Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) by Alur et al. (2002).
In particular, temporal logics with strategic operators allow us to express properties
of games, such as the existence of a winning strategy for an agent.
We start by defining the syntax of ATL∗, which is composed by state formulas (ϕ)
and path formulas (ψ), for a given set of variables Φ and a set of agents N:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | 〈〈C〉〉ψ
ψ ::= ϕ | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∨ ψ2 | ©ψ | ψ1Uψ2
where p ∈ Φ and C ∈ 2N. The intuitive reading of 〈〈C〉〉ψ is “coalition C has a
strategy to enforce ψ”, that of ©ψ is “ψ holds at the next state” and that of ψ1Uψ2
is “ψ1 will hold until ψ2 holds”. Conjunction (∧) and implication (→) are defined in
the usual way. The language of ATL consists of all state formulas where ψ in 〈〈C〉〉ψ
is either©ϕ or ϕU ϕ.
The language of LTL is defined by the following BNF and it consists of all path
formulas in ATL∗ whose state formulas are propositional atoms only:
ψ ::= p | ¬ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | ©ψ | ψ1Uψ2
In order to clarify the syntax of ATL, ATL∗ and LTL, we provide here a small
example of formulas which we can or cannot express in the three logics:
Example 5.2. Let Φ = {p, q} be our propositional variables and N = {1, 2, 3} be our
set of agents. Consider the following four formulas:
ϕ1 = p ∨ q ϕ2 =©p ∨ q
ϕ3 = 〈〈{1, 2}〉〉p ∨ q ϕ4 = 〈〈{1, 2}〉〉© p ∨ q
We have that ϕ1 is a formula of ATL, ATL∗ and LTL; ϕ2 is a formula of ATL∗ and LTL;
ϕ3 is a formula of ATL∗; and ϕ4 is a formula of ATL and ATL∗.
We now introduce Concurrent Game Structures (CGS), which will give us a way
to define truth conditions for LTL and ATL∗ formulas:
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Definition 5.1. Given a set N of agents and a set Φ of propositional variables, a
concurrent game structure (CGS) is a tuple G = 〈S, Act, d, τ,pi〉 such that:
• S is a non-empty set of states;
• Act is a non-empty set of individual actions;
• d : N× S→ (2Act \ {∅}) is the protocol function, returning the actions available
to the agents at each state;
• τ : S × Act|N| → S is the transition function, such that for every s ∈ S and
α ∈ Act|N|, τ(s, α) is defined if and only if αi ∈ d(i, s) for all i ∈ N;
• pi : S→ 2Φ is the state labelling function.
In order to define the semantics for LTL and ATL∗ we still need to provide some
additional notation. The set of enabled joint actions at some state s is defined as
Act(s) = {α ∈ An | αi ∈ d(i, s) for every i ∈ N}. The set of successors of s is
Succ(s) = {τ(s, α) | α ∈ Act(s)}. An infinite sequence of states λ = s0s1 . . . is a
computation or a path if sk+1 ∈ Succ(sk) for all k ≥ 0. For every computation λ and
k ≥ 0, λ[k,∞] = sk, sk+1, . . . denotes the suffix of λ starting from sk. Observe that
λ[k,∞] is also a computation. When λ is clear from context, we denote with α[k] the
action such that λ[k+1] = τ(λ[k], α[k]).
The following is a simple example to illustrate all the concepts introduced so far:
Example 5.3. Consider the sets of variables Φ = {p, q} and agents N = {1, 2, 3}.
Define a CGS G with states S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, actions Act = {a1, a2, a3, a1, a2, a3},
protocol function d where for all s ∈ S and i ∈ N we have d(i, s) = {ai, ai}, transition
function τ where for all s ∈ S if α = a1a2a3 then τ(s, α) = s1, if α = a1a2a3 then
τ(s, α) = s4, and for any other α we have τ(s, α) = s2, and finally labelling function
pi such that pi(s1) = {p, q}, pi(s2) = {p}, pi(s3) = {q} and pi(s4) = {∅}.
We have that Act(s) = {a1a2a3, a1a2a3, a1a2a3, a1a2a3, a1a2a3, a1a2a3, a1a2a3, a1a2a3}
and Succ(s) = {s1, s2, s4} for all s ∈ S. An example of a computation is the path
λ = s1s2s4s1s2s4 . . . , and also its suffix λ[2,∞] = s4s1s2s4 . . . is a computation as
well. We have that α[2] = a1a2a3 is the action such that λ[3] = τ(λ[2], α[2]) = s1.
A (memoryless) strategy for agent i ∈ N is a function σi : S→ Act such that σi(s) ∈
d(i, s), returning an action for each state. We let σC be a joint strategy for coalition
C ⊆ N, i.e., a function returning for each agent i ∈ C, the individual strategy σi.
For simplicity we write σ for σN . The set out(s,σC) includes all computations λ =
s0s1 . . . such that (a) s0 = s; and (b) for all k ≥ 0, there is α ∈ Act(s) such that
σC(i)(sk) = αi for all i ∈ C, and τ(sk, α) = sk+1. Note that out(s,σ) is a singleton.
We continue Example 5.3 to explain these new pieces of notation just defined:
Example 5.4. The strategy of agent 1 is defined as σ1(s1) = σ1(s2) = a1 and σ1(s3) =
σ1(s4) = a1. For agent 2, let σ2(s1) = σ2(s3) = a2 and σ2(s2) = σ2(s4) = a2. Finally,
for agent 3 let σ3(s1) = σ3(s4) = a3 and σ3(s2) = σ3(s3) = a3. Given these strategies,
we have for instance that out(s1,σ) = {s1s1s1s1 . . . } and out(s4,σ) = {s4s2s2s2 . . . }
We are now ready to define truth conditions for LTL and ATL∗ formulas with
respect to a CGS G:
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(G, s) |= p iff s(p) = 1
(G, s) |= ¬ϕ iff (G, s) 6|= ϕ
(G, s) |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff (G, s) |= ϕ1 or (G, s) |= ϕ2
(G, s) |= 〈〈C〉〉ψ iff for some σC, for all λ ∈ out(s,σC), (G,λ) |= ψ
(G,λ) |= ϕ iff (G,λ[0]) |= ϕ
(G,λ) |= ¬ψ iff (G,λ) 6|= ψ
(G,λ) |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff (G,λ) |= ψ1 or G,λ |= ψ2
(G,λ) |=©ψ iff (G,λ[1,∞]) |= ψ
(G,λ) |= ψ1Uψ2 iff for some i ≥ 0, (G,λ[i,∞]) |= ψ2 and
(G,λ[j,∞]) |= ψ1 for all 0 ≤ j < i
In particular, observe that formulas in ATL∗ are interpreted on states, while for-
mulas in LTL are interpreted on computations.
5.2 Related Work on Games, Logic, and Networks
A game-theoretic setting which is close to strategic goal-based voting is that of ag-
gregation games (Grandi et al., 2019). In aggregation games, agents hold as proposi-
tional goals conjunctions over the variables at stake, and contrary to Boolean games
agents have shared control over all the variables. The strategic actions consist in
submitting a binary ballot over the issues. If transposed to the framework of goal-
based voting, this would mean that agents would be allowed to submit only one of
the models of their goal (as Camille in Example 3.1).
Influence games are part of the literature on formal models of opinion diffusion
in multi-agent systems, combining techniques from social network analysis with
those of belief merging and judgment aggregation. In particular, in Belief Revi-
sion Games (Schwind et al., 2015, 2016) agents connected via a network hold be-
lief bases over some issues. At each step of the game, agents update their beliefs
on the issues based on the opinions of the agents connected to them if the opinions
do not conflict with their current beliefs; otherwise, agents update by means of be-
lief merging operators to choose the most plausible opinion based on how “close”
it is to the opinions of their connected agents (and themselves). Other examples
include propositional opinion diffusion and pairwise preference diffusion on social
networks (Grandi et al., 2015; Brill et al., 2016). In the propositional opinion diffusion
model (later extended by Botan et al., 2019 with the inclusion of constrains on the
issues), the focus is on studying how the opinions of the agents evolve over time due
to the influence of other agents in the network. An agent’s opinion at a given time
results from aggregating the opinions at the previous time step of the agens from
which she is influenced. Our contribution with influence games consists in adding
a strategic component to these models, where agents can rationally choose whether
or not to disclose their opinon to the people they influence, if by doing so they can
work towards the satisfaction of their goal.
The CGS with shared control that we define extend CGS with exclusive control
which have been introduced by Belardinelli and Herzig (2016). Another example of a
logical framework for reasoning about capabilities of agents with exclusive proposi-
tional control is that of Coalition Logic of Propositional Control (CL-PC), introduced
by van der Hoek and Wooldridge (2005). When ATL formulas are interpreted over
the class of strong CGS with exclusive control defined by Belardinelli and Herzig
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(2016), where control is exhaustive and all actions are available at all states, the ex-
pressive power is the same as that of CL-PC.1 Gerbrandy (2006) studied variations
of CL-PC without exclusive control, i.e., where a propositional variable p may be
controlled by more than one agent. In particular, the logic of positive control requires
that at least one agent sets p to true to assign the truth value true to p, while in the
logic of consensus games all agents have to set p to true to change its value to true.2
Finally, we also mention simple games, a class of cooperative games where each
coalition of agents is labeled as either winning or losing, and weighted majority games,
a class of simple games where we can associate to each agent some weight such
that for every winning coalition the sum of agents’ weights is higher than the sum
of weights in every losing coalition (Isbell, 1959). Observe however that in these
cooperative games agents do not hold conflicting logical goals.
1The respective model-checking problems however differ in complexity: ∆P3 -complete for CGS with
exclusive control and PSPACE-complete for CL-PC (Belardinelli and Herzig, 2016).
2Observe the similarity of these notions with, respectively, the TrSh rules with quota 1 (introduced
in Section 3.1.2) and the unanimity axiom (introduced in Section 3.2.3).
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Chapter 6
Strategic Goal-Based Voting
Manipulation of voting rules has been amply studied in voting theory, starting from
the seminal result of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) to more recent studies
aimed at finding barriers to manipulation (see, e.g., the recent survey by Conitzer
and Walsh, 2016). When introducing the framework of goal-based voting in Chapter
3 we assumed that agents always provide their truthful goal. However, there may be
situations where agents would benefit (i.e., getting a better outcome) by lying about
their goals. Consider the following example:
Example 6.1. Three automated personal assistants need to arrange a business meal
for their owners. They have to decide whether the restaurant should be fancy (F), if
it should be in the center (C), and if they should meet for lunch (L) instead of dinner.
Each owner gives to their assistant a propositional goal with respect to these issues.
The goal of the first agent is that if they go to a restaurant in the suburbs, then they
should have a casual lunch: γ1 = ¬C → (¬F ∧ L). The second agent wants that
the meeting is either in the suburbs or casual, but not both: γ2 = ¬C ⊕ ¬F. The
third agent wants a fancy lunch in the center: γ3 = F ∧ L ∧ C. If the agents use the
TrueMaj rule (defined in Section 3.1.2), the result would be {(111)}. However, the
second agent notices that by submitting the goal γ2 = C ∧ ¬F ∧ ¬L the outcome
of TrueMaj would be {(101)} which is one of the models of the goal γ2 unlike the
truthful outcome {(111)}.
In this chapter we will thus study the strategic behavior of goal-oriented agents
when there is no assumption on their truthfulness. In particular, we will focus on the
three majoritarian rules that we have introduced in Section 3.1.2: i.e., EMaj, TrueMaj
and 2sMaj. The appeal of majority lies not only in its intuitive definition and exten-
sive application in real-world scenarios, but also on having been widely studied in
the related fields of voting theory and judgment aggregation (May, 1952; Dietrich
and List, 2007a), including from a strategic point of view (Dietrich and List, 2007c).
Each of our majoritarian goal-based voting rules will be analyzed with respect to
its resistance to several manipulation strategies, inspired by similar work on strategy-
proofness in belief merging (Everaere et al., 2007). Negative results, i.e., finding that
a rule can be manipulated in the general case, lead us to study the computational
complexity of manipulation, as well as restricting the language of individual goals
in the hope of discovering niches of strategy-proofness.1
6.1 Framework
The basic definitions of the framework of goal-based voting have been introduced in
Section 3.1.1. As we have mentioned, we assume that agents holding propositional
1Conitzer and Walsh (2016) discuss the limitations of the worst-case complexity approach when
dealing with manipulation, as the instances making the problem hard may be uncommon.
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goals leads to a dicothomous preference relation on outcomes: an agent equally
prefers any model of her goal to any counter-model. For resolute rules, this implies
that the unique outcome satisfies an agent if and only if it is a model of her goal. If a
rule is not resolute (in the stronger sense), however, different notions of satisfaction
with respect to the outcome can be defined depending on how an agent compares
two sets of interpretations.
Let sat : LI × (P({0, 1}m) \∅)→ [0, 1] be a function expressing the satisfaction of
agent i towards the outcome of a rule F on profile Γ, with the intuitive reading that 1
indicates maximal satisfaction of the agent while 0 indicates maximal unsatisfaction.
We simply write sat(i, F(Γ)) instead of sat(γi, F(Γ)). The optimistic, pessimistic and
expected utility maximizer are three notions of satisfaction an agent may hold:
opt(i, F(Γ)) =
{
1 if F(Γ) ∩Mod(γi) 6= ∅
0 otherwise
pess(i, F(Γ)) =
{
1 if F(Γ) ⊆ Mod(γi)
0 otherwise
eum(i, F(Γ)) =
|Mod(γi)∩ F(Γ)|
|F(Γ)|
An optimistic agent is satisfied if in the outcome of F there is at least one model
of her goal. A pessimistic agent wants all the interpretations in the outcome of F to
be models of her goal. The notions of optimistic and pessimistic agents also appear
in the work by Jimeno et al. (2009) for orderings of candidates. More precisely, when
comparing two sets of candidates A and B, an optimist ordering prefers A to B if the
best candidate in A is better than the best candidate in B. Conversely, a pessimistic
ordering prefers A to B if the worst candidate in A is better than the worst candidate
in B. These notions correspond to ours when considering sets A and B containing
interpretations over variables. Expected utility maximizers assume that a unique
interpretation will be chosen at random among those tied in the outcome of F, and
thus the higher the proportion of models of the agent’s goal in F(Γ) over the total
number of interpretations in F(Γ), the better.2
Another approach to model the satisfaction of an agent with repect to an outcome
F(Γ) would be by using preferences based on the Hamming distance, as done for
instance in judgment aggregation (Dietrich and List, 2007c; Endriss et al., 2012). The
Hamming distance between two interpretations corresponds to the number of issues
on which they have different values: for instance, interpretations (011) and (101)
have an Hamming distance of 2 as they only differ on the values assigned to the first
two issues. When comparing a set of interpretations (e.g., the models of an agent’s
goal) with a single interpretation (e.g., the outcome of a resolute rule) or another set
of interpretations (e.g., the outcome of a non-resolute rule) we would need to define
again different types of agents, depending on whether the Hamming distance is
computed between the interpretations that are closer, those that are further away, or
an average of them. We leave the study of manipulation of goal-based voting with
Hamming preferences for future work.
2Expected utility maximizers, optimistic, and pessimistic agents correspond to the probabilistic, weak
drastic and strong drastic satisfaction indexes in the work of Everaere et al. (2007), whose work however
did not study the issue-wise majority rules defined here.
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The preference of agent i over outcomes is a complete and transitive relation <i,
whose strict part is i, which is defined based on the agent’s satisfaction:
F(Γ) <i F(Γ′) iff sat(i, F(Γ)) ≥ sat(i, F(Γ′)).
Namely, agent i prefers the outcome of F on profile Γ to the outcome of F on
profile Γ′ if and only if the satisfaction of agent i for F(Γ) is higher than her sat-
isfaction for F(Γ′). Generalizing standard definitions of manipulation in judgment
aggregation, we can now define what does it mean for a goal-based voting rule to
be immune to manipulation.
Given Γ = (γi)i∈N, let (Γ−i,γ′i) = (γ1, . . . ,γ
′
i , . . . ,γn) be the profile where only
agent i changed her goal from γi to γ′i . Agent i has an incentive to manipulate by sub-
mitting goal γ′i instead of γi if and only if F(Γ−i,γ
′
i) i F(Γ). A rule F is strategy-proof
if and only if for all profiles Γ there is no agent i who has an incentive to manipulate.
Even though in some scenarios an agent may have an incentive to manipulate,
there could be some constraints on the type of manipulation she can actually per-
form. For instance, consider the example below:
Example 6.2. Ann, Barbara and Camille are deciding the details of their next meeting
and, among other things, whether they will meet in the morning or in the afternoon.
Barbara and Camille know Ann very well, and they are aware that she is definitely a
morning person. Therefore, even if there may be cases in which Ann would benefit
by submitting a goal favouring a meeting in the afternoon, Barbara and Camille
would immediately suspect that Ann is up to something.
For this reason, we will focus on three manipulation strategies previously intro-
duced by Everaere et al. (2007):
• Unrestricted: i can send any goal γ′i instead of her truthful goal γi
• Erosion: i can only send a goal γ′i such that Mod(γ′i) ⊆ Mod(γi)
• Dilatation: i can only send a goal γ′i such that Mod(γi) ⊆ Mod(γ′i)
Observe that a rule F that is manipulable by erosion and dilatation is therefore
manipulable unrestrictedly. Conversely, a rule that is strategy-proof for unrestricted
manipulation is also strategy-proof for erosion and dilatation strategies.
Another type of restriction that we will study for manipulation is on the indi-
vidual goals themselves. Goals have been defined as arbitrary consistent formulas
of propositional logic in Section 3.1.1, but the fact that a goal-based voting rule F
is manipulable may depend on which fragment of propositional logic the agent is
using to express her goal. Hence, we will investigate what happens when the goals
are restricted to the languages L? defined at the end of Section 2.1.
In the rest of the chapter we will focus on the three issue-wise majoritarian rules
introduced in Section 3.1.2, i.e., EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj.
6.2 Manipulation of Majoritarian Rules
A well-known result in judgment aggregation proven by Dietrich and List (2007c)
is that the issue-wise majority rule is single-agent strategy-proof.3 Our first result
3More precisely, their result in formula-based judgment aggregation holds for closeness-respecting
preferences: i.e., preferences where J <i J′ if (Ji ∩ J′) ⊂ (Ji ∩ J) for judgment sets Ji, J, J′. For goal-
based voting, we could rewrite it as F(Γ) <i F(Γ′) if (Mod(γi)∩ F(Γ′)) ⊂ (Mod(γi)) ∩ F(Γ)), which is
implied by our definition of preference for resolute rules.
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shows that in the context of goal-based voting strategy-proofness is not guaranteed
for the three adaptations of the majority rule:
Theorem 6.1. EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj are manipulable by erosion and dilatation.
Proof. We provide goal-profiles where an agent can get a better result by submitting
an untruthful goal. For ease of presentation we display the models of the agents’
goals, but recall that the input of a rule F consists of propositional formulas. Con-
sider the profiles Γ, Γ′ and Γ′′ for three agents and three issues, together with the
results of EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj:
Γ Γ′ Γ′′
Mod(γ1) (111) (111) (111)
Mod(γ2) (001) (001) (001)
(101) (101) (101)
Mod(γ3) (010) (010)
(000) (000)
(100)
(110)
{E/True/2s}Maj (001) (101) (101)
Let Γ be the profile where each agent submits their truthful goal: γ1 = 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3,
γ2 = ¬1 ∧ ¬2 ∧ 3, γ3 = (¬1 ∧ ¬3) ∨ (1 ∧ ¬2 ∧ 3). For erosion manipulation, agent
3 prefers the result of EMaj, 2sMaj and TrueMaj (which happen to coincide) when
applied to Γ′ rather than when applied to Γ. For dilatation, agent 3 prefers the result
of EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj when applied to Γ′′ rather than to Γ.
Observe that the three majoritarian rules on the profiles used in the proof of The-
orem 6.1 return singleton outcomes: hence, the result holds for optimists, pessimists
and expected utility maximizers (since the three notions coincide on such profiles).
Theorem 6.1 is thus in contrast with the result of judgment aggregation, painting
a more negative picture for manipulation in goal-based voting. In the next sections
we thus study three restrictions on the goal-language in a quest to find islands of
strategy-proofness. Results are summarized in Table 6.1.
6.2.1 Conjunctions
The language of conjunctions L∧ captures the framework of judgment aggregation
with abstentions (Gärdenfors, 2006; Dietrich and List, 2008; Dokow and Holzman,
2010b; Terzopoulou et al., 2018), as explained in Section 3.4.2. This means, in partic-
ular that agents having a goal in L∧ either support, reject or abstain on each issue.
For this restriction on the language we find positive results of strategy-proofness:
Theorem 6.2. For any profile Γ where γi ∈ L∧ for some i ∈ N , agent i has no
incentive to manipulate unrestrictedly the rules 2sMaj and EMaj.
Proof. Consider a profile Γ with γi ∈ L∧ for some agent i ∈ N . Since 2sMaj and
EMaj are resolute, we have a unique outcome {w} on Γ (which may be different for
the two rules). If w ∈ Mod(γi) agent i has no incentive to manipulate as her goal
is already satisfied. Hence, suppose that w 6∈ Mod(γi). As γi = Lj1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ljk for
j1, . . . , jk ∈ I , we have for all j` ∈ I :
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• If Lj` is not in γi, then mi(j`) = ( |Mod(γi)|2 , |Mod(γi)|2 );
• If Lj` = ` is in γi, then mi(`) = (0, |Mod(γi)|);
• If Lj` = ¬` is in γi, then mi(`) = (|Mod(γi)|, 0).
Therefore, if w 6∈ Mod(γi) there must be x literals in γi such that w satisfies their
negation. Consider an arbitrary such literal Lx.
For 2sMaj, let EMaj(γi) = {wi} be the result of the first step of majority applied
to γi. We have that wi(x) = 1− w(x), and therefore agent i cannot influence the
outcome of 2sMaj towards wi(x), and thus towards her goal.
For EMaj, if w(x) = 1 (analogously for 0), Lx = ¬x. Since mi(x) = (|Mod(γi)|, 0),
we have ∑v∈Mod(γi)
v(x)
|Mod(γi)| = 0 and thus ∑k∈N\{i} ∑v∈Mod(γk)
v(x)
|Mod(γk)| ≥
n
2 . Agent i
is already giving no support to x and yet x is accepted in the outcome. Therefore,
EMaj cannot be manipulated.
For TrueMaj we can provide a similar proof, but we also need to consider the type
of satisfaction of the agents, i.e., optimist, pessimist or expected utility maximizer:
Theorem 6.3. For any profile Γ where γi ∈ L∧ for some i ∈ N , agent i has no
incentive to manipulate unrestrictedly the rule TrueMaj.
Proof. First, observe that on the resolute profiles on which TrueMaj and EMaj coin-
cide, we can apply the same reasoning as for the proof of Theorem 6.2. Consider
now a profile Γ such that γi ∈ L∧, and let TrueMaj(Γ) = {w1, . . . , w`}.
Let us start by considering an optimist agent i. By definition, agent i manipulates
if and only if {w1, . . . , w`} ∩Mod(γi) = ∅, and she seeks to include at least one v ∈
Mod(γi) into TrueMaj(Γ). As v 6∈ TrueMaj(Γ), there exists ` ∈ I with literal L` ap-
pearing in γi such that M(Γ)={1− x} for x=v(`). Thus∑i∈N m
1−x
i`
|Mod(γi)|>∑i∈N
mxi`
|Mod(γi)| .
By being truthful, however, agent i is already giving her full support to L` and hence
cannot change the outcome in her favor.
An expected utility maximizer agent i manipulates when she can increase the
value of |Mod(γi)∩TrueMaj(Γ)||TrueMaj(Γ)| . As shown above, it is not possible for agent i to include
an arbitrary v ∈ Mod(γi) that is not in TrueMaj(Γ) = {w1, . . . , w`} in the outcome
TrueMaj(Γ). However, agent i may want to remove some counter-models of γi from
TrueMaj(Γ). All counter-models differ from the models of γi on some of the is-
sues appearing as literals in γi. Hence, for any of these issues j the agent has to
change M(Γ)j = {0, 1} into {0} if Lj = ¬j, or {1} if Lj = j. However, at Γ we have
∑i∈N
m1ij
|Mod(γi)|=∑i∈N
m0ij
|Mod(γi)| , even though agent i is giving the full support of 1 to Lj.
Thus, she cannot break the tie as any γ′i would have models lowering her support.
Finally, a pessimist agent i cannot manipulate since she wants at least one v ∈
Mod(γi) in the outcome, which is impossible as shown for the optimist case, and
to remove all counter-models, which is also impossible as shown for the expected
utility maximizers. Hence, the rule TrueMaj is strategy-proof.
A consequence of Theorems 6.2 and 6.3 is that goals in L∧ make the three ma-
jorities for goal-based voting strategy-proof:
Corollary 6.1. For any I and N, if γi ∈ L∧ for all i ∈ N then EMaj, TrueMaj and
2sMaj are strategy-proof for unrestricted manipulation.
Hence, Corollary 6.1 gives us a strategy-proofness result for majority rules in
judgment aggregation with abstentions.
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6.2.2 Disjunctions
Agents with goals in the language L∨ want at least one of the literals in their goal
to be accepted. The language of disjunctions is not enough, however, to guaran-
tee strategy-proofness for EMaj and TrueMaj, as the following result shows for the
erosion manipulation strategy:
Theorem 6.4. There exists a profile Γ and an agent i ∈ N with γi ∈ L∨ such that
agent i has an incentive to manipulate EMaj and TrueMaj by erosion.
Proof. Consider a profile Γ for three agents and two issues such that γ1 = ¬1 ∧ ¬2
and γ2 = γ3 = 1 ∨ 2. The outcome on Γ for both EMaj and TrueMaj is {(00)}. How-
ever, if agent 3 now submits goal γ′3 = 1 ∧ 2 we obtain EMaj(Γ′) = TrueMaj(Γ′) =
{(11)}. Therefore, agent 3 has an incentive to manipulate Γ and the rules EMaj and
TrueMaj are not strategy-proof.
We can however obtain a positive result for EMaj and TrueMaj by restricting the
set of available manipulation strategies to dilatation:
Theorem 6.5. For any profile Γ with γi ∈ L∨ for i ∈ N, agent i has no incentive to
manipulate EMaj and TrueMaj by dilatation.
Proof. Consider a profile Γ with γi ∈ L∨ for some i ∈ N. First of all, observe that an
agent having p ∨ ¬p for some p ∈ I in her goal already supports all interpretations
and thus has no incentive to manipulate. For EMaj, let EMaj(Γ) = {w} such that
w 6∈ Mod(γi). Since agent i can only use a dilatation strategy, the goals γ′i such that
Mod(γi) ⊆ Mod(γ′i) available to agent i are those whose models would lower i’s
support for each literal L` in γi. Thus she cannot manipulate.
Consider now TrueMaj(Γ) = {w1, . . . , wk}. Similarly to the reasoning above, an
optimist agent i does not have any dilatation strategy which can allow her to include
one of the models of γi in the outcome of TrueMaj. An expected utility maximizer
agent i may want to remove some wk ∈ TrueMaj(Γ) such that wk |= ¬Lj for all Lj
in γi. However, this is only possible when {w1, . . . , w`} ∩Mod(γi) = ∅, since the
agent is restricted to dilatation strategies, and any other γ′i would have more models
increasing the votes against the literals in her sincere goal γi. By combining the
reasoning for optimists and expected utility maximizers we can obtain an analogous
result for pessimist agents as well, thus concluding the proof.
For 2sMaj we have a positive result for any type of manipulation strategy:
Theorem 6.6. For any profile Γ where γi ∈ L∨ for some i ∈ N, agent i has no
incentive to manipulate unrestrictedly the rule 2sMaj.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary Γ where for some i ∈ N we have γi ∈ L∨. First, an
agent having p ∨ ¬p for some p ∈ I in her goal already supports all interpretations
and thus has no incentive to manipulate. The result wi of EMaj(Mod(γi)) is such that
wi(x) = 1 if Lx = x appears in γi, and wi(x) = 0 if Lx = ¬x appears in γi. Hence,
it coincides with the result of EMaj(Mod(γ′i)) for γ
′
i ∈ L∧ where every occurrence of
∨ in γi has been replaced by ∧ in γ′i . The proof of Theorem 6.2 can thus be applied,
obtaining that agent i is already maximizing her chances of getting γi satisfied by
submitting γi.
By combining the results of Theorems 6.5 and 6.6 we get the following corollary:
Corollary 6.2. If γi ∈ L∨ for all i ∈ N then EMaj and TrueMaj are strategy-proof for
dilatation manipulation, and 2sMaj is strategy-proof for unrestricted manipulation.
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By combining Corollaries 6.1 and 6.2 we get the following positive result:
Theorem 6.7. For any profile Γ such that γ1, . . . ,γn ∈ L∧ ∪ L∨, EMaj and TrueMaj
are strategy-proof for dilatation manipulation and 2sMaj is strategy-proof for unre-
stricted manipulation.
Therefore, we have found a restriction on the language of goals that gives us a
strategy-proofness result for the three issue-wise majority rules EMaj, TrueMaj and
2sMaj. If agents have as goals conjunctions or disjunctions they will not have an
incentive to manipulate.
6.2.3 Exclusive Disjunctions
The final restriction that we study is that on the language of exclusive disjunctions
L⊕, where each formula is an exclusive disjunction of literals. The models of a for-
mula ϕ = ((p⊕ q)⊕ r) over three variables are Mod(ϕ) = {(111), (010), (100), (001)}.
While our intuitive understanding of exclusive disjunction (i.e., “exactly one vari-
able is true at the same time”) may be in contrast with the presence of model (111),
the results in this section are all for profiles on only two variables that thus do not
pose any problem of interpretation.
Unfortunately, such a restriction does not give strategy-proofness for majority
rules, as the following result shows:
Theorem 6.8. There exists profiles Γ0, Γ1 and Γ2, and agent i ∈ N with γi ∈ L⊕ such
that agent i has an incentive to manipulate rules 2sMaj, EMaj and TrueMaj by erosion
and dilatation.
Proof. All profiles are for three agents and two issues. For 2sMaj and EMaj and ero-
sion manipulation, consider profile Γ0 where γ1 = 1 ∧ 2, γ2 = ¬1 ∧ ¬2 and γ3 =
1⊕ 2. We have that 2sMaj(Γ0) = EMaj(Γ0) = {(00)}. Consider now γ′3 = ¬1 ∧ 2.
The result for both rules is {(01)}, and thus agent 3 has an incentive to manipulate.
For dilatation, consider the profile Γ1 where γ1 = ¬1∧ 2, γ2 = ¬1∧¬2 and γ3 =
1⊕ 2. We have that 2sMaj(Γ1) = EMaj(Γ1) = {(00)}. If we consider γ?3 = 1 ∨ 2, the
result is 2sMaj(Γ1?) = EMaj(Γ1?) = {(01)}, and thus agent 3 has again an incentive
to manipulate.
For TrueMaj, consider Γ2 with γ1 = 1 ∧ 2, γ2 = 1 ∧ ¬2 and γ3 = 1⊕ 2. We have
TrueMaj(Γ2) = {(10), (11)}. Agent 3 can manipulate by erosion with γ?3 = 1 ∧ ¬2,
and by dilatation with γ??3 = ¬1∨ ¬2. In both cases the result is {(10)}.
Therefore, the language of exclusive disjunctions does not guarantee strategy-
proofness for the rules 2sMaj, EMaj and TrueMaj for any of the manipulation strate-
gies we introduced. From the proofs of Theorems 6.6 and 6.8 we can observe that the
rule 2sMaj behaves in counter-intuitive ways for the goals in L∨ and L⊕, and hence
its use should not be prioritized in such cases.
6.3 Computational Complexity
We have seen in Section 6.2 that majoritarian goal-based voting rules are in general
subject to the threat of manipulation, as shown by Theorem 6.1. However we may
be interested in checking how hard would it be for an agent to actually know that by
submitting another goal she would get a better outcome.
The problem of manipulability of resolute rules is defined as follows, akin to its
definition for judgment aggregation (Endriss et al., 2012):
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L∧ L∨ L⊕
E D E D E D
EMaj SP SP M SP M M
TrueMaj SP SP M SP M M
2sMaj SP SP SP SP M M
TABLE 6.1: Manipulation and strategy-proofness results for the ma-
joritatian rules EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj and the language restrictions
L∧, L∨ and L⊕. In particular, ‘E’ stands for erosion, ‘D’ for dilatation,
‘SP’ for strategy-proof and ‘M’ for manipulable.
MANIP(F)
Input: Profile Γ = (γ1, . . . ,γn), agent i
Question: If Mod(γi)∩ F(Γ) = ∅, is there γ′i so that Mod(γi)∩ F(Γ−i,γ′i) 6= ∅?
As we have seen in Section 3.3.4, the winner determination problem WINDET
of majority rules was hard for the class PP (Probabilistic Polynomial Time). Our
results will make use of Lemma 3.1 where we proved that the problem MAJSAT-p is
PP-complete.
Theorem 6.9. MANIP(2sMaj) is PP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from the PP-complete problem MAJSAT-p. Consider an instance
of MAJSAT-p with a formula ϕ[p1, . . . , pk] and p1 one of its variables. Construct an
instance of MANIP(2sMaj) where I = {p1, . . . , pk, q, r}, and a profile Γ = (γ1,γ2,γ3)
with γ1 = (p2 ∧ · · · ∧ pk) ∧ p1 ∧ q ∧ r, and γ2 = ϕ ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r, and γ3 = (p2 ∧ · · · ∧
pk) ∧ (p1 ⊕ q) ∧ (r → q).
We show that |Mod(ϕ ∧ p1)| > |Mod(ϕ ∧ ¬p1)| if and only if agent 3 can manip-
ulate 2sMaj on Γ. The following table represents some features of Γ, where question
marks indicate the (possibly many) models of ϕ over p1, . . . , pk:
p2 . . . pk p1 q r
Mod(γ1) 1 . . . 1 1 1 1
? ? 0 0
Mod(γ2)
...
... 0 0
? ? 0 0
1 . . . 1 0 1 1
Mod(γ3) 1 . . . 1 0 1 0
1 . . . 1 1 0 0
The result on p2, . . . , pk is decided by agents 1 and 3: all issues will be accepted
regardless of agent 2’s vote. Let us now focus on p1, q and r. Applying strict majority
to the models of γ3 leads to the first-step result (010). Agent 3 is pivotal on issues q
and r (since agents 1 and 2 give one vote for and one vote against them after the first
step). There are now two cases to consider:
a) If |Mod(ϕ ∧ p1)| > |Mod(ϕ ∧ ¬p1)|, the result of 2sMaj(Γ) is (1 . . . 1110), that
is not a model of γ3. However, by submitting γ′3 = (p2 ∧ pk) ∧ p1 ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r,
we have 2sMaj(Γ′) = (1 . . . 1100) which is a model of γ3. Hence, agent 3 has
an incentive to manipulate.
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b) If |Mod(ϕ ∧ p1)| ≤ |Mod(ϕ ∧ ¬p1)|, we have that 2sMaj(Γ) = (1 . . . 1010),
which is a model of γ3. Agent 3 has thus no incentive to manipulate.
This completes the reduction, showing that MANIP(2sMaj) is PP-hard.
For the rule EMaj we can provide the following similar result:
Theorem 6.10. MANIP(EMaj) is PP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from MAJSAT-p by constructing an instance of MANIP(EMaj) from
a given instance (ϕ, p1) of MAJSAT-p. Let I = {p1, . . . , pk, q, r}, and profile Γ =
(γ1,γ2,γ3) with γ1 = (p2 ∧ · · · ∧ pk) ∧ p1 ∧ q ∧ r, γ2 = ϕ ∧ ¬q ∧ r and γ3 = (p2 ∧
· · · ∧ pk) ∧ ((p1 ∧ q ∧ r) ∨ (p1 ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r) ∨ (¬p1 ∧ ¬q ∧ r) ∨ (¬p1 ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r)).
Analogously to the proof of Theorem 6.9, we show that on profile Γ agent 3 can
manipulate EMaj if and only if |Mod(ϕ ∧ p1)| > |Mod(ϕ ∧ ¬p1)|:
p2 . . . pk p1 q r
Mod(γ1) 1 . . . 1 1 1 1
? ? 0 1
Mod(γ2)
...
... 0 1
? ? 0 1
1 . . . 1 1 1 1
Mod(γ3) 1 . . . 1 1 0 0
1 . . . 1 0 0 1
1 . . . 1 0 0 0
Regardless of what agent 2 is voting for p2, . . . , pk, the result is decided by agents
1 and 3: all issues will be accepted in the outcome. For variables p1, q and r we do
a case study to show that |Mod(ϕ ∧ p1)| > |Mod(ϕ ∧ ¬p1)| if and only if agent 3 can
manipulate EMaj on Γ:
1. If |Mod(ϕ ∧ p1)| > |Mod(ϕ ∧ ¬p1)|, then we have EMaj(Γ) = (1 . . . 1101),
which is not a model of γ3. By submitting γ′3 = (p2 ∧ · · · ∧ pk) ∧ p1 ∧ q ∧ r,
we have EMaj(Γ′) = (1 . . . 1111) which is a model of γ3. Hence, agent 3 has an
incentive to manipulate.
2. If |Mod(ϕ ∧ p1)| ≤ |Mod(ϕ ∧ ¬p1)|, then EMaj(Γ) = (1 . . . 1001), which is a
model of γ3. Agent 3 has thus no incentive to manipulate.
Therefore, MANIP(EMaj) is PP-hard.
The result of Theorem 6.10 holds for a manipulator i having a goal γi in propo-
sitional logic, without restrictions on the language: the next step would be to study
if the problem stays hard when we focus on goals in L∨. Given that the goals of the
other agents can be arbitrary formulas, we conjecture it to be PP-hard as well. The
manipulation problem for TrueMaj is also probably at least as hard as the WINDET
problem (and the MANIP problem for EMaj), but its definition should include an-
other parameter for the satisfaction of the agents.
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6.4 Conclusions
This chapter has studied the strategic component of the framework of goal-based
voting presented in Chapter 3. In particular, the focus has been on the three rules
that we have proposed as adaptations of the issue-wise majority rule with varying
degrees of resoluteness. We found that in the general case EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj
are not immune to manipulation, even when the manipulator can only use limited
strategies on their truthful goal (i.e., erosion and dilatation).
Looking for ways to make manipulation impossible, we restricted the language
of an agent’s goal to fragments of propositional logic: the language of conjunctions
L∧, the language of disjunctions L∨ and the language of exclusive disjunctions L⊕.
Restricting goals to the language L∧ makes manipulation impossible, as well as
dilatation manipulation for the language L∨. This suggests a promising direction
for further research, on minimal restrictions to the language of goals to guarantee
strategy-proofness of majoriatrian rules.
Finally, we also found that while they are not strategy-proof in the general case,
the EMaj and 2sMaj rules are PP-hard for an agent to manipulate, i.e., as hard as their
winner determination problem which has been studied in Section 3.3.4. Therefore,
even though the manipulation problem is in general hard to solve for an agent, it is
not harder than computing the winner for the majority rules. We thus suspect the
manipulation problem to become easy when the agents all have a goal in a restricted
language for which the winner determination problem is easy.
79
Chapter 7
Influence Games over a Network
We have seen in Chapter 6 the strategic component of goal-based voting, where
agents submit (possibly untruthful) goals to take a collective decision. In this chapter
we focus on the process of how opinions are formed when agents are connected by
a network. More precisely, we study the process of social influence, or propositional
opinion diffusion, as per the work by Grandi et al. (2015) adding a game-theoretic
component. In propositional opinion diffusion (POD) the agents’ opinions over bi-
nary variables are propagated on a network by means of a chosen aggregation rule,
and agents have no goals or strategic actions available. We define here the games of
influence as a new class of infinite repeated games: at each step a player can choose
whether to make her private opinion on some issues public or not, and she will up-
date her current opinion according to the public opinions of the agents she trusts
and via some aggregation procedure. As in Chapter 6 each player has a goal that
she wants to achieve, this time expressed in a variant of the logic LTL which allows
to consider the future opinions of the agents.
The following example illustrates the situations captured by influence games:
Example 7.1. Ann, Bob and Jesse will be asked to participate in a referendum about
issue p at some point in the coming months. Ann thinks at the moment that the
vote should go in favor of p, and she also knows that Bob and Jesse always listen to
what she thinks on political matters. Before the referendum comes, Ann would like
to find a consensus with Bob and Jesse about p (they either all approve p or they all
approve ¬p), since she does not like to argue with her friends about politics, and in
order to do so she will make use of her influence power over them.
Influence games provide a basic abstraction to explore the effects of a trust net-
work on the behavior of agents, as well as allowing us to study game-theoretic so-
lution concepts such as winning strategy, weak dominance and Nash equilibrium.
The interplay between the network structure and the type of goal an agent holds has
an impact on her strategic ability to achieve her goal.
In this chapter we will focus on two goal schemas: that of reaching consensus
among a group of agents, akin to the one of Ann in Example 7.1, and that of in-
fluencing individuals towards one’s opinion. As we shall see, introducing a network
into an apparently simple influence problem makes positive results hard to find both
from a strategic and computational perspective.
7.1 Framework
We generalize the POD model by separating the notions of private and public opin-
ions via a notion of visibility (Section 7.1.1), and we adapt the diffusion process
through aggregation to this more complex setting (Section 7.1.2).
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7.1.1 Private Opinions and Unanimous Diffusion
Let I = {p1, . . . , pm} be a finite set of propositions or issues and let N = {1, . . . , n}
be a finite set of individuals or agents. Agents have opinions on issues in I in the
form of a propositional interpretation or, equivalently, a binary vector:
Definition 7.1. The private opinion of agent i is a function Bi : I → {1, 0} where
Bi(p) = 1 and Bi(p) = 0 express, respectively, the agent’s opinion that p is true and
the agent’s opinion that p is false.
Let B = (B1, . . . , Bn) denote the profile of private opinions of agents in N, analo-
gously to what we have seen for binary aggregation in Section 3.4.2. For simplicity
we do not introduce any integrity constraint. We assume that each agent has the
choice of using (or not) her influence power over her private opinion on each issue,
as formalized in the following definition:
Definition 7.2. We call visibility function of agent i any map Vi : I → {1, 0} where
Vi(p) = 1 expresses that agent i’s opinion on p is visible.
We denote by V = (V1, . . . , Vn) the profile composed of the agents’ visibility
functions. By combining the private opinion with the visibility function of an agent,
we can build her public opinion as a three-valued function on the issues.
Definition 7.3. Let Bi be the opinion of agent i and Vi her visibility function. The
public opinion of i is a function Pi : I → {1, 0, ?} such that
Pi(p) =
{
Bi(p) if Vi(p) = 1
? if Vi(p) = 0
Again, P = (P1, . . . , Pn) is the profile of public opinions of all the agents in N. We
denote by PC the restriction of public profile P to individuals in C ⊆ N.
Definition 7.4. A state is a tuple S = (B,V) where B is a profile of private opinions
and V is a profile of visibility functions. The set of all states is denoted by S .
A state thus consists of the profiles of private opinions and of visibilities of all
the agents in N. The agents, in particular, are linked by an influence network modeled
as a directed graph:
Definition 7.5. An influence network is a directed irreflexive graph E ⊆ N×N, where
(i, j) ∈ E means that agent j is influenced by agent i.
We also refer to E as the influence graph and to individuals in N as the nodes
of the graph. Let Inf (i) = {k ∈ N | (k, i) ∈ E} be the set of influencers of agent
i in the network E. Given a state S, this definition can be refined by considering
Inf S(i, p) = {k ∈ N | (k, i) ∈ E and Pk(p) 6= ?} to be the subset of i’s influencers that
are actually showing their private opinion about issue p.
Given a profile of public opinions and an influence network, we model the pro-
cess of opinion diffusion by means of an aggregation function, which modifies the
private opinion of an agent from the public opinions of other agents.
Definition 7.6. An aggregation procedure for agent i is a class of functions
Fi,C : {0, 1}I × {0, 1, ?}I×C −→ {0, 1}I for all C ⊆ N \ {i}
that maps agent i’s individual opinion and the public opinions of a set of agents C
to agent i’s individual opinion.
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To simplify notation, we drop C from the subscript when clear from context.
Many aggregation procedures have been considered in the literature on judgment
aggregation, and they can be adapted to our setting. Notable examples are quota
rules, where agents change their opinion if the number of people disagreeing with
them is higher than a given quota, such as the majority rule (see Section 3.1.2 for
other examples of aggregation rules). Unanimity is another instance of a quota rule,
which we define here as we will use it in our results:
Definition 7.7. The unanimous issue-by-issue aggregation procedure is defined as:
FUi (Bi,PC)(p) =

Bi(p) if C = ∅
x ∈ {0, 1} if Pk(p) = x for all k ∈ C s.t. Pk(p) 6= ?
Bi(p) otherwise
That is, an individual will change her private opinion about issue p if and only
if all agents in C (usually among her influencers, as we will see) publicly expressing
their opinion are unanimous in disagreeing with her own.
7.1.2 Actions, Transitions and Individual Goals
In our model, agents can use their influence power over the issues by means of
specific actions of type reveal(J) — i.e., the action of showing the opinion on issues
in J, and hide(J) — i.e., the action of hiding the opinion on issues in J. We allow for
simultaneous disclosure on multiple propositions. Let thus:
A = {(reveal(J), hide(J′)) | J, J′ ⊆ I and J ∩ J′ = ∅}
be the set of individual actions. Each joint action a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ An induces a
new state from a given one via a transition function:
Definition 7.8. The transition function succ : S ×An −→ S associates to each state S
and joint action a a new state S′ = (B′,V ′) as follows, for all i ∈ N and p ∈ I . For
ai = (reveal(J), hide(J′)) ∈ A:
• V ′i (p) =

1 if p ∈ J
0 if p ∈ J′
Vi(p) otherwise
• B′i = FUi (Bi,P′Inf (i)S)
where P′ is the public profile obtained from private profile B and visibility profileV ′.
By a slight abuse of notation we denote with a(S) the state succ(S, a) obtained
from S and a by applying the transition function. We also use the following abbrevi-
ations: skip = (reveal(∅), hide(∅)) for doing nothing, reveal(J) = (reveal(J), hide(∅)),
hide(J) = (reveal(∅), hide(J)), and we drop curly parentheses in reveal({p}) and
hide({p}). Our definition assumes that the influence process occurs after the actions
have changed the visibility of the agents’ opinions. Specifically, first, actions affect
the visibility of opinions, and then each agent modifies her private opinion on the
basis of those opinions of her influencers that have become public.
We are now ready to define the concept of history, describing the temporal aspect
of agents’ opinion dynamic:
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Definition 7.9. Given a set of issues I , a set of agents N, and aggregation proce-
dures Fi for i ∈ N over a network E, an history is an infinite sequence of states
H = (H0, H1, . . .) such that for all t ∈ N there exists a joint action at ∈ An such
that Ht+1 = at(Ht). The set of all histories is denoted byH.
Observe that Definition 7.9 restricts the set of all possible histories to those that
correspond to a run of the influence dynamic described above. For notational con-
venience, for any i ∈ N and for any t ∈ N, we denote with HBi,t agent i’s private
opinion in state Ht and with HVi,t agent i’s visibility function in state Ht.
Example 7.2. Consider the example in Figure 7.1, where the initial state is H0 and
the agents are N = {1, 2, 3} such that Inf (1) = {2, 3}. Let a0 = (skip, skip, reveal(p))
and a1 = (skip, hide(p), skip) be the joint actions of the agents at the first two states.
Namely, agent 3 reveals her opinion on p, and at the next step agent 2 hides hers. If
all individuals are using the unanimous aggregation procedure, then states H1 and
H2 result from applying the joint actions from state H0. In state H1, agent 1’s private
opinion about p has changed to 1, as all her influencers are publicly unanimous on
p, while in H2 no opinion is updated.
(B0,V0) (B1,V1) (B2,V2)
((011), (110))
H0
((111), (111))
H1
((111), (101))
H2
a0 a1
FIGURE 7.1: The first three states of a history: in each state H0−2,
the private opinions of the three agents (B) as well as their choice for
visibility (V ) are displayed.
We define a language LLTL–I to express the goals of the agents using the temporal
logic LTL introduced in Chapter 5. In particular, atoms in LLTL–I will be of the form
op(i, p), to be read as “agent i’s opinion is that p is true” (and since opinions are
binary, ¬op(i, p) has to be read “agent i’s opinion is that p is not true”) and vis(i, p)
to be read as “agent i’s opinion about p is shown”. We can also define the temporal
operators ‘eventually’ (♦) and ‘henceforth’ () as ♦ϕ = >Uϕ and ϕ = ¬♦¬ϕ.
The interpretation of LLTL–I-formulas relative to histories is defined as follows:
Definition 7.10. Let H be a history, let ϕ be a formula of LLTL–I and let k, k′, k′′ ∈ N.
Then:
H, k |= op(i, p) ⇔ HBi,k(p) = 1
H, k |= vis(i, p) ⇔ HVi,k(p) = 1
H, k |= ¬ϕ ⇔ H, k 6|= ϕ
H, k |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ⇔ H, k |= ϕ1 and H, k |= ϕ2
H, k |=©ϕ ⇔ H, k + 1 |= ϕ
H, k |= ϕ1U ϕ2 ⇔ ∃k′ : (k ≤ k′ and H, k′ |= ϕ2 and
∀k′′ : if k ≤ k′′ < k′ then H, k′′ |= ϕ1)
Formulas of LLTL–I will be used to express agents’ goals on the iterative diffusion
process. Since individuals do not have any influence on the initial state of the history,
we will consider only goals of the form ©ϕ and ϕUψ, for any ϕ and ψ in LLTL–I,
which we denote as goal formulas.
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For some subset of agents C ⊆ N and some issues J ⊆ I consider the following
goals on consensus and influence in situations of opinion diffusion:
cons(C, J) := ♦(pcons(C, J) ∨ ncons(C, J))
influ(i, C, J) := ♦
∧
p∈J
(
(op(i, p)→©pcons(C, p))
∧(¬op(i, p)→©ncons(C, p)))
where:
pcons(C, J) :=
∧
i∈C
∧
p∈J
op(i, p)
ncons(C, J) :=
∧
i∈C
∧
p∈J
¬op(i, p).
Intuitively, an agent holding the cons(C, J) goal wants at some point in the his-
tory to reach a stable consensus either for or against the issues in J with the agents
in C. The influ(i, C, J) goal expresses instead the idea that agent i wants to eventu-
ally gain a stable influence over the people in C about the issues in J (i.e., they will
always hold her opinion at the next step).
7.2 Influence Games
We are now ready to combine all concepts introduced in the previous sections to
give the definition of an influence game:
Definition 7.11. An influence game is a tuple IG = (N, I , E, Fi, S0,γ1, . . . ,γn) where
N, I , E and S0 are, respectively, a set of agents, a set of issues, an influence network,
and an initial state, Fi for i ∈ N is an aggregation procedure, and γi is agent i’s goal.
For the sake of simplicity, in the remainder we will consider that all agents use
the unanimous aggregation procedure of Definition 7.7.
In Section 7.2.1 we introduce the strategies that agents use in order to attain their
goals, and in Section 7.2.2 we give the definitions of some solution concepts for the
games of influence. The strategies and solution concepts we introduce here are com-
mon notions in game theory (see, e.g., the book by Gibbons, 1992), adapted to the
context of agents having goals inducing dichotomous preferences.
7.2.1 Strategies
The individual strategies our agents will used are defined on states and are called
memory-less, as the agent only consider the current state of the world to decide her
next move:
Definition 7.12. A memory-less strategy for player i is a function Qi : S → A that
associates an action to every state.
A strategy profile is a tuple Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn). For notational convenience, we
also use Q to denote the function Q : S −→ An such that Q(S) = a if and only if
Qi(S) = ai, for all S ∈ S and i ∈ N. As the following definition highlights, every
strategy profile induces a history if combined with an initial state:
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Definition 7.13. Let S0 be an initial state and let Q be a strategy profile. The induced
history HS0,Q ∈ H is defined as follows:
H0(S0,Q) = S0
Hn+1(S0,Q) = succ(Sn,Q(Sn)) for all n ∈N
It is important to observe that we study influence games as repeated games of
complete information. The hide action can thus be interpreted in our model as “not
exercising one’s own influence", without any epistemic interpretation, and the reveal
action as “persuade".
7.2.2 Solution Concepts
We start by defining the solution concept of winning strategy. Intuitively, Qi is a
winning strategy for player i if and only if by playing this strategy she will achieve
her goal no matter what the other players do.
Definition 7.14. Let IG be an influence game and let Qi be a strategy for player i. We
say that Qi is a winning strategy for player i in state S0 if
HS0,(Qi ,Q−i) |= γi
for all profiles Q−i of strategies of players other than i.
Example 7.3. Let Ann, Bob and Jesse be three agents and suppose that BAnn(p) = 1,
BBob(p) = 0, BJesse(p) = 0 for p ∈ I . Their influence network is as follows:
Ann
Bob
Jesse
Suppose Ann’s goal is ♦op(Jesse, p). Her winning memory-less strategy is to play
reveal(p) in all states. Bob will be influenced to believe p at the second stage in the
history and similarly for Jesse at the third stage, since her influencers are unanimous
even if Bob plays hide(p).
As we will see in Section 7.3.1, the concept of winning strategy is rather strong
in our setting. We then define the less demanding notion of weak dominance:
Definition 7.15. Let IG be an influence game and Qi a strategy for player i. We say
that Qi is a weakly dominant strategy for player i and initial state S0 if and only if for
all profiles Q−i of strategies of players other than i and for all strategies Q′i we have:
HS0,(Q′i ,Q−i) |= γi ⇒ HS0,(Qi ,Q−i) |= γi
Example 7.4. Suppose that in Example 7.3 Ann thinks p, but does not influence Jesse
any longer. Here, Ann does not have a winning strategy: if neither Bob nor Jesse
believe p, it is sufficient for Bob to play hide(p) to make sure that Ann will never
satisfy her goal. However, playing action reveal(p) is weakly dominant for Ann.
Finally, we introduce the concept of Nash equilibrium for influence games:
Definition 7.16. Let IG be an influence game and Q a strategy profile. We say that Q
is a Nash equilibrium for initial state S0 if and only if for all i ∈ N and for all Q′i ∈ Qi:
HS0,(Qi ,Q−i) |= γi or HS0,(Q′i ,Q−i) 6|= γi.
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Results on the computational problems of membership, existence and unique-
ness of Nash equilibria will be described in Section 7.3.2.
7.3 Game-Theoretic and Computational Results
In this section we will present game-theoretic and computational results for influ-
ence games. In Section 7.3.1 we study the interplay between network structure and
existence of solutions concepts for certain types of goals. Then, in Section 7.3.2 we
summarize some results concerning the computational complexity of checking the
presence of winning strategies or Nash equilibria in influence games.
7.3.1 Influence Network and Solution Concepts
In this section we show how a certain type of network may or may not ensure the
existence of a certain solution concept given the goals of the agents. Our first result
tells us that in a network without cycles of influence, if an agent wants to achieve
the consensus goal then she has a winning strategy to do so.
Proposition 7.1. If E is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) such that |Inf (i)| ≤ 1 for all
agents i ∈ N, and if agent a has goal γa := cons(Ca, J) where J ⊆ I and Ca := {k ∈
N | a ∈ Inf (k)} ∪ {a}, then agent a has a winning strategy.
Proof. Consider a DAG E and an agent a with goal γa. Let Qa be the strategy as-
sociating to every state S action reveal(J). We want to show that HS0,(Qa,Q−a) |= γa
holds for all S0 and Q−a. Consider the position of agent a in the graph for arbitrary
S0. In case there is no agent b such that a ∈ Inf (b), the goal reduces to cons({a}, J)
which is always trivially satisfied. In case Inf (a) = ∅, by playing reveal(J) in S0 and
since every agent uses the unanimous aggregation rule, at stage 1 all child nodes of
a will update their beliefs on J by copying a’s opinion (she is their only influencer).
Moreover, they can’t change their opinions on J later on in the history.
On the other hand, suppose there is some agent b such that a ∈ Inf (b) and some
agent c ∈ Inf (a). By assumption on E we thus have that Inf (a) = {c} and Inf (b) =
{a}. Hence, either at some point k in the history all ancestors of a will have reached
consensus, such that by playing reveal(J) from point k + 1 onwards the consensus
among a and her child nodes will be maintained, or there is no such k. Since there
is a unique path linking a to one of the source nodes of E, if her ancestors always
disagree in the history it means that there is some agent among them who has a
different opinion and who will never play reveal(J). Therefore, the opinion of a will
nonetheless be stable and γa will be attained.
The assumption of acyclicity in the above result rules out the situation where all
nodes in a cycle play reveal(J) and they start in S0 by having alternating positive and
negative opinions on the issues in J. Moreover, having at most one influencer per
agent ensures each agent to have full control over their child nodes.
Proposition 7.1 also implies that for γa := ♦(pcons(Ca, J) ∨ ncons(Ca, J)) the
same result holds. In fact, since eventually a will reach a stable consensus with
her child nodes, it is always true that we can find some later point in the history
where consensus holds. In general, however, Proposition 7.1 suggests that winning
strategies are a strong solution concept, and the type of goals which can be ensured
have a narrow scope.
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If we focus on the less demanding concept of weak dominance, we may intu-
itively think that a strategy associating action reveal(J) to all states is weakly dom-
inant for an agent a having goal γa := influ(a, C, J) for C ⊆ N, regardless of the
network E or the initial state S0. In fact, all agents use the monotonic aggregation
rule FUi . Yet, we show in the following example that to satisfy goals of type γa as
described, an agent could sometimes benefit from hiding her opinion.
Example 7.5. For four agents N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and one issue I = {p} consider the
network E = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4)}. Suppose agent 1 and 2 associate action reveal(p)
to all states, and agent 3 associates action hide(p) only to the states where 1, 2 and 3
agree on p. Let the goal of agent 2 be γ2 = influ(2, {4}, {p}). Consider the history
below for these strategies, where goal γ2 is not attained (we only represent B):
(0101)
H0
(0010)
H1
(0001)
H2
a0 a1
From state H2 onward, given the strategies of the agents, the profile of opinions
B = (0001) won’t change. On the other hand, consider a strategy for agent 2 iden-
tical to the previous one, but for the fact that it associates to state H0 action hide(p).
This is what would happen:
(0101)
H0
(0000)
H1
a0
From state H1 onwards, given the strategies of the agents, the profile of opinions
won’t change. Thus, we found a network, an initial state H0, and strategies for the
other agents, such that agent 2 can be better off by hiding her opinion on p to satisfy
her influence goal γ2.
We can now see an easy example of how the network structure and the agents’
goals can yield a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 7.2. Let E be a cycle for N = {1, 2}. If γ1 = γ2 = cons(N, J), where
J ⊆ I , then there exists a Nash equilibrium for any initial state S0.
Proof. To attain their goal the agents must coordinate on the issues in J on which they
disagree in S0. In fact, in case at some stage k of the history they both play hide(p)
for p ∈ J their private opinion would stay the same at stage k + 1. If they both play
reveal(p), at the next stage they would just swap their opinions on p (since they are
each other’s only influencers and they both use the unanimous rule). Hence, agent
1 has to play reveal(p) whenever the other agent is playing hide(p) so that at the
next stage in the history he will have copied her opinion, while she would have not
changed hers — and similarly if the other agent is playing reveal(p).
Consider thus an arbitrary strategy Q1 for agent 1 and an initial state S0. Con-
struct now strategy Q2 for agent 2 associating action reveal(JS) to all states where
strategy Q1 associates action hide(JS) for JS = {p ∈ J | b1p = 1 − b2p in S}, and
viceversa for reveal(JS). By the above reasoning, the strategy profile Q = (Q1, Q2)
generates a history that satisfies both γ1 and γ2, and therefore is a Nash equilibrium.
The same construction can be done for an arbitrary strategy of agent 2.
The results in this section shed light on how the different components of an influ-
ence game (i.e., the network, the strategies and the goals) interact with one another.
7.4. Conclusions 87
In particular, we have seen in Proposition 7.1 how an agent can achieve her consen-
sus goal over the people she influences given that the influence network she belongs
to is a directed acyclic graph. We also have a positive result for the consensus goal in
case two agents mutually influence one another, as Proposition 7.2 tells us that there
is a Nash equilibrium no matter the initial state.
The most interesting result is perhaps the one illustrated by Example 7.5. In fact,
even though the model of influence given by influence games is pretty simple, its
dynamic is non-trivial: an agent can sometimes benefit from not using her influence
power in order to attain her influence goal.
7.3.2 Computational Complexity
We briefly present some preliminary complexity results that have been obtained for
influence games and Nash equilibria, leaving a more detailed analysis for future
work. There are three standard computational problems to study for games and the
Nash equilibrium solution concept. The first one asks, given an influence game and a
strategy profile, whether the profile is a Nash equilibrium of the game (membership).
The second one asks, given an influence game, if there is a Nash equilibrium for the
game (existence). Finally, the third one asks, given an influence game, if there is a
unique Nash equilibrium for the game (uniqueness).
For memory-less strategies, the three problems are in PSPACE. The result is ob-
tained by providing a translation of memory-less strategies, the unanimous aggre-
gation function and of the opinion diffusion process as formulas of the logic LTL–I.
Then, the problem is reduced to validity checking for LTL, which is in PSPACE. Ad-
ditional details and proofs can be found in the paper by Grandi et al. (2017).1
We will see again influence games in Chapter 8, where we will study the compu-
tational problem of checking, given a specific game and an agent, if the agent has a
winning strategy in that game (see Proposition 8.2).
7.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we extended a model of opinion diffusion on networks by Grandi
et al. (2015) with a strategic component modeling agents who can choose to use or
not their influence power. The diffusion of opinions is an important process to study,
especially if these are linked to some future collective decision agents have to take
(such as the ones of Chapter 3). We defined influence games, a class of iterated games
where agents have goals expressed in LTL. Our results on the interaction between
the type of goals, the network structure and the game-theoretic solution concepts
showed that agents were greatly empowered by these basic actions. Interestingly,
for the influence goal and the unanimous aggregation rule, a strategy always using
an agent’s influence power is not weakly dominant. From a computational point
of view, the problems of checking membership, existence and uniqueness of a Nash
equilibrium in influence games are all in PSPACE. In line with the work of Chapter 6,
we could enrich the work presented here by adding actions for the agents to lie about
their private opinions. This would give them even more sophisticated strategies
to attain their goals. Moreover, we could use different aggregation procedures to
update the opinions of the agents.
1The paper also studies the complexity problems for agents having perfect-recall strategies (i.e.,
where agents choose an action based on the history up to that stage), which we did not touch here
but are a standard notion for iterated games.
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Chapter 8
Shared Control in Concurrent
Game Structures
In Chapter 5 we have seen the definition of Boolean games as a strategic model of
agents with propositional goals having exclusive control over variables. Boolean
games have also been generalized to their iterated version (Gutierrez et al., 2015,
2013), where the agents’ goals are formulas of Linear Temporal Logic LTL, and an
agent’s strategy determines an assignment to the variables she controls for every
round of the game. Intuitively, an iterated Boolean game would be a situation like
the one of Example 5.1, with the sole difference that the potluck now is a recurring
event and thus the three agents can have goals concerning the future. In Chapter 7
we have seen another example of an iterated game, i.e., influence games, where
agents holding goals in LTL influence each other about opinions over issues.
In order to reason about such iterated games we can use Alternating-time Tem-
poral Logic ATL∗ (introduced in Section 5.1) to express, for instance, the fact that an
agent has a winning strategy to make her goal true. Formulas of ATL∗ can be in-
terpreted over the Concurrent Game Structures (CGS) of Definition 5.1, but observe
how there the actions and the transition functions are left completely general. Be-
lardinelli and Herzig (2016) defined a particular subclass of CGS in order to model
situations as the ones presented in Example 5.1, where the control over propositional
variables is exclusive (CGS-EPC): their definition will be given in Section 8.1.
In this chapter we study models in which we relax the assumption that propo-
sitional control is exclusive: consider for instance Example 3.1, where the control
over the variables is shared among the agents and no single agent can unilaterally
decide the truth value of some variable. We thus introduce Concurrent Game Struc-
tures with Shared Propositional Control (CGS-SPC) and show their relationship with
different classes of games studied in literature, including (variations of) iterated
Boolean games. The main result will be that verification of ATL∗ formulas on CGS-
SPC can be reduced to verification in CGS-EPC, via a polynomial translation of a
CGS-SPC into a CGS-EPC by means of a dummy agent who controls the value of the
shared variables and simulates the transition function.
8.1 Framework
In this section we present two classes of concurrent game structures with propo-
sitional control, used for the interpretation of logics for individual and collective
strategies introduced in Chapter 5.
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The concurrent game structures with exclusive propositional control (CGS-EPC) are
formally defined by Belardinelli and Herzig (2016) as:1
Definition 8.1. A concurrent game structure with exclusive propositional control is a tuple
G = 〈N,Φ1, . . . , Φn, S, d, τ〉, where:
• N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents;
• Φ = Φ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Φn is a set of propositional variables partitioned in n disjoint
subsets, one for each agent;
• S = 2Φ is the set of states, corresponding to all valuations over Φ;
• d : N × S → (2A \∅), for A = 2Φ, is the protocol function, with d(i, s) ⊆ Ai for
Ai = 2Φi ;
• τ : S×An → S is the transition function such that τ(s, α1, . . . , αn) = ⋃i∈N αi.
Intuitively, a CGS-EPC describes the interactions of a group N of agents, each
one of them controlling (exclusively) a set Φi ⊆ Φ of propositional atoms. The state
of the CGS is an interpretation of the atoms in Φ. In each such state the protocol
function returns which actions an agent can execute.
The intuitive meaning of action αi ∈ d(i, s) is “assign true to all atoms in αi, and
false to all atoms in Φi \ αi”. We introduce the idles action as {p ∈ Φi | s(p) = 1}, for
every i ∈ N, s ∈ S. With an abuse of notation we write d(i, s) = α whenever d(i, s)
is a singleton {α}.
Each state s ∈ S can be equivalently seen as a function s : Φ → {0, 1} returning
the truth value of a propositional variable in s, so that s(p) = 1 iff p ∈ s. Given
α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ An, we equally see each αi ⊆ Φi as a function αi : Φi → {0, 1}
returning the choice of agent i for p under action α.
We now generalize concurrent game structures for propositional control by re-
laxing the exclusivity requirement on the control of propositional variables. We thus
introduce concurrent game structures with shared propositional control CGS-SPC:
Definition 8.2. A concurrent game structure with shared propositional control is a tuple
G = 〈N,Φ0, . . . ,Φn, S, d, τ〉 such that:
• N, S, and d are defined as in Definition 8.1 with A = 2Φ\Φ0 ;
• Φ = Φ0 ∪Φ1 ∪ · · · ∪Φn is a set of propositional variables, where Φ0 ∪Φ1 ∪ · · · ∪
Φn is not necessarily a partition and Φ0 = Φ \ (Φ1 ∪ · · · ∪Φn);
• τ : S×An → S is the transition function.
In CGS-SPC the same atom can be controlled by multiple agents, and propo-
sitional control is not exhaustive. Additionally, the actions in A do not take into
account propositional variables in Φ0 because they are not controlled by anyone
(though their truth value might change according to the transition function). The
transition function combines the various actions and produces a consistent succes-
sor state according to some rule.2 Simple examples of such rules include introducing
a threshold mp ∈ N for every variable p, thus setting p ∈ τ(s, α) if and only if the
1More precisely, the CGS-EPC we consider here correspond to the weak version defined by Belar-
dinelli and Herzig (2016), as opposed to a strong version where d(i, s) = Ai for all i ∈ N and s ∈ S.
2The definition of τ as an arbitrary function is needed to represent complex aggregation procedures
such as those used in the games described in Section 8.2.2.
8.2. Examples of CGS in Iterated Games 91
number of agents i with p ∈ αi is greater than mp: these rules are analogous to the
TrSh rules introduced in Section 3.1.2.
A CGS-EPC can be seen as a special case of CGS-SPC in which every atom is con-
trolled by exactly one agent, and therefore {Φ0, . . . ,Φn} is a partition of Φ. More-
over, τ is given in a specific form as per Definition 8.1.
8.2 Examples of CGS in Iterated Games
In order to illustrate the concepts introduced in Section 8.1 we present three exam-
ples of how to use CGS-SPC to model iterated games, i.e., iterated boolean games
(Gutierrez et al., 2015), influence games (Grandi et al., 2017), and aggregation games
(Grandi et al., 2019). We then relate the satisfiability of a certain ATL∗ formula on a
CGS-SPC to an agent having a winning strategy for her goal in the game.
8.2.1 Iterated Boolean Games
An iterated Boolean game is a tuple 〈G,γ1, . . . ,γn〉 such that (i) G is a CGS-EPC with a
trivial protocol (i.e., for every i ∈ N, s ∈ S, d(i, s) = Ai); and (ii) for every i ∈ N, the
goal γi is an LTL-formula.
We can generalize the above to iterated Boolean games with shared control as follows:
Definition 8.3. An iterated Boolean game with shared control is a tuple 〈G,γ1, . . . ,γn〉
where:
(i) G is a CGS-SPC;
(ii) for every i ∈ N, the goal γi is an LTL-formula.
Just like CGS-SPC generalize CGS-EPC, iterated Boolean games with shared con-
trol generalize standard iterated Boolean games. For both types of control (exclusive
or shared) we can thus link the existence of a winning strategy for an agent in an
iterated Boolean game (with exclusive or shared control, respectively) to the model-
checking problem of a simple ATL∗ formula, as expressed in the following straight-
forward proposition:
Proposition 8.1. An agent i in an iterated Boolean game has a winning strategy for
goal γi and state s if and only if formula 〈〈{i}〉〉γi is satisfied in (G,s).
8.2.2 Influence Games
We associate here to an influence game IG = 〈N,Φ, E, S0, {Fi,Inf(i)}i∈N , {γi}i∈N〉 as
per Definition 7.11 a CGS-SPC G ′ = 〈N′,Φ′0, . . . ,Φ′n, S′, d′, τ′〉 by letting N′ = N;
Φ′0 = {op(i, p) | i ∈ N, p ∈ Φ}; Φ′i = {vis(i, p) | p ∈ Φ} for i ∈ N′; S′ = 2Φ
′
;
d′(i, s′) = 2Φ′i for s′ ∈ S′; and finally for state s′ ∈ S′ and action α′ we let:
τ′(s′, α′)(ϕ) =
{
α′i(vis(i, p)) if ϕ = vis(i, p)
Fi,Inf(i)(~a,~b)|p if ϕ = op(i, p)
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where vectors ~a = (a1, . . . , a|Φ|) and ~b = (b1, . . . , b|Φ|) are defined as follows, for
k ∈ Inf(i):
ap =
{
1 if op(i, p) ∈ s′
0 otherwise
bp =

1 if αk(vis(k, p)) = 1 and op(k, p) ∈ s′
0 if αk(vis(k, p)) = 1 and op(k, p) 6∈ s′
? if αk(vis(k, p)) = 0
Vector~a represents the opinion of agent i over the issues at state s′, while vector~b
represents the opinions of i’s influencers over the issues, in case they are using their
influence power. In particular, ‘?’ indicates that the influencers of i in Inf(i) are not
using their influence power.
Proposition 8.2. Agent i in influence game IG has a winning strategy for goal γi and
state S0 if and only if formula 〈〈{i}〉〉γi is satisfied in the associated CGS-SPC and
state s′ corresponding to S0.
Proof. Let IG be an influence game and let G ′ be the CGS-SPC associated to it. Con-
sider now an arbitrary agent i and suppose that i has a winning strategy in IG for
her goal γi in S0. A memory-less strategy σi for agent i in an influence game maps
to each state actions of type (reveal(J), hide(J′)), where J, J′ ⊆ Φ and J ∩ J′ = ∅. For
any state s in IG, consisting of opinions and visibilities, consider the state s′ in G ′
where Bi(p) = 1 if and only if op(i, p) ∈ s′ and Vi(p) = 1 if and only if vis(i, p) ∈ s′.
We now construct the following strategy for G ′:
σ′i (s
′) = {vis(i, p) | p ∈ J for σi(s) = (reveal(J), hide(J′))}
By the semantics of the 〈〈{i}〉〉 operator provided in Section 5.1, and by the definition
of winning strategy, the statement follows easily from our construction of G ′.
The above translation sheds light over the control structure of the variables of
type op(i, p). In fact, we can now see that op(i, p) ∈ Φ′0 for all i ∈ N and p ∈ Φ, i.e.,
opinions are not controlled directly by agents.
8.2.3 Aggregation Games
Individuals facing a collective decision have goals on the outcome of the voting pro-
cess, outcome that is jointly controlled by all individuals in the group. For instance,
a vote on a single binary issue using the majority rule corresponds to a game with a
single variable controlled by all individuals, the majority rule playing the role of the
transition function.
Similar situations have been modelled as one-shot games called aggregation games
(Grandi et al., 2019), and we here define them for iterated decision processes:
Definition 8.4. An iterated aggregation game is a tuple AG = 〈N,Φ, F,γ1, . . . ,γn〉
where:
• N is a set of agents;
• Φ = {p1, . . . , pm} are variables representing issues;
• F : {0, 1}N×Φ → {0, 1} is an aggregation function, i.e., a Boolean function asso-
ciating a collective decision to the opinions of the agents on the issues;
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• γi for i ∈ N is an individual goal for each agent, i.e., a LTL formula over Φ.
Individuals at each stage of an aggregation game only have information about
the current valuation of variables in Φ, resulting from the aggregation of their indi-
vidual opinions. Analogously to Proposition 8.2, we can obtain the following result:
Proposition 8.3. Agent i in AG has a winning strategy for goal γi in s if and only if
formula 〈〈{i}〉〉γi is satisfied in the associated CGS-SPC in the corresponding state s′.
Proof. From an iterated aggregation game AG = 〈N,Φ, F,γ1, . . . ,γn〉, construct a
CGS-SPC G ′ = 〈N′,Φ′, S′, d′, τ′〉 as follows. Let N′ = N; Φ′i = Φ for all i = 1, . . . , n;
and Φ′0 = ∅. Hence, each agent controls all variables. Let the set of actions available
to each player be d′(i, s) = 2Φ′ for all i and s, and the transition function τ′ be such
that τ′(s, α1, . . . , αn) = F(α1, . . . , αn). The statement then follows easily.
An example of an iterated aggregation game is the setting of iterative voting,
where individuals hold preferences about a set of candidates and iteratively change
the result of the election in their favor until a converging state is reached.
8.3 Relationship between Exclusive and Shared CGS
We prove here our main result, namely that the shared control of a CGS-SPC can
be simulated in a CGS-EPC having exclusive control. In particular, any formula in
ATL∗ satisfied in some CGS-SPC can be translated in polynomial time into an ATL∗-
formula satisfied in a CGS-EPC. To do so, we introduce a dummy agent to simulate
the aggregation function and we make use of an additional turn-taking atom which
allows us to distinguish the states where the agents choose their actions from those
in which the aggregation process takes place. Agents have memory-less strategies.
We begin by inductively defining a translation function tr within ATL∗. Intu-
itively, tr translates every ATL∗-formula χ into a formula tr(χ) having roughly the
same meaning, but where the one-step “next” operator is doubled:
tr(p) = p
tr(¬χ) = ¬tr(χ)
tr(χ ∨ χ′) = tr(χ) ∨ tr(χ′)
tr(©χ) = ©© tr(χ)
tr(χUχ′) = tr(χ)U tr(χ′)
tr(〈〈C〉〉χ) = 〈〈C〉〉tr(χ)
where p ∈ Φ, C ⊆ N, and χ, χ′ are either state- or path-formulas. The translation
is easily seen to be polynomial.
We then map a given CGS-SPC to a CGS-EPC:
Definition 8.5. Let G = 〈N,Φ0, . . . ,Φn, S, d, τ〉 be a CGS-SPC. The CGS-EPC corre-
sponding to G is G ′ = 〈N′,Φ′1, . . . , Φ′n, S′, d′, τ′〉 where:
• N′ = N ∪ {∗};
• Φ′ = Φ ∪ {turn} ∪ {cip | i ∈ N and p ∈ Φi} and Φ′ is partitioned as follows,
for agents in N′:
Φ′i = {cip ∈ Φ′ | p ∈ Φi}
Φ′∗ = {turn} ∪Φ
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• S′ = 2Φ′ . For every s′ ∈ S′, let s = (s′ ∩Φ) ∈ S be the restriction of s′ on Φ;
• d′ is defined according to the truth value of turn in s′. Specifically, given αi ∈
Ai, let α′i = {cip ∈ Φ′i | p ∈ αi} ∈ A′i. Then, for i ∈ N we let:
d′(i, s′) =
{
{α′i ∈ A′i | αi ∈ d(i, s)} if s′(turn) = 0
∅ if s′(turn) = 1
For agent * we define:
d′(∗, s′) =
{
+turn if s′(turn) = 0
τ(s, α), for αi(p) = s′(cip) if s′(turn) = 1
where +turn = idles ∪ {turn}.
• τ′ is defined as per Definition 8.1, i.e., τ′(s′, α′) = ⋃i∈N′ α′i.
Intuitively, in the CGS-EPC G ′ every agent i ∈ N controls local copies cip of atoms
p ∈ Φ. The aggregation function τ in G is mimicked by the dummy agent ∗, whose
role is to observe the values of the various cip, then perform an action to aggregate
them and set the value of p accordingly. Observe that agent ∗ acts only when the
turn variable is true, in which case all the other agents set all their variables to false,
i.e., they all play ∅. This is to ensure the correspondence between memory-less
strategies of G and G ′, as shown in Lemma 8.2.
The size of game G ′ is polynomial in the size of G, and G ′ can be constructed in
polynomial time from G. To see this, observe that an upper bound on the number of
variables is N×Φ. While we can associate to each state s′ ∈ S′ a state s = s′ ∩Φ in
S, when given a state s ∈ S there are multiple states s′ that agree with s on Φ. The
purpose of the next definition is to designate one such state as the canonical one:
Definition 8.6. For every s ∈ S, we define the canonical state s′? = {s′ ∈ S′ | s′ ∩Φ =
s and s(p) = 0 for p 6∈ Φ}.
Observe that, in particular, in all canonical states atom turn is false. The follow-
ing example illustrates this concept:
Example 8.1. Consider Φ = {p, q} and N = {1, 2}. Let then Φ1 = {p} and Φ2 =
{p, q}. We thus have that Φ′ = {p, q, c1p, c2p, c2q, turn}. If s = {p}, we have for
instance that s′ ∩Φ = s for s′ = {p, c1p}. On the other hand, s′? = {p}.
We now define a correspondence between paths of G and G ′. For notational con-
venience, we indicate with λ[k]|Φ = λ[k]∩Φ, the restriction of state λ[k] to variables
in Φ. Given a path λ′ of G ′, consider the unique infinite sequence of states λ associ-
ated to λ′ defined as follows:
λ[k] = λ′[2k]|Φ = λ′[2k+1]|Φ for all k ∈N. (†)
On the other hand, there are multiple sequences λ′ that can be associated with a
path λ, so that (†) holds true. In fact, we only know how the variables in Φ behave,
while the truth values of the other variables can vary. We now use condition (†) to
characterize the paths of G and G ′ that can be associated:
Lemma 8.1. Given a CGS-SPC G and the corresponding CGS-EPC G ′, the following
is the case:
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λ[0]
λ′[0] λ′[1]
λ[1]
λ′[2] λ′[3]
λ[2]
λ′[4] λ′[5]
. . .
. . .
(α1 . . . αn)[0]
α′1 . . . α′n
+turn
∅
τ(λ′[1]|Φ, α)
(β1 . . . βn)[1]
β′1 . . . β′n
+turn
∅
τ(λ′[3]|Φ, β)
(δ1 . . . δn)[2]
δ′1 . . . δ′n
+turn
∅
τ(λ′[5]|Φ, δ)
FIGURE 8.1: A path λ in a CGS-SPC G and its associated path λ′ in a
CGS-EPC G ′.
1. for all paths λ′ of G ′, sequence λ satisfying condition (†) is a path of G;
2. for all paths λ of G, for all sequences λ′ satisfying (†), λ′ is a path of G ′ if and
only if for all k there exists a G-action α[k] such that λ[k] α[k]−−→ λ[k+1] and states
λ′[2k+1] and λ′[2k+2] can be obtained from state λ′[2k] by performing actions
(α′1, . . . , α
′
n, +turn) and then (∅1, . . . ,∅n, τ(λ′[2k+1]|Φ, α)).
Proof. We first prove (1) by showing that λ is a path of G, i.e., that for every k there is
an action α that leads from λ[k] to λ[k+1]. Suppose that λ′[2k]
α′[2k]−−−→ λ′[2k+1] α
′[2k+1]−−−−→
λ′[2(k+1)] for action α′[2k] = (α′1, . . . , α
′
n,+turn) and action α′[2k+1] = (∅1, . . . ,∅n,
τ(λ′[2k+1]|Φ, α)). Then, we observe that we can move from state λ[k] = λ′[2k]|Φ =
λ′[2k+1]|Φ to λ[k+1] = λ′[2k+2]|Φ by performing action (α1, . . . , αn) such that αi =
{p ∈ Φ | cip ∈ α′i} for every i ∈ N.
As for (2), the right-to-left direction is clear. For the left-to-right direction, let λ′
be a path associated to λ. From (†) we know that for any k we have that λ′[2k]|Φ =
λ[k] and λ′[2k+2]|Φ = λ[k+1]. Now by Definition 8.5, the only actions available to
the players at λ′[2k] are of the form (α′1, . . . , α
′
n,+turn), and the only action available
at λ′[2k+1] is (∅1, . . . ,∅n, τ(λ′[2k+1]|Φ, α)). We can thus obtain the desired result
by considering action α[k] = (α1, . . . , αn), where αi = {p ∈ Φi | cip ∈ α′i} for each
i ∈ N, and by observing that by (†) we have τ(λ′[2k + 1]|Φ, α) = τ(λ[k], α).
Figure 8.1 illustrates the two paths λ and λ′ in the proof of Lemma 8.1. The
second part of the lemma characterizes the set of G ′-paths λ′ associated to a G-path
λ: for any sequence of G-actions that can generate path λ, we can construct a distinct
G ′-path λ′ that corresponds to λ, where the sequence of actions can be reconstructed
by reading the values of the variables in Φ′i in odd states λ[2k + 1].
From this set of G ′-paths λ′ we can specify a subset of canonical paths as follows:
Definition 8.7. For a path λ of G, a canonical associated path λ′? of G ′ is any path λ′
such that (†) holds and λ′[0] = λ[0]′?.
That is, a canonical path λ′ associated to λ starts from the canonical state λ[0]′? asso-
ciated to λ[0]. The following example clarifies the concepts just introduced:
Example 8.2. Consider a CGS-SPC G with N = {1, 2} and Φ = {p, q} such that
Φ1 = {p} and Φ2 = {p, q}. Let d(i, s) = 2Φi for all i ∈ N and s ∈ S, and let
τ(s, α)(p) = 0 if and only if α1(p) = α2(p) = 0, while τ(s, α)(q) = α2(q) for all s ∈ S.
Namely, issue p becomes true if at least one agent makes it true, while issue q follows
the decision of agent 2. Let now λ = s0s1 . . . be a path of G such that s0 = {p} and
s1 = {p, q}. Observe that there are many actions α such that τ(s0, α) = s1: namely,
the one where both agents set p to true, or where just one of them does (and agent 2
sets q to true).
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Construct now the CGS-EPC G ′ as in Definition 8.5 and consider the following
four sequences λ′ = s′0s′1s
′
2 . . . where:
(a) s′0 = {p}, s′1 = {c1p, c2p, c2q, p, turn}, s′2 = {p, q}, . . .
(b) s′0 = {p}, s′1 = {c1p, c2q, p, turn}, s′2 = {p, q}, . . .
(c) s′0 = {p, c1p}, s′1 = {c1p, c2q, p, turn}, s′2 = {p, q}, . . .
(d) s′0 = {p}, s′1 = {c2q, p, turn}, s′2 = {p, q}, . . .
Observe that (a) and (b) are both examples of canonical paths (up to the considered
state), corresponding to two actions that might have led from s0 to s1 in G. On the
other hand, (c) is a non-example while being a path of G ′ satisfying (†), since s′0 is
not canonical. Finally, sequence (d) satisfies (†) but it is not a path of G ′, since it is
not possible to obtain s′2 from s′1.
The next result extends the statement of Lemma 8.1 to paths generated by a spe-
cific strategy. Given a G ′-strategy σ′C and a state s′ ∈ S′, let Π(out(s′,σ′C)) = {λ |
λ′ ∈ out(s′,σ′C)}, i.e., all the “projections” of paths λ′ in out(s′,σ′C) to paths λ in G,
obtained through (†).
Lemma 8.2. Given a CGS-SPC G, the corresponding CGS-EPC G ′ is such that:
1. for every joint strategy σC in G, there exists a strategy σ′C in G ′ such that for
every state s ∈ S we have that Π(out(s′?,σ′C)) = out(s,σC);
2. for every joint strategy σ′C in G ′, there exists a strategy σC in G such that for all
canonical states s′ ∈ S′ we have that Π(out(s′,σ′C)) = out(s′ |Φ,σC).
Proof. We first prove (1). Given strategy σC in G, for i ∈ C define σ′i as follows:
σ′i (s
′) =
{
{cip | p ∈ σi(s) and s = s′ |Φ} if s′(turn) = 0
∅ otherwise
Observe that if s′(turn) = 1 agents in C are obliged to play action ∅ by Definition
8.5, since it is their only available action. By combining all definitions above, we get
that Π(out(s′?,σ′C)) = out(s,σC) for an arbitrary state s ∈ S.
To prove (2) we start from a strategy σ′C in G ′. For any state s ∈ S, define σi(s) =
{p ∈ Φi | cip ∈ σ′i (s′?)}. Note that the assumption in Definition 8.5 that all variables
outside of Φ are put to false at stage 2k+1 in G ′ is crucial here. In fact, without this
assumption we would only be able to prove that Π(out(s′,σ′C)) ⊇ out(s′ |Φ,σC), as
a strategy σ′C may associate a different action to states s
′
1 and s
′
2 that coincide on Φ
and that are realized in a path λ′ ∈ out(s′,σ′C).
By means of Lemma 8.2 we are able to prove the following main result:
Theorem 8.1. Given any CGS-SPC G, the corresponding CGS-EPC G ′ is such that for
all state-formulas ϕ and path-formulas ψ in ATL∗ the following holds:
for all s ∈ S (G, s) |= ϕ iff (G ′, s′?) |= tr(ϕ)
for all λ of G (G,λ) |= ψ iff (G ′,λ′?) |= tr(ψ) for any λ′?.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of formulas ϕ and ψ. The base case
for ϕ = p follows from the fact that s = s′ |Φ for all s′ associated to s, including s′?.
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As to the inductive cases for Boolean connectives, they follow immediately from
the induction hypothesis.
Suppose that ϕ = 〈〈C〉〉ψ. For the left-to-right direction, assume that (G, s) |= ϕ.
By the semantics, for some strategy σC, for all λ ∈ out(s,σC), (G,λ) |= ψ. By
Lemma 8.2.1 we can find a strategy σ′C in G ′ such that Π(out(s′?,σ′C)) = out(s,σC).
By induction hypothesis, we know that for all λ ∈ out(s,σC) we have that (G ′,λ′?) |=
tr(ψ). These two facts combined imply that for all λ′ ∈ out(s′?,σ′C) we have that
(G ′,λ′?) |= tr(ψ), i.e., by the semantics, that (G ′, s′?) |= 〈〈C〉〉tr(ψ), obtaining the
desired result. The right-to-left direction can be proved similarly with Lemma 8.2(2).
Further, if ϕ is a state formula, (G,λ) |= ϕ if and only if (G,λ[0]) |= ϕ, if and only
if by induction hypothesis (G ′,λ[0]′?) |= tr(ϕ), i.e., (G ′,λ′?) |= tr(ϕ).
For ψ = ©ψ1, suppose that (G,λ[1,∞]) |= ψ1. By induction hypothesis, this is
the case if and only if (G ′, (λ[1,∞])′?) |= tr(ψ1). Recall that by (†), we have that
(λ[1,∞])′? = λ′?[2,∞]. This is the case because, when moving from λ to λ′?, we
include an additional state λ′?[1] in which the aggregation takes place. Therefore,
(G ′,λ′?[2,∞]) |= tr(ψ1), that is, (G ′,λ′?) |= ©© tr(ψ1) = tr(ψ). The case for ψ =
ψ1Uψ2 is proved similarly.
As a consequence of Theorem 8.1, if we want to model-check an ATL∗-formula ϕ
at a state s of an CGS-SPC G, we can check its translation tr(ϕ) at the related state
s′? of the associated CGS-EPC G ′. By observing that both the associated game G ′ and
the translation ϕ are polynomial in the size of G and ϕ, we obtain that:
Corollary 8.1. The ATL∗ model-checking problem for CGS-SPC can be reduced to
the ATL∗ model-checking problem for CGS-EPC.
8.4 Computational Complexity
In this section we prove complexity results for the model checking problem of an
ATL∗ (or ATL) formula ϕ on a CGS-SPC.
First, we define the model-checking problem for ATL over CGS-SPC:
MODELCHECK
Input: a CGS-SPC G, a state s ∈ S, and an ATL formula ϕ
Question: Is it the case that (G, s) |= ϕ?
We can then obtain the following result:
Theorem 8.2. Problem MODELCHECK (CGS-SPC and ATL formulas) is ∆p3 -complete.
Proof. For membership, given a pointed CGS-SPC (G, s) and an ATL specification ϕ,
by the translation tr introduced in Section 8.3 and Theorem 8.1 we have that (G, s) |=
ϕ iff (G ′, s′) |= tr(ϕ). Also, we observe that the CGS-EPC G ′ is of size polynomial in
the size of G, and that model checking ATL with respect to CGS-EPC is ∆p3 -complete
(Belardinelli and Herzig, 2016). For hardness, it is sufficient to observe that CGS-EPC
are a subclass of CGS-SPC.
For the verification of ATL∗ we define the following problem:
MODELCHECK∗
Input: a CGS-SPC G, a state s ∈ S, and an ATL∗ formula ϕ
Question: Is it the case that (G, s) |= ϕ?
The model-checking problem for ATL∗ on general concurrent game structures is
2EXPTIME-complete (Alur et al., 2002). We prove the following for CGS-SPC:
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Theorem 8.3. Problem MODELCHECK∗ (CGS-SPC and ATL∗ formulas) is PSPACE-
complete.
Proof. Membership follows from the PSPACE algorithm for ATL∗ on general CGS
(Bulling et al., 2010). As for hardness, we observe that satisfiability of an LTL formula
ϕ can be reduced to the model checking of the ATL∗ formula 〈〈1〉〉ϕ on a CGS-SPC
with a unique agent 1.
In Section 8.2 we showed how some examples of iterated games from the litera-
ture can be modelled as CGS-SPC, and how the problem of determining the existence
of a winning strategy can therefore be reduced to model checking an ATL∗ formula.
We now define and study the problem of checking existence of a winning strategy:
E-WIN(G, i)
Input: a game G, an agent i
Question: Does i have a memory-less winning strategy in G?
As an immediate consequences of Theorem 8.3 we obtain:
Corollary 8.2. E-WIN(G, i) is in PSPACE for G an iterated Boolean game with shared
control.
An analogous result cannot be obtained for influence games and aggregation
games directly. Decision problems in these structures are typically evaluated with
respect to the number of agents and issues, and the size of the CGS-SPC associated
to these games are already exponential in these parameters.
Corollary 8.3. E-WIN(G, i) is in PSPACE in the size of the associated CGS-SPC for G
an influence game.
Corollary 8.3 is in line with previous results in the literature (Grandi et al., 2017).
8.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we introduced a class of concurrent game structures with shared
propositional control (CGS-SPC), which we used to interpret popular logics for strate-
gic reasoning ATL and ATL∗. We have shown that CGS-SPC are general enough to
capture iterated Boolean games and their generalization to shared control, as well as
the influence games presented in Chapter 7 and aggregation games. Our main re-
sult shows that the model-checking problem for CGS-SPC and ATL∗ formulas can be
reduced to the model-checking of ATL∗ formulas over standard CGS with exclusive
control, allowing to establish some computational complexity results for the games
mentioned above.
Even though our main result shows that the generalization to shared control
structures can still be expressed by exclusive control structures, using CGS-SPC al-
lows to model in a natural way complex interactions between agents on the assign-
ment of truth values to propositional variables (as shown by the examples provided
for Boolean games, influence games and aggregation games). Therefore, we have a
way to model and reason about strategic situations of multi-agent decision-making
as the ones at the core of this thesis.
An assumption on our CGS (both with exclusive and shared control) is that
agents have perfect knowledge of the environment they are interacting with. In-
deed, in our construction of Definition 8.5 the dummy agent ∗ is able to mimick the
aggregation function τ as she can observe the values of cip for any other agent i. An
interesting question is whether our reduction of CGS-SPC to CGS-EPC goes through
even when imperfect information is assumed.
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Conclusions
At the incipit of this thesis we told the story of three researchers motivated by in-
dividual goals and preferences who were facing multiple situations of collective
decision-making. In our quest to help them find such a collective choice, we de-
lineated in Section 1.2 two main research questions, that we recall here:
1. How can we design aggregation procedures to help a group of agents having
compactly expressed goals and preferences make a collective choice?
2. How can we model agents with conflicting goals who try to get a better out-
come for themselves by acting strategically?
To conclude this thesis we provide a detailed summary of the main results that
we achieved as an answer to these questions (Section 9.1), as well as some paths for
future research that our contribution has opened (Section 9.2).
9.1 Summary of Contributions
The first three chapters were concerned with answering the first research question,
on the aggregation of compactly represented goals and preferences coming from dif-
ferent agents. In Chapter 2 we presented two languages introduced in the literature,
i.e., propositional logic and CP-nets (conditional preference networks), and pro-
vided a literature review for both. We also compared the preference orderings over
outcomes generated by propositional goals (assuming dichotomous preferences) and
CP-nets, observing that some orderings cannot be expressed by both languages.
In Chapter 3 we introduced the framework of goal-based voting, where agents
express their goals as propositional formulas over binary issues, and they take a col-
lective decision via a voting rule taking the goals as input and returning a set of
interpretations as outcome. We then proceeded to an axiomatic study of our rules,
by introducing properties for goal-based voting and then proving whether our rules
satisfy them or not. Given our objective of helping agents find a collective decision,
the first important axiom that we introduced was that of resoluteness of a rule (de-
clined in a stronger and weaker notion). In this respect, we found the Approval rule
to be inadequate, as it outputs a large set of possible plans whenever each of them is
approved by a few agents only in the profile.
We then turned to issue-wise rules, warranted in particular by the absence of
integrity constraints in our model, and we proposed three different generalizations
of the well-known majority rule (i.e., EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj) all satisfying the
weaker or stronger notion of resoluteness. Nevertheless, Theorem 3.1 exposed the
fact that not all desirable properties can be achieved at the same time (specifically
resoluteness, anonymity and duality) and compromises need to be taken when choos-
ing a rule with respect to its properties. Our main result consisted in an axiomatic
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characterization of TrueMaj, obtained from independence, egalitarianism, neutral-
ity, anonymity, monotonicity, unanimity and duality, thus striking a good balance
among the (jointly achievable) properties of interest.
We then studied the computational complexity of determining the outcome for
our rules, i.e., the WINDET problem. We found that having as input propositional
formulas made the problem much harder than in voting. In particular, the three
majorities EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj were found to be hard for the class PP (Prob-
abilistic Polynomial Time). We however found some positive (tractable) results for
the WINDET problem for our majorities by restricting the language of goals to con-
junctions or disjunctions. This limitation is however still general enough to include
binary aggregation with abstentions and Horn clauses. Finally, we compared the
framework of goal-based voting with judgment aggregation and belief merging,
with respect to properties (i.e., axioms or postulates) of aggregation rules. We found
in particular that our notions of resoluteness conflicted with the (IC2) postulate of
belief merging (Proposition 3.6), but this should not be seen too negatively as de-
pending on the nature of the input (e.g., beliefs or goals) different sets of properties
can be deemed more important by the user.
In Chapter 4 we merged two lines of research in CP-nets by investigating for the
first time the aggregation of incomplete (generalized) CP-nets. Agents were thus
given more flexibility in expressing their preferences (with respect to classical CP-
nets), and they could find a collective decision via the Pareto, maj, max and rank
semantics, which were known in the literature on complete CP-nets. We studied nu-
merous computational problems related to dominance of outcomes in the preference
ordering induced by the aggregation of incomplete CP-nets. For most problems we
got hardness for the class PSPACE from the corresponding single-agent case, often
leading to completeness results. The complexity can thus be seen as inherent to the
studied problems and not given by the switch from one to multiple agents, two ex-
ceptions being the problem of checking if an outcome is non-dominated (jumping
from P to PSPACE) and the problem of checking if it exists a non-dominated out-
come (going from NP to PSPACE).
The second part of this thesis studied problems pertaining to our second research
question, on the strategic behavior of goal-oriented agents. In Chapter 5 we recalled
the definition of (iterated) Boolean games, a class of games where each agent controls
exclusively a subset of the propositional variables and they hold logic-based goals.
We provided the syntax and semantics of the logics LTL and ATL, interpreting them
over Concurrent Game Structures (CGS). We then discussed the related work on
game theory, logic and networks.
In Chapter 6 we considered again our framework of goal-based voting, assum-
ing now that agents may submit untruthful goals if by doing so they can get a better
result for themselves. We focused on the issue-by-issue majority rules EMaj, True-
Maj and 2sMaj, which were found to be manipulable in the general case. This first
negative result lead us to refine our study of manipulation by modulating different
parameters of the problem: we considered agents with goals belonging to restric-
tions of the language (conjunctions, disjunctions, and exclusive disjunctions), agents
with different satisfaction attitudes (optimistic, pessimistic, expected utility maxi-
mizer) and finally agents who were allowed to perform only certain manipulation
strategies (unrestricted, erosion, and dilatation).
Regardless of the agent’s satisfaction attitude, we found all our majoritarian rules
to be strategy-proof for erosion and dilatation when the goals are conjunctions, and
for dilatation (and erosion, for 2sMaj) when the goals are disjunctions. Therefore,
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even though our majoritarian rules are in general subject to manipulation, some in-
stances of strategy-proofness can be recovered by tuning two relevant parameters:
the allowed manipulation strategy and the language of the agents’ goals. From a
computational perspective, our results indicate that checking if an agent can prof-
itably manipulate is as hard as the WINDET problem for majoritarian rules. Hence,
while we can consider it a positive result that a rule is PP-hard to manipulate (in
the worst case), from a practical perspective we would ideally want a rule to be
easy to compute and hard to manipulate — as it is the case, for instance, for the
premise-based procedure in judgment aggregation (Endriss et al., 2012). This leads
to a promising direction for future work: studying the MANIP problem for goals
restrictions for which WINDET is easy (e.g., EMaj and TrueMaj for disjunctions).
In Chapter 7 we defined influence games, a class of iterated games for modeling
rational agents who decide whether to use their influence power in order to attain
their LTL goals. Agents in influence games can thus act strategically by deciding
to influence (or not) their neighbors in the influence network on the issues at stake,
but they cannot lie about their opinions. We studied solution concepts for games
where agents use the unanimous procedure to aggregate their influencers’ opinions
(to update their own). We found that an agent having a consensus goal has a win-
ning strategy when the influence network is a DAG and each agent has at most one
influencer. We also found a Nash equilibrium strategy profile for two agents having
a consensus goal. Against our intuition, always using one’s influence power is not
a weakly dominant strategy to attain the influence goal. Therefore, the addition of
a simple strategic action (i.e., using the influence power or not) to a model of opin-
ion diffusion makes the dynamics of the spread of opinions much more difficult to
capture and it is not straightforward to obtain general results.
In Chapter 8 we generalized the definition of a previously introduced CGS, where
agents have exclusive control over a set of propositional variables, to a CGS where
agents may have shared control over some variables. Our main result proved that
verification of ATL∗ formulas over CGS with shared control can be reduced to ver-
ification of ATL∗ formulas over CGS with exclusive control. We then studied the
computational complexity of model checking ATL∗ formulas over CGS with shared
control, which also allows us to express the problem of checking whether an agent
has a winning strategy for one of the aforementioned iterated games: our results lie
for the most part at the level of the PSPACE complexity class. Hence, while CGS-
SPC offer a natural way to represent known iterated games in the literature where
the control over variables is shared (including influence games), their verification
problem of ATL∗ formulas can still be reduced to structures with exclusive control.
In conclusion, with respect to the first research question we managed to provide
two frameworks the agents can use to aggregate their compactly expressed goals and
preferences (i.e., goal-based voting and mgCP-nets), whose rules satisfy a number
of desirable properties, though the related computational problems are in general
of high complexity and need to be restricted to become tractable. For the second
research question, we found that (i) goal-based majoritarian rules are manipulable
in general, but islands of strategy-proofness can be found under some restrictions
of the setting, (ii) our strategic model of influence generates a complex opinions
dynamics for which general results are hard to obtain, but fixing the type of graph
and goal gives results for common solution concepts, and finally (iii) we understood
the relationship between shared and exclusive control in concurrent game structures.
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9.2 Perspectives and Future Work
In this thesis we achieved numerous results in the field of collective decision-making
with compactly expressed goals and preferences. Nonetheless, there are extensions
of this work that we believe would be worth investigating in the future, many of
which we already mentioned in the respective concluding sections of each chapter.
We list here some additional ideas.
In the first place, we could think about designing a more general framework
which is able to model all the different problems that we studied in this thesis. For
instance, the three researchers in our initial story can use propositional goals to de-
cide about the conference, and generalized CP-nets to decide about the syllabus, but
the aggregation procedures that we defined do not allow them to provide as input
a mix of propositional goals and incomplete CP-nets. This research direction would
go towards the work by Bienvenu et al. (2010) on the “prototypical” preference logic
PL that we mentioned in Section 2.5, giving agents even more flexibility in how they
express their goals and preferences.
We could also extend the aggregation frameworks of goal-based voting and mgCP-
nets by considering that decisions may be recurring (e.g., the syllabus for a course
that is taught every year) or that agents may want to change their vote after they
have seen the current outcome or they have discussed it with their peers. Analo-
gously to what has been done for classical voting (see the recent chapter by Meir,
2017), we could study the iterative versions of goal-based voting and aggregation of
incomplete CP-nets. This would be in line with the recent work by Terzopoulou and
Endriss (2018) who studied an iterative model for judgment aggregation.
Additionally, we could study in more depth possible restrictions over our frame-
works. We have seen that certain classes of propositional goals for some rules give us
tractable results for the winner determination problem or strategy-proofness results.
We could then look for a precise characterization of the restrictions over the lan-
guage which give us bounds for WINDET tractability and strategy-proofness. Anal-
ogously, we could look for restrictions on the precondition of incomplete CP-nets to
make dominance tasks easier to compute than the PSPACE class.
In order to prove that our issue-wise majority rules are manipulable in general,
we provided in the proof of Theorem 6.1 specific profiles for which an agent has
an incentive to manipulate. Since for this kind of results a single counter-example
suffices, it may paint an overly negative picture of the manipulation landscape —
as such manipulable profiles may be rarely occurring in practice. Another direction
for future work would be then to implement voting situations under majoritarian
rules to get some statistics on which percentage of profiles are actually manipulable.
Observe, however, that even checking all possible profiles for just three agents and
issues would give us a total of (22
3 − 1)× (223 − 1)× (223 − 1) = 255× 255× 255 =
16581375 profiles to consider. For each of them we would need to check not only that
there is some agent whose goal is not satisfied in the outcome, but also that they can
actually manipulate the current result by submitting a different goal — accounting
also for the different types of satisfaction for the rule TrueMaj.
A topic that has received increasing attention in recent years is that of expla-
nation in artificial intelligence, i.e., the ability to explain to the (human) users the
behavior and output of algorithms (see, e.g., the paper by Miller, 2019). In the area
of computational social choice in particular, Cailloux and Endriss (2016) proposed
a framework aimed at helping humans choose the “best” voting rule by modeling
arguments for or against them based on the axioms they satisfy. We could pursue
a similar approach for goal-based voting: while the rules that we use are not per se
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difficult to understand (e.g., the three generalizations of majority), they satisfy dif-
ferent axioms that are mutually incompatible and thus a choice needs to be taken
over them by the user, depending on their priorities.
Finally, we could bring together our goal-based voting (or mgCP-nets) frame-
work and the idea of agents connected by a trust network in influence games, into
a framework where the dynamics that is modeled is that of delegation instead of
diffusion. For instance, in goal-based voting we could imagine that an agent who is
not able to form a goal over the issues could instead decide to “+1” the goal of an-
other agent she trusts. In this research direction we can mention the Blue Sky paper
by Brill (2018) on interactive democracy and vote delegation where some ideas and
potential issues on the topic are presented.
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